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Abstract

The purpose of this research is to establish a conceptual methodological
framework that will facilitate effective cyber damage and mission impact assessment and
reporting following a cyber-based information incidents. Joint and service guidance
requires mission impact reporting, but current efforts to implement such reporting have
proven ineffective. This research seeks to understand the impediments existing in the
current implementation and to propose an improved methodology. The research
employed a hybrid historical analysis and case study methodology for data collection
through extensive literature review, examination of existing case study research and
interviews with Air Force members and civilian personnel employed as experts in cyber
damage and mission impact assessment of Air Force networks. Nine respondents
provided valuable first hand information about the current implementation cyber damage
and mission impact assessment. This research identified several critical impediments to
current mission impact assessment efforts on Air Force networks. Based upon these
findings, a proposal is made for a new operations-focused defensive cyber damage and
mission impact methodology. The methodology will address the critical impediments
identified and will result in profound benefits in other areas of cyber asset protection.
Recommendations for conceptual implementation and operationalization are presented
and related future research topics are discussed.
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TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEFENSIVE CYBER DAMAGE AND
MISSION IMPACT METHODOLOGY

I. Introduction
“Success in the twenty-first century battlespace will rely more and more on our
ability to use and protect information. Quality information is the counter to the
fog of war. Military operations make special demands on information functions
and we must meet those demands if we are to give our commanders the
information advantage. Information superiority is just like air superiority or
space superiority: it gives us the freedom and ability to operate in the information
domain while denying it to the enemy.” Statement of Lt. General Donahue before
the House Military Procurement and Research and Development Subcommittee
(1997)
Background
The past several decades have been witness to a revolution information
technology (IT). This revolution has resulted in an ever-growing reliance upon IT in
developed and developing nations. Networking technology, and the Internet in particular,
has given both business and government organizations alike the promises of greater
efficiency through networked computing. The IT boom of the 1980s and 1990s produced
a dependence on digital information assets making internal and external networks central
to the modern organization’s information infrastructure. In a relatively short time, cyberbased digital information became a critical asset on which the operational and strategic
operations of the modern enterprise depend (Denning 1999, pp. 13-15). Information has
become a transnational commodity and every modern business organization has become
an information organization (Drucker 1993, pp. 89, 143-145).
The Department of Defense (DoD) was quick to recognize the potential benefits
of automating processes with IT and readily embraced the new technologies. Today the
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daily operations of the virtually every United States government agency maintain a great
dependency on IT and the light-speed exchange of information in cyber space. This is
especially true of the armed services when this dependence upon cyber information was
first notably demonstrated during the Persian Gulf War; the first war where cyber
technologies were used to great effect in support of combat actions in the air, ground, and
sea (Gumahad 1997). Organizations whose critical mission processes maintain such a
great dependence on cyber information result in an environment where information
compromise, damage, loss can equate to mission failure (Kemmerer 2003, p. 705). This
makes the need to protect and defend information assets in cyberspace a paramount
requirement to ensure the organization’s success (GAO 2005). Inevitably, such
organizations are forced to deal with an information incident, whether by malicious
intent, accident, or natural disaster. When this happens, the organization’s decision
maker must have a timely and clear picture of how the incident as impacted the
organization’s ability to accomplish its mission. Success in military operations depends
on providing the commander rapid and accurate battlespace awareness. Part of this is
gaining an understanding how cyber incidents affect the organization’s ability to
accomplish the mission.
The Need for a Defensive Cyber Damage Assessment Framework
Since the beginning of organized warfare, commanders have attempted to assess
the impact of offensive actions against the enemy’s war fighting assets (Diehl and Sloan
2005, p. 59), as well as understand the impact of a successful enemy attack against
friendly warfighting assets. As the DoD continues to integrate kinetic operations into
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cyber space, the more valuable asset information becomes. Annual surveys conducted by
the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) determined that the reported economic losses
from cyber security incidents continued a four-year decline in 2006 (Gordon 2006, p. 12).
This is a possible indicator that these organizations are more secure. It could be, however,
that economic metrics are not accurately portraying the extent of damage that these
organizations are truly experiencing from the cyber incidents. Despite the best of efforts
to prevent such security breaches, many attacks against cyber information assets
successfully breach network defenses. This is extremely worrisome for organizational
decision makers who understand that the continued growth in successful attacks, coupled
with the ever-growing dependency of kinetic operations upon cyber assets, creates an
environment for unprecedented ‘hidden’ damage to warfighting capabilities. In 2004,
Department of Defense officials acknowledged that these successful intrusions had
resulted in reduced military operational capability (Tiboni 2005b).
Commanders are now beginning to ask the hard questions of ‘how’ a cyber attack
affects both their respective organization and the mission operations as a whole. In fact,
recently amended military joint guidance (CJCSM6510.01 2006) requires commanders to
ensure operational impact assessment is accomplished following a network incident. In
the cyber realm, however, DoD organizations are finding it difficult to accurately map
damage assessment to operational impact after an information compromise occurs.
In 1996, the Department of Defense (DODD5220.22-M) conducted a series of
“day after” games to measure their ability to effectively respond to cyber attacks. These
exercises demonstrated that the DoD was not ready to respond effectively to such attacks.
A report following these exercises cited four critical issues that must be addressed to
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improve the DoD’s ability to respond to these cyber attacks if they were to happen in the
real world. Among these was the need for “a ‘battle damage’ assessment process suitable
for IW” (Alberts 1996, pp. 24-25). Ten years later, there still exists no standardized
operational damage assessment model for information compromises on United States Air
Force (USAF) networks (Thiem 2005).
Despite the need to understand the organizational impact caused by information
incidents, surprising little research has focused in this area (Horony 1999). The work that
does exist tends to be funded by the private, for-profit sector and to focus providing
awareness for decision making on the financial impact the organization. The models
established by these works yield economic metrics. Economic measurements are more
tangible than other forms of impact metrics (Horony 1999) and lend themselves more
easily to complex calculation in damage models that attempt to quantify an incident’s
financial cost to the organization. Indeed, these models meet the decision-making needs
of many for-profit, private sector organizations. Nevertheless, such models and metrics
are far less useful to those organizations with missions not economically driven; such as
those that exist within the DoD and other critical branches of government. In these areas,
and especially in the context of military operations, the financial value of information is
of very low importance. Economic metrics simply do not provide commanders with the
information necessary to make smart and timely decisions after an information
compromise.
To illustrate this point, consider the following real world example illustrating how
cyber attacks on information assets can directly impact a military organization’s physical
mission. In early 2004, network defenders watching for suspicious activity on networks

4

supporting Multinational Force-Iraqi (MMF-I), at that time called the Combined Joint
Task Force Seven, were reporting as many as 60 new computer network incidents each
day. With network control locations dispersed widely across the Iraq theater of
operations, and no defensive damage assessment framework in place to predicatively
assess potential impact to the mission in event of a successful cyber incident, computer
incident response was extremely difficult. In all cases, it was a “wait and see” activity to
determine the extent of damage to both network operations and the ripple effect of impact
to mission operations. Damage assessment consisted of solely post-recovery analysis that
reported the impact to mission capability long after the fact rather than assessed the
impact in a timely manner. No framework existed that allowed local information owners
or custodians to both identify the information assets stored on potentially compromised
systems and work with incident responders to assess damage to the overall mission. This
left many forward deployed units with limited and occasionally no access to important
information stored on military servers at the rear. This problem was compounded by a
poor, disjointed framework for incident reporting, which in at least one case contributed
to human casualties.
There is a dire need for an efficient framework to assess the impact to an
organization’s information assets and provide the decision maker with an understanding
of the impact to the organization’s mission capability following a compromise. By
providing the commander with a timely and clear sight picture of any degradation to their
own mission capability, the commander is better prepared to make better decisions in
accomplishing the mission.
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Problem Statement
Defensive cyber damage assessment metrics produced by damage assessment
methodologies currently employed on Air Force networks do not enable commanders to
see the mission capability impact resulting from a cyber compromise. Nearly all existing
methodologies assess the economic impact of a cyberspace incident. While economic
impact can be a factor a commander may consider when justifying IT and security
upgrades, it is of little value as a decision input factor in military operations. Attempts to
assess damage following a compromise of Air Force networks have been less than
successful for a wide range of reasons and the chief of these may lie in the Air Force’s
fundamental approach and perspective regarding network security.
The Air Force approaches cyber security from an infrastructure-focused
perspective. This approach focuses on protecting the organization’s IT infrastructure
against known technological vulnerability-focused scenarios. According to Soo Hoo
(2005) this approach is inherently limited in its ability to identify the risks to the assets
the organization means to protect (Soo Hoo 2000, p.11). Vulnerability is only significant
if it places a critical asset at risk (Stevens 2005, p. 14). Rather than identifying the
information assets within the system and determining the relative value they present to
the organization organizational mission, this approach explicitly focuses on technical
components of infrastructure technological assets. This approach overlooks information
and substitutes its value to the organization with that of the infrastructure components
and cannot account the value of the organization’s most important asset—its information.
The assumption that technology is an equitable substitute for information is a dangerous
assumption and follows a proven path of failure (Davenport and Prusack 1998).
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The DoD is beginning to realize that this approach imposes inherent limitations
on attempts attempting to perform damage assessment. When an information incident
occurs, the agency responsible for incident response activities must conduct a mission
impact assessment to quantify the value of the affected information asset contributes to
the organization’s mission. This is especially true in DoD agencies where the incident
response agent exists outside the organization. In nearly all cases, no documentation of
information asset value exists to aid the incident response agent in understanding its
value. As a result, subsequent efforts to identify and quantify the impact are subjective
and unreliable, and produce little or no usable for use in timely and reliable decisionmaking.
There is currently no effective methodology to assess the damage to information
assets on Air Force networks, estimate the impact to organizational mission, and
effectively report timely and accurate impact assessment to decision makers following a
cyber security incident on Air Force Networks.
Problem Approach
The shortcomings in the current approach to damage assessment are evident in the
failure to provide organizational decision makers with an understanding of how a cyber
incident affects the organization’s mission. Several issues may contribute to this
problem. This research will approach the problem with an examination of how the Air
Force implements damage assessment and what issues may be impeding effective
damage and mission impact assessment efforts. The research will attempt to understand
how the Air Force identifies and values its cyber assets, since understanding the value of
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the organization’s critical cyber-based information assets is fundamental to determining
the extent of damage and subsequent mission impact following a cyber attack.
To this end, this research must discover what obstacles may be preventing cyber
damage and mission impact assessment, as well as what issues may be contributing to
these efforts. Successful and accurate cyber damage and mission impact assessment
depends on the successful and effective accomplishment of a number of supporting
activities. Such key supporting activities are identification of the correct cyber assets in
an organization, determining their relative value to the organization, determining damage
after an incident, and mapping that damage to an effect on the organization’s mission.
Damage assessment is only the first step and mission impact assessment should be the
ultimate goal of cyber damage assessment on military networks.
Ultimately, this research will propose an ideal methodology for defensive cyber
damage and mission impact assessment to allow organizations to understand how a
successful cyber incident affects its mission.
Research Questions
This research aims to answer three questions that are essential to the development
of a Defensive Cyber Damage Assessment framework:
R1. How can the damage resulting from a successful cyber attack be effectively
measured in a non-profit driven organization?
R2. How can such damage be mapped to impact to an organization’s mission
capability?
R3. How must this assessment be reported to the decision maker to maximize the
quality of the assessment for use as decision input?
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To effectively answer these questions, this research aims to determine how damage is
currently being assessed, how to what degree impact to mission operations is assessed,
and what, if any problems exist in the current methodology.
Foundational Terminology
Defining a canonical terminology is essential when communicating ideas to
diverse communities of interest. For this reason, we now define the terminology used in
the Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Assessment (CDA-D/MIA) framework
proposed in this paper. First, the scope and purpose of defensive cyber damage
assessment must be established. Joint Publication 1-02 defines military damage
assessment as “an appraisal of the effects of an attack on a nation’s military forces to
determine residual military capability and to support planning for recovery and
reconstitution” (JP 1-02 2006, p. 336). Historically, the focus of damage assessment has
been on the effects of offensive actions against the mission capability of enemy forces.
Conversely, our work is focused upon defensive damage assessment which appraises the
effects of a cyber-based incident that potentially impacts friendly mission capability. For
the purposes of our research, a mission describes the overall purpose of the organization.
The term mission is also used in a similar context to define the goals and objectives of a
specific department, group, or unit within the organization. Thus, the overall mission of
an organization is comprised of a hierarchy of subordinate missions, with an over-arching
enterprise mission being supported by the missions of its organizations. Each
organization may have supporting departmental missions. This hierarchy is an “essential
component of operational effectiveness” (Alberts and Dorofee 2005, p.4).
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A mission is supported by one or more operational processes as shown in Figure 1
below. Operational processes are those processes that enable people or systems to
accomplish the mission. In modern organizations, most operational processes are
supported by one or more information processes. Information processes are those
information flows that support the operational process. An organization’s information
processes depend on information assets. An information asset is a set of information that
holds value to the organization’s mission. A cyber information asset is information that
resides electronically within cyberspace. A cyber information asset may be information
stored on the organization’s server infrastructure or an information flow on which the
organization depends. A critical cyber information asset is one which the organization
depends upon to accomplish its tactical, operational, or strategic mission. Damage is
defined as a reduction in value or usefulness of the object affected (Oxford, 1986).
Damage or loss of a critical cyber information asset potentially would result in
impairment of the organization’s mission. This impairment to the organization’s mission
is called impact. Damage and impact are related, but are not the same. Impact is
generally the result of some damage. Since this research deals explicitly with defensive
damage assessment of cyber-based assets, all references to information assets imply
cyber information assets.
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Figure 1. Mission Structure Hierarchy

Most traditional approaches to damage assessment make no difference between
data and information. However, some very distinct and important differences between
data and information exist. Data is the elemental subset of information that possesses no
inherent value, but is dependent on external application. This external application assigns
value to the information. Information is aggregation of data that is grouped in such a way
that meaning and value are both inherent and vary contextually (Petrocelli 2005, pp. 180181). This important characteristic of information is fundamental to developing a
foundation on which to build effective cyber damage assessment. All information assets
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have producers, owners, consumers, and custodians. The information producer is the
creator of the information or the originator of an information flow. The information
owner is the entity that bears responsibility for determining the classification, value, and
level of protection of the information asset commensurate with its value. The information
custodian is the entity responsible for implementing the security measures that protect the
information asset. An information consumer is any entity that maintains transitive
dependencies on the information. It is important to understand that the information
producer, owner, custodian, and consumer are all closely related; and they can be the
same entity.
Research Scope
Defensive cyber damage assessment methodology is an important part of gaining
a heightened level of mission assurance in any organization reliant on cyber-based
information. The overall perspective of this thesis research, however, is from a military
operations perspective. This research aims to develop a defensive cyber damage and
mission impact assessment framework to provide decision makers, the commanders,
situational awareness of how a cyber information compromise affects his/her mission
capability through understanding the value of the critical information assets on which the
mission relies. This is primarily concerned with aiding the commander working in the
tactical and operational domains of operations. The framework intends to provide useful
metrics for decision makers operating in the strategic domain of operations.
This research recognizes that different communities of interest in both the public
and private sector have specific requirements and expectations for a damage assessment
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model. It is also important to note there are varying assumptions of the methodology and
scope of a defensive introduced by the widely varying experiential perspectives of the
communities of interest that may desire to implement such a framework. For example,
the network security community of interest may feel strongly that the commander must
know how and why an intruder was able to gain access to and compromise critical assets
on the network. These activities are extremely important and are accomplished by the
agencies tasked with that responsibility. This type of information, while important in
preventing future malicious incidents, it may not be useful to the commander who needs
to know how the incident has affected his immediate mission operations. Development
of a mission impact assessment methodology for organizations not driven by economic
profit is the goal of this research. For this reason, the scope of research is different from
existing models that attempt to assign value as an economic function. This research will
attempt to discover a new way to determine cyber asset value in terms that are
meaningful to an organization that is not driven by economic gain. By determining asset
value, the research intends to determine a damage assessment methodology that allows
mapping between the asset and the mission operations that the asset supports.
Thesis Structure
This research employs qualitative research methods in order to answer the
research questions. The quest for answers to the research questions presented in this
chapter require a multiple vectored approach to gathering appropriate data. This chapter
presents and introduction to the material, but Chapter 2 delves into an extensive literature
review of the large information space that is required to develop a sound understanding of
damage and mission impact assessment.
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Chapter 3 presents a detailed discussion of the research methodology. In order to
understand the methods and problems with current damage assessment methodology and
mission impact estimation techniques currently being used on the Air Force networks,
this research depends on existing research and interviews with agencies involved with Air
Force network operations and network defense activities.
Chapter 4 discusses, analyses, and synthesizes the data collected through the
extensive literature review, examination of existing case study research, and interviews
performed in this research effort. Chapter 4 will present the findings of this research as
they relate to the investigative research question presented in Chapter 1.
Chapter 5 presents a conclusive proposal for an improved cyber damage and
mission impact assessment model. The proposed Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission
Impact Assessment methodology is a comprehensive methodology that if properly
implemented would correct the weaknesses in the current approach that results in
unsatisfactory impact awareness on Air Force networks.
Research Limitations
The DoD has been admittedly slow to address the area of defensive cyber damage
assessment and as a result this is still a relatively immature area of research. The DoD
maintains a highly segmented structure and this research effort proceeds forward with the
understanding that there may be related work underway in other segments of the DoD to
address this issue. In an effort to present this work in an unclassified format, some issues
will not be addressed to prevent potential disclosure of sensitive information; particularly
those involving specifics of network offensive activities, network defense specifications
and procedures. However, this framework will maintain a generic quality to allow
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application in these areas not explicitly addressed in this work. Additionally, since the
focus of this research effort is development of a defensive cyber damage assessment for
military networks, the specific audience is limited to those potential users to do not utilize
financial loss as a driver for decision making.
Another limitation is the absence of data to demonstrate the degree of
effectiveness in a practical sense, and validity in an academic sense of this research. It is
hoped that future research will address these issues.
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II. Literature Review
Introduction
“Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear
the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every
victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor
yourself, you will succumb in every battle. (Sun-Tzu 1993)”
The information revolution changed the face of the modern organization. In both
government and private sector alike, the new technology of this revolution created new
ways for information to flow through and within an organization. These changes both
flattened traditional decision-making hierarchies and forced a massive re-engineering of
the way business is done (Drucker 1993, pp. 89). Every organization that maintains
reliance upon information cyberspace is in the information business. For this reason,
virtually every modern organization is an information organization (Drucker 1995). This
includes the military.
The advent of cyberspace was a dual edged sword. It offered great promises of
efficient production and reduced operating costs, but also introduced new and unexpected
risks and vulnerabilities. Organizations embraced the promises of cyberspace technology
without thought for security; and many quickly found themselves ill prepared for these
new problems.

Recent years have witnessed many private sector and government

organizations fall victim to malicious activity, mishap, and natural disaster that has
degraded or removed access to cyber information with grave impact to the organization’s
ability to conduct normal mission operations. Literature review shows that despite the
evolution towards stronger security, vulnerabilities and successful exploits maintain and
annual increase (CERT 2006). Since “perfect security is not attainable” (Mimoso 2005),
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organizations must be prepared to efficiently handle the impact of a successful attack.
An organization must also be able to understand how the incident impacts the
organization’s mission capability. Mission capability refers to the organization’s ability
to accomplish its tactical, operational, and strategic business goals. Exhaustive literature
review has demonstrated that relatively little research has been conducted on mission
impact following a cyber attack. With only a few exceptions, research in this area is
limited to determination of the economic costs associated with remediation and recovery
from a cyber incident. As cyber warfare continues to evolve, many organizations that are
not profit driven, such as military organizations, are discovering that cost loss does not
provide the right input information for smart and timely operational decisions after being
hit. This literature review explores the essential concepts of cyberwarfare, information
value, and other concept critical to the foundations of a defensive cyber damage
assessment framework.
Cyberwarfare and Defensive Damage Assessment
Information is the center of gravity of cyberspace. The ever-growing American
dependence on cyberspace has made information a critical center of gravity on which
national security depends (Billo and Chang 2004, p. 22). Denning identifies information
as a valued asset to both owner and adversary; therefore, it is an asset that must be
protected (Denning 1999, pp. 22-25). President George Bush accurately noted, however,
“…there is no such thing as perfect security. (Bush 2004) ”; and his words hold
particularly true in the cyber domain. The DoD has recognized that successful attacks
against cyber information inevitably occur and when such attacks successfully damage
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the organization’s information assets real world mission operations can be affected
(Tiboni 2005b).
When an attack is successful, it is essential to perform immediate incident
response to arrest propagation of the incident as quickly as possible. Additionally these
incident response actions are part of damage assessment activities that help the
organization understand the impact and make the right decisions for recovery and mission
operations (Lala and Panda 2000, p. 300). Mission success can, and often does, depend
on a clear understanding of how the cyber attack has degraded the actual or potential
capabilities of kinetic mission operations. This section will examine literature discussing
the nature of cyber space and cyber warfare, briefly examine the evolution of military
operational dependence upon cyber space, and the importance of defensive cyber damage
assessment to ensuring successful military operations in both cyberspace and the real
world.
What is cyberspace?
Understanding the cyber battlespace if fundamental to understanding cyber
warfare. The concept of cyberspace was originally conceived by science fiction author,
William Gibson (1984) to describe a virtual and alternate world that existed in the
electronic space between every computer in the human system. In Gibson’s vision, virtual
cyberspace was a virtual domain of virtual dimension and space that imitated the modern
world, the realspace of the human world. Cyberspace and realspace are integrated such
that the effect of activities in one domain could affect the other. The American Heritage
New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, 3d Edition, defines cyberspace in the following
way:
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“The space in which computer transactions occur, particularly transactions
between different computers. We say that images and text on the Internet
exist in cyberspace, for example. The term is also often used in
conjunction with virtual reality, designating the imaginary place where
virtual objects exist. For example, if a computer produces a picture of a
building that allows the architect to [walk] through and see what a design
would look like, the building is said to exist in cyberspace. (American
Heritage n.d.)”
In many ways, Gibson’s predictive definition of the cyber realm has become
something close to a reality. Joint Publication 1-02 concisely defines cyberspace as “the
notional environment in which digitized information is communicated across computer
networks (JP 1-02 2006, p. 139).” The Internet is often considered to be cyberspace, but
it is actually only a part of it. Cyberspace is that place between all computers—a massive
exchange of information at light speed between “the sum total of all computer networks
(Denning 1999, p. 22).”
The United States government has realized that physical assets are vulnerable to
attacks from cyberspace. As Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge
stated,
“Cyber security cuts across all aspects of critical infrastructure protection.
Most businesses in this country are unable to segregate the cyber
operations from the physical aspects of their business because they operate
interdependently (USCERT 2003)”
Many security experts have expressed concern that America’s ever-growing dependence
on cyberspace has become its Achilles heel (Blodgett 1999).
What is cyber warfare?
The term cyber warfare is often confused with information warfare. Denning
describes information warfare as consisting “of offensive and defensive operations
against information resources of a ‘win-lose’ nature. It is conducted because information
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resources have value to people (Denning 1999, 67).” Cyber warfare, itself, may be
loosely viewed as that part of information warfare that occurs within the domain of
cyberspace; and uses the technologies of that realm. Cyberwarfare activities are part of
the many constructs of Information Operations. (IO). IO covers broad spectrum of
activities and therefore overlaps the boundaries of many different communities of
interest. As a result, different communities maintain slightly differing perspectives of
what cyber war is in relations to their respective interest.
In 1993, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt introduced the concept of
cyberwarfare to describe knowledge-centric conflict in military operations. They
describe cyberwar in this way:
“Cyberwar refers to conducting, and preparing to conduct, military
operations according to information -related principles. It means
disrupting, if not destroying, information and communications
systems, broadly defined to include even military culture, on which
an adversary relies in order to know itself: who it is, where it is,
what it can do when, why it is fighting, which threat to counter
first, and so forth. It means trying to know everything about an
adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about
oneself. It means turning the balance of information and
knowledge in one's favor, especially if the balance of forces is not.
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993, p. 30)"

Three key concepts may be deduced from Arquilla & Ronfeldt’s description of
cyberwar:
1. information is central to cyberwar activities,
2. the purpose of cyberwar is to effect the adversary’s kinetic military
capabilities, while protecting your own,
3. it is important to effect decision making to understand the impact of a
successful cyber attack both offensively and defensively.
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Cyber warfare has broad implications for both military organization and
warfighting doctrine (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993, pp. 24-25). The technologies
employed in cyber warfare can provide the commander with topsight. Topsight is a
greater understanding of the big picture and improved situational awareness of the
battlespace. It delivers improvements to the decision-making processes by providing a
more clear picture of battle space capabilities through both a more accurate picture of the
enemy and friendly force capabilities (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993, pp. 30-31).
In cyber warfare, however, gaining topsight may not be easy. According to
Gruber, a lack of deliberate planning to employ cyber technologies to objectives has
traditionally hindered the full realization of the capabilities offered by these technologies
(Gruber 2000, pp. 8-12). The key to being successful in the continually evolving domain
of cyberwarfare operations is to continually re-examine the existing paradigm and adjust
as necessary. If areas of improvement are identified, the organization must strive to meet
those needs. Such an area with a need for improvement is providing the military
commander with the topsight needed to understand how a successful cyber incident has
impacted his/her ability to carry out the mission.
The Evolution of Military Dependence on Cyberspace.
Cyber warfare is a serious matter in military circles as more military operations
continue to depend on computer networks and cyber space (Kumagai 2003, pp. 118-119).
The first step in understanding how the Air Force approaches cyber information security
is to “gain a common view of how information has grown into a critical component that
directly affects the conduct of military operations (Gruber 2000, p. iii).” From the
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earliest military operations, information has been a key factor to success in warfare.
Human history provides a nearly endless set of examples of the army with the superior
information advantage winning the battle. In his forward comments, prefacing Air Force
doctrine, General John P. Jumper states that those with a “superior ability to gather,
understand, control, and use information” maintain this advantage on the battlefield
(AFDD2-5 2005). America has traditionally been the leader in employing cyber-based
information technologies to gain and exploit such an advantage in the battlespace. As the
technology evolves, so must our understanding of how to best employ this technology to
fully exploit the cyber-based information assets gained from our adversaries—and our
own. It is important to understand how we arrived. Sometimes we can learn from the
problems of the past to improve our future. Much is written about the evolution of
information technology, the emergency of the Internet. This sub-section concisely
describes the gradual infusion of military operations into cyberspace.
The DoD embarked on its first large-scale attempt at integration of computers,
satellites, and communication systems with the issuance of DoD Directive S-5100.30,
titled “Concept of Operations of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System
(WWMCCS). WWMCCS, although never fully integrating all functions of command
and control, was the first large scale system designed to link information-bearing
technologies to provide increased situational awareness to military commanders (Gruber
2000, pp. 4-5). Allard notes that WWMCCS development was influenced by the rapid
and novel availability of both technology and resources to meet the requirements of the
individual unified and specified commands, rather than by specified strategic goals
(Allard 1990, pp. 133-135). The importance of WWMCCS to this research is that it
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foreshadows the vulnerability of kinetic operations that depend upon digital information,
as several real world mission complications resulted from WWMCCS computer outages
(Allard 1990). This may be the first time that the military realized degradation of
operations capabilities directly attributable to the failure of computerized processing
systems.
The next milestone on the journey to technology-dependence was the emergence
of networks, which eventually lead to the creation of cyberspace. Integration of military
operations and computer information systems had grown silently and steadily in the
previous decades, but the promise of increased efficiency through new networking
technologies and the Internet encourage the Air Force to embark in a characteristic rush
to new incorporate these new technologies; reintroducing many of the problems
experienced with the WWMCCS program. This dependence of the flow of digital
information and information technology was soon apparent in the evolution of the
military as an expeditionary force with new and sophisticated weapons systems that
pushed the envelope of the existing cyber-infrastructure (Gruber 2000, p. 16).
The already straining infrastructure was quickly further burdened by the new
emphasis in information warfare. Gruber observes that there was little forward planning
for fitting technology to objective, and the result was a reduced ability of the DoD’s
infrastructure to support fully support combat operations. The underlying reason was that
the DoD’s approach to information warfare forced a focus on watching for hostile
computer attacks, which inhibited efficient information flow from CONUS to forward
operating locations. (Gruber 2000, pp. 19-21). To correct this problem, Gruber makes
several suggestions, some of which we seen implemented in 2004 and continue to date;
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as witnessed within the United States Air Force by the creation of the Air Force Network
Operations and Security Center (AFNOSC) (AFI 33-138 2004), consolidation of Air
Force networks under a unified network operations command and control structure.
The DoD has recognized many of the problems observed by Gruber and others
and has made similar shifts in control and configuration of information infrastructure on
which military operations are now so intimately dependent. The Global Information Grid
is a product of this shift and a clear indicator that the DoD recognizes that the military’s
“ability to leverage the power of information will be key to our success in the 21st century
(Grimes n.d.).” The GIG vision is to overcome the problems described by Gruber by
providing user with a seamless, secure, and interconnected information environment for
both the warfighter and the authorized business user (NSA n.d.).
This carries with it a heavy implication of the level of dependence the military,
and indeed the nation, has on the information flow of cyberspace. In a study performed
on the cyber warfare means and motivations of selected nation states by the Institute for
Security Studies at Dartmouth College, Billo and Chang identify three general areas of
vulnerabilities to national security of the United States exploitable through cyberspace
operations. These are:
1. the United State’s critical infrastructure,
2. its economic and financial sector,
3. and the military and national security sector (Billo and Chang 2004, pp. 130131).
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Billo and Chang cite the modern military’s high level of reliance upon cyberspace
assets is opening up “more holes in critical military infrastructure. (Billo and Chang
2004, p. 131)” Billo and Chang further state that:
“Much of the Pentagon logistics chain flows over public-switched
networks. Some of the intelligence gathering of U.S. intelligence agencies
also flows over public networks. Secure IT is critical in making sure that
the data received on both ends of an intelligence transmission is not
compromised (Billo and Chang 2004, p. 131).”
There can little serious disagreement that the United States military relies
more heavily upon cyberspace than ever before and will continue to do so into the
near future. Drucker’s (1993) assessment that every organization is an now an
information organization rings especially true for the modern United States
military. Many realize that our military operations are vulnerable and defensive
cyber operations must evolve at a rate commensurate with our adversaries and
ensure we are prepared to defend against a cyber attack (Winkler, O'Shea et Al.
1996, pp. 2-4).
The Kinetic Impact of Cyber Attacks.
“This is the first time in American history that we in the federal
government, alone, cannot protect our infrastructure. We can’t hire an
army or a police force that’s large enough to protect all of America’s cell
phones or pagers or computer networks.” Comments of Secretary of
Commerce William M. Daley (2000) regarding cyber protection

It is commonly accepted that cyber attacks can affect real world functions and
activities, but a debate exists over the extent to which the effects of cyber-induced
damage may be realized in the real world. Billo and Chang observe that the community
of cyber-security experts holds widely ranging opinions on this issue. Some experts feel
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that an electronic Pearl Harbor is impossible while others herald that such a catastrophe
is inevitable (Billo and Chang 2004, p. 12). James Lewis, a senior fellow and director of
technology policy at the Center for Strategic and International studies, made the
following statement regarding the impact of a cyber attack:
"Nobody argues -- or at least no sane person argues -- that a cyber attack
could lead to mass casualties. It's not in any way comparable to weapons
of mass destruction. In fact, what a lot of people call them is "weapons of
mass annoyance." If your power goes out for a couple hours, if somebody
draws a mustache on Attorney General Ashcroft's face on his Web site, it's
annoying. It's irritating. But it's not a weapon of mass destruction(Lewis
2003)."
In this interview Lewis also makes the following argument against the vulnerability of
national infrastructure to a cyber attack:

“The other thing you can look at is, we know what attacks on critical
infrastructures are like. This is something the military has been doing for
at least 80 years. What we've discovered is it's hard to knock out an
infrastructure. Nations are a lot tougher than they look. You can put
something out for a couple of days, and people work really hard to get it
back online. So this isn't an easy task when you're using high explosives,
and high explosives do permanent damage, unlike cyber attacks, which are
not anywhere near as threatening (Lewis 2003).”
Lewis is not alone in his view that the impact of a cyber attack is grossly inflated. Joshua
Green, an editor for Washington monthly states:
“There is no such thing as cyberterrorism--no instance of anyone ever having
been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. Nor is there
compelling evidence that al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has resorted
to computers for any sort of serious destructive activity. What's more, outside of a
Tom Clancy novel, computer security specialists believe it is virtually impossible
to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale, and many scoff at the notion
that terrorists would bother trying (Green 2002).“
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The literature review accomplished in this research begs the question, where are
Green’s many scoffers? The vast majority of literature available on this subject does not
support the view of Lewis and Green. It should be noted that their point of view glosses
over a universally agreed upon issue that America is the world leader in dependence on
cyber-based information, with as much as 95% of networks being connected to each other
in some way (Billo and Chang 2004, pp. 14-17).
And the degree of the dependency increases annually. In interview with GCN
magazine, Sami Saydjari, CEO of Cyber Defense Agency commented on this recent
explosive growth.
“Twenty years ago, the infrastructure operated separately from the Internet
and other open networks. So in some sense, the level of vulnerability has
gone up simply because the level of interconnectedness has gone up
significantly (Jackson 2006, p. 20).”
Billo and Chang point out that the experts with access to classified information
sources express concern that “the growing tendency in advanced industrial
economies to link internal business management tools and administrative controls
to the Internet could be catastrophic for overall U.S security (Billo and Chang
2004, p. 12).”
Indeed, even skeptics such as Washington Post writer Chris Suellentrop,
who called the idea of cyberterrorism both a hoax and a conspiracy by the
technology companies to generate large profits, become convinced of the reality
of the national vulnerability when seeing the extent of American critical
infrastructure dependence on cyberspace up close. After participating in a cyber
terrorism exercise conducted by Dartmouth Institute for Security Technology
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Studies, he realized the gravity of the vulnerabilities presented by cyberwarfare,
reversing his opinion and going from “smarty-pants to scaredy-cat (Suellentrop
2006).”
Recent research studied the costs to the U.S. economy from damage
caused by a successful large scale, well targeted cyber attack and produced
disturbing findings. Dynes’ study, Costs to the U.S. Economy of Information
Infrastructure Failures (Dynes, Andrijcic et Al. 2006) examined the ripple effect
a catastrophic cyber attack and determined that would cost the economy millions
of dollars for cyberspace disruptions greater than a few days. The study noted
that a growing reliance on networks would result create the possibility for even
greater impact in the future (Dynes, Andrijcic et Al. 2006, p. 20). In February
2002, a group of 54 distinguished Information Assurance professionals drafted
and signed a letter for President George W. Bush expressing a deep concern over
the large and continually growing risk to the nation from a danger potentially
more devastating to national morale and the country’s economy than the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks (PCD 2002a).” Richard Clarke, who served as
the White House Cyber Security Advisor from October 2001 to March 2003,
expressed great concern about the vulnerability of the United States to
cyberwarfare, and made the following statement in an interview with PBS
Frontline:
“We, as a country, have put all of our eggs in one basket. The reason that
we're successfully dominating the world economically and militarily is
because of systems that we have designed, and rely upon, which are cyberbased. It's our Achilles heel. It's an overused phrase, but it's absolutely
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true….some enemy some day was able to come around and knock the
whole empire over." That's the fear (Clarke, 2003).”
Michael Vatis, the Director of the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth
College, and director of the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P)
supports this view and states:
“America remains highly vulnerable to another form of attack: a “cyber
attack” against the computer networks that are critical to our national and
economic security. Attackers might target banking and financial
institutions, voice communication systems, electrical infrastructures, water
resources, or oil and gas infrastructures. The growing complexity and
interconnectedness of these systems renders them increasingly vulnerable
to attack. While a physical attack is likely to be carried out only by
terrorists or hostile foreign nation-states, cyber attacks may be carried out
by a wide array of adversaries, from teenage hackers and protest groups to
organized crime syndicates, terrorists, and foreign nation states. As a
result, the problem is of enormous breadth and complexity (Vatis 2002,
p.3).”

Certainly, the majority of literature publicly available serves as worthy
and suitable evidence of the American vulnerability to a large and well-targeted
cyber attack. Considering that the experts closest to the problem, with
presumably the better view of the dependencies and vulnerabilities within the
American critical infrastructure and military operations, there can be little serious
argument whether cyber-based attacks can cause impact kinetic activities in the
real world.
The extent of impact varies on the type of cyber asset successfully
attacked and the degree of dependency the real-world function has on it. It
follows, therefore, that the better civilian and military decision makers know the
potential impact when key cyber-supported systems are lost, the better prepared
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America will be to recover. This fact underscores the need for development of an
effective cyber-damage assessment framework.
Threats to Cyber Assets.
Organizations that rely on cyber information face daily threats that could damage
or destroy these information assets on which mission operations rely. In an environment
where loss of critical information can result in loss of operational capability, it is
important to understand threat. Threats originate from both inside and outside the
organization, and can be man-made or may be caused by an unpreventable disaster
(Petrocelli 2005, p. 5). This section will discuss some of the common forms of threats to
an organization’s information assets.
Outsider Threat.
The term cyber attack generally brings to mind malicious activity from outside of
the organization. Too often generalized as “hackers” by the uninitiated, outside threat
actors come in many flavors ranging from nation states, organized crime, cyberterrorists,
and “hacktivists”. They share a common goal of either directly attacking cyber
information assets, or its container, the system on which the information asset resides
(Stevens 2005, p. 5). The motivation, for each varies widely. Organized crime and cyber
cartels, generally motivated by financial gain, often target cyber information assets of
banks or other e-commerce sites to engage in a variety of illicit activities ranging from
theft to extortion by holding to hold the victim information or systems for “ransom”
(Winkler 2005, pp. 71-74). “Hacktivists” and cyberterrorists generally attack cyber
assets to promote political, ideological, theological, or similar causes. Denning observes
that the boundaries between the two latter groups are fuzzy (Denning 2001, p. 241).
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Nation states may attempt to cripple American military and civilian command and control
structure via external cyber operations (Shimeall, Williams et Al. 2002).
Despite the best efforts to keep the outside actors on the outside, there are
countless examples of successful intrusion, with many causing damage measured in
millions of dollars (Tiboni 2005a). In 2001, a Connecticut teenager hacked a presumed
secure Air Force system that tracked the positions of Air Force planes worldwide causing
more than $66,000 damage (Rosencrance 2001). The year 2005 was both the widely
publicized hacking of the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) data base in which 33,000
Air Force officers was compromised (Mark 2005), and the less publicized but no less
dangerous onslaught of “attacks: against United States critical infrastructure and military
networks (Graham and Eggen 2005). Both examples serve to illustrate the targeting of
cyberspace information assets either directly or indirectly targeting information by
attacking the infrastructure that contains the asset. These indirect attacks against the
asset’s container, attempt to affect the organization’s ability to use the asset effectively.
Each type of attack bears the potential of causing some degree of mission degradation,
whether damage and mission impact realized or not.
Inside Threat.
Chinchani, et. Al, define the insider as a legitimate user who leverages system privileges,
“familiarity and proximity to their computational environment to compromise valuable
information or inflict damage (Chinchani, Iyer et Al. 2005, pp. 108-109).” Existing
literature agrees to the spirit of this definition. Insiders have rapidly come to be
considered “one of the most challenging problems facing the security of information
systems today (Butts 2006, p. ii)” For the past several years, the CSI/FBI survey has
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reported a decline in the number of reported insider incidents (Gordon, Loeb et Al. 2006,
p. 13). This, however, is not a reliable indication of the threat, as damage caused by
inside threat actors can be severe; accounting for more than 80 percent of annual losses in
some organizations as shown in Figure 2 below. In a military environment where the
economic impact of a cyber security incident is secondary to the impact upon operational
mission capability the effects of insider activity may be catastrophic; as demonstrated
when insider activity resulted in more than 36 hours of mission stoppage on Coast Guard
networks (DiDio 1998). Research on detecting and preventing insider activity continues
to emerge, such as the Butts’ methodology (Butts 2006) for formalizing the inside threat
to identify high-probability inside threat actors. Regardless of preventative measures,
inside threat actors will inevitably occur making the need for a defensive cyber damage
assessment framework even more important.
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Figure 2. Percentage of Reported Loss from Insider Threats (Gordon, et. Al 2006, p. 12)

Human Accident and Natural Disaster.
Not all threats to cyber assets are necessarily malicious in nature. Baskerville
observes that many times cyber security programs focus too exclusively on malicious
activity. Important threats, such as the potential for human error and harm caused by
accident, are excluded from the organization’s risk assessment. Such exclusion allows
the effects of accidents introduce overlooked threats and vulnerabilities to the
organization’s critical cyber information assets (Baskerville and Im 2005). Mistakes and
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slips by system or software developer and/or users can unintentionally create a mission
impacting catastrophe or introduce security holes which allow unauthorized and
potentially damaging activities to be carried out by malicious threat actors (Norman
1983, pp. 254-255). Human accident, while not malicious in nature can have the same
impact on mission capability as a malicious attack.
Natural disaster is another area that Baskerville charges as overlooked by many
security programs. As with human error, natural disaster can introduce exploitable
vulnerabilities, or more often act as an independent agent to impact the ability of cyber
security to function as expected (Baskerville and Im 2005). Recent natural disasters,
particularly Hurricane Katrina documented the vulnerabilities of our cyber-based
information systems and demonstrated both how quickly an information infrastructure
could be taken out and how a program that does not plan for these non-malicious events
can find itself unprepared when natural disaster occurs (IEEE-USA 2006).
An Incident Taxonomy.
An organization with a limited scope of risk to its assets can find itself unprepared
when a risk is realized from a vector beyond the organization’s scope of assessed risk.
This is especially true of organizations that plan for risks based on threat scenarios (Soo
Hoo 2000, p.11).

Unfortunately, many widely accepted threat and incident taxonomies

maintain a relatively narrow scope on risk. One such widely cited taxonomy model is the
Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy (see Figure 3 below) proposed by Howard
and Longstaff (1998, pp. 15-17).
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Figure 3. Howard's Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy (1998, p. 16)

Section Summary.
Cyberspace is more than just the Internet. It is all the space between networked
computers where digital information is exchanged. Cyberwarfare is a critical part of
information warfare and IO that occurs in cyberspace. Cyberwarfare activities can have
kinetic effects on organizations whose operations rely on the information assets of
cyberspace. Military operations have developed a strong and ever-increasing dependence
on cyberspace; which has introduced new vulnerabilities to new threats both inside and
outside the network. These threats can come from a variety of vectors, and a good
security program must plan for all forms of threats to protect the cyber-based assets on
which modern military operations depend.
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It is important to rely on a threat or incident taxonomy model the captures as wide
a spectrum of risk as possible. It is also important that the taxonomy recognize the value
of information as an asset. All cyber attacks against an organization are attacks on its
information assets to some degree. These attacks produce second and third order impact
effects that the organization must address.
Foundations of Defensive Cyber Damage Assessment
Military theorist and United States Air Force Colonel John A. Warren wrote that
the commander is the center of gravity for all military campaigns. Command, itself can
be broken down into three basic functions: information, decision, and communication.
He states that one of the keys to effective command is exploiting an awareness of both
sides of the front (Warden 1988). Defensive cyber damage assessment is intended to be
an exclusive form of mission capability assessment to provide the commander with
awareness of how a successful cyber attack on his own networks has impacted his
mission operations capability. Research in this area is sparse. What research is available
is designed for assessing financial losses resulting from an attack; a measurement not
useful for decision makers in organizations not driven by other than profit. Cyberspace
operations affect both the cyber domain and the physical domain. The reliance of
military operations upon cyberspace establishes the need for a defensive assessment
framework to provide commanders with the battlespace awareness needed to prosecute
the modern campaign. Surprisingly little research has been carried out towards
establishment. This section will examine literature supporting the necessary foundational
concepts need for CDA-D/MIA framework development.
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Battle Damage Assessment.
Assessing the affects of actions against the adversary has been a critical factor in
the outcome of battles and wars since the beginning of military history. Battle damage
assessment (BDA) continues to play a pivotal role in command decision making in
modern military operations. JP 1-02 provides the following definition for BDA:
“The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the
application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a
predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the
employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and
special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military
operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence
responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators (JP
1-02 2006).”
Early battle damage assessment was simple but became more complex as
the complexity of war grew (Diehl and Sloan 2005, pp. 59-60). The technology
of warfare allowed faster conduction of military operations, which called for the
commander to make more decisions in ever shortening time constraints.
Unfortunately, the limitations of the existing BDA paradigm began to show. The
DoD’s Final Report to Congress: The Persian Gulf War, 1992 stated that
traditional BDA methodology as it was employed in the Persian Gulf War was
“too slow and inadequate”. Changes were needed to improve the efficiency of the
BDA structure (DOD 1992).” Lt Col Hugh Curry (2004)echoed this sentiment
argued for the use of cyber technology to improve the timeliness of the BDA
process.
In 2004, Lt. Col Michael Masterson discussed an improved conceptual
BDA framework to provide commanders with improved battlespace awareness
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through assessing the effects of actions against the enemy. Combat assessment
(CA) is defined by JP 1-02 as “[t]he determination of the overall effectiveness of
force employment during military operations (JP 1-02 2006, p. 97).” Put another
way, CA is the overall assessment of combat operations in relation to the intent of
the command objectives, of which BDA is only a part (Sopko 1999). Masterson
states that CA is a hierarchy of assessment that begins with Tactical Assessment
(TA) where BDA occurs. TA supports component commander’s Operational
Assessment (OA), which in turn supports campaign assessment, which is the joint
force commander’s assessment the state of overall campaign mission (Masterson
2004).
Masterson’s description of the hierarchy of assessment bears an analogous
relationship to the hierarchy of missions discussed in the previous chapter (Alberts and
Dorofee 2005, pp. 3-4); and is a important concept to defensive cyber damage
assessment. Sopko, while citing problems with CA that affect the Joint Air Operations
Center (JAOC) makes the following important differentiation between CA and BDA that
will have strong ramifications for the development of CDA-D/MIA methodology:
“The most common mistake among operators and intelligence
support personnel alike is the confusion between BDA and CA. BDA is a
familiar term with historical roots and tends to overshadow the CA
process. Unfortunately, BDA is just one part of this process. BDA is
intelligence driven while CA is the responsibility of the commander. BDA
focuses damage to the target and target system while CA is much broader
and tries to answer the question: "how well are we doing and what’s
next?" Like BDA, CA provides information to commanders, battle staffs,
planners, and other decision-makers. This wide audience complicates
definitions and functions as it is applied across all components and joint
staffs. The bottom line is that this audience must understand what type of
information they need. Commanders must be educated in the process and
be able to practice this. All too often, CA is an afterthought. CA must be
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considered in the beginning of the targeting process with the development
of the commander’s objectives. (Sopko 1999)”
Defensive Damage Assessment.
BDA as previously defined by JP 1-02, attempts to build “timely and accurate
estimate (2001, p. 63)” of effects of offensive actions against an adversary. Conversely,
defensive damage assessment seeks to provide the same type of estimate of the effects of
an enemy’s attack on friendly assets. The goal of defensive cyber damage assessment is
to assess the degree of degradation to one’s own mission capability resulting from a
successful cyber attack. In the private sector, such loss of mission capability may be
measured in financial loss and related constructs, such as those discussed in the Horony
model (Horony 1999) which discussed later in this paper. In military operations,
however, factors such as customer loss, business expenses, and damage to reputation do
not provide the commander with the situational awareness required to make smart and
timely decisions in wartime.
In military operations, commanders must make binding decisions that affect the
overall success of a battle or campaign. Defensive cyber damage assessment must
provide the commander with timely and accurate assessment of any degradation in
operational capability resulting from a successful cyber attack, which may impede his
force’s ability to carry out the operational intent. Failure to perform self-assessment
accurately following a successful cyber attack may introduce unnecessary risk and error
into the commanders’ decision-making process.
The lack of a self-damage assessment model was an issue discussed more than a
decade ago, when Alberts recognized the serious deficiency in the DoD’s ability to assess
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the damage resulting from a successful compromise of friendly cyber assets (Alberts
1996, p. 24). Today, literature on defensive cyber damage assessment remains relatively
scarce considering the awareness of the exploitable vulnerabilities of business and
national infrastructure. Available research literature nearly exclusively addresses private
sector economic interests; with cost loss determination being the focal point of damage
assessment. Even research attempting to determine impact in an academic environment
(Rezmierski, Deering et Al. 1999) elects economics as the impact metric of choice.
Although establishing an effective CDA-D/MIA framework that is suitable for damage
and mission impact assessment of military operations encounters many problems and
challenges cited by Sopko (Sopko 1999), the issue is important enough that it must be
accomplished. When doing so, it is important that the approach to damage assessment is
correct to ensure delivery of the right damage and mission impact assessment metrics to
the military commander.
Decision Superiority.
Air Force doctrine describes decision superiority as being able to employ the constructs
of decision making faster and more effectively than the adversary. Decision superiority
provides an advantage in the real world and cyber battlespace by allowing commanders
to exploit a superior situational awareness of the battle space. This situational awareness
enables commanders and their forces to make and implement better-informed and smarter
decisions faster than can the adversary (AFDD2-5 2005). The Air Force utilizes the wellknown “OODA loop” as a grounded decision-making model. The OODA loop is a
theory developed by retired Air Force Col. John Boyd that asserts that all rational human
behavior can be modeled as a continual cycling through four distinct tasks: Observation,
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Orientation, Decision, and Action (OODA). According to Boyd (1996) , the key to
competitive success is operating inside opponents’ OODA loops. The Air Force has
developed an adaptation of Boyd’s OODA loop to match its revised doctrinal concept of
decision making in the IO environment (see Figure 4 below). This model provides both a
picture of the IO environment and a logical foundation for the constructs of IO
capabilities in the information environment as it relates to Air Force IO doctrine.

Figure 4. Decision Making in the Information Environment (AFDD 2-5 2005, p. 3)
Information Quality.
Joint Publication 3-13 explicitly states that “information is a strategic resource
vital to national security (JP 3-13 1996, p. ix) ” The information that is used for making
important mission decisions depends that the information is of high quality suitable for
such use. The criteria for quality information chart provided by JP 3-13 builds a solid
foundation for determining the type of information to be presented in a damage and
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mission impact assessment report (see Table 1 below). The information in this report
must be all of these things to allow the commander to make smart and timely decisions
about issues that may arise following a successful cyber incident.
Table 1. Information Quality Criteria

(JP 3-13 1996, I-3)
Development of Damage Metrics.
Military operations supported by cyber technology can provide commanders a
distinct advantage by equipping them with timely information. Too often, though,
military decision makers find themselves presented with the wrong information on which
to base timely and smart decisions. When performing effective defensive cyber damage
assessment after successful cyber attack, it is supremely importance that the
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organization’s decision maker is presented with a timely and accurate assessment of any
impact to mission capability. In other words, to be effective a defensive damage
assessment model must measure the right thing in the right way so that the result can be
used effectively by the commander. Doing this begins with creating the appropriate
metrics.
Although metrics are generally applied to process improvement, this research
borrows some of the important concepts in metrics development. According to Wesner,
metrics must first and foremost measure the right thing (Wesner, Hiatt et Al. 1995). In
other words, the measurement must be bound to a goal or objective. In BDA this may be
a measure or performance (MOP) – measuring the efficiency of a task’s ability to meet an
objective; or it may be a measure of effectiveness (MOE) – how efficient a task was in
doing the right thing (Masterson 2004). MOPs and MOEs intend to measure the “right”
things to provide battlespace awareness; defensive cyber damages assessment must do
the same thing. Metrics must also be SMART: specific, measurable, actionable, relevant,
and timely (Wesner, Hiatt et Al. 1995). Each these constructs must be considered to
develop an effective defensive cyber damage assessment framework which provides
decision makers with the right information following a cyber compromise. An effective
defensive damage assessment framework can be crucial to giving the organization’s
decision makers decision superiority. Indeed, determining what the organization’s
decision maker needs to see for decision superiority in the battlespace must be a primary
driver for developing assessment metrics.
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Information Saturation.
IT and cyberspace can provide the organizational decision maker, and particularly
the military commander, with the capability to have all the right information at arm’s
length almost instantaneously. In this way, IT affords the decision maker a tremendous
advantage when desiring to attain decision superiority. However, effective and smart
decisions depend on having the right quantities of the right input information, meaning
accurate and relevant information, to facilitate option development needed for effective
decision making. In accurate or incomplete decisional input, the wrong amount of input,
or a combination of both produces what is colloquially known as garbage in garbage out
decision making (Bowman and Moskowitz 2001, p. 775).
Providing the decision maker with input information of insubstantial quality or
quantity will increase the probability of a bad decision. Often overlooked, however, is
the fact that too much information can have a similar effect on decision making; even if
the information is correct and suitable to the situation. Jensen observes that “too much
information leads to incapacitation of the decision maker’s ability to make a timely
decision. Information age leaders must caution themselves about this possibility. Sensory
overload represents our human limitation to process information. Increased volume
overwhelms not only our ability to consume, but also our ability to process and
understand (Jensen 2005, p. 56).”
In a time when many military leaders are calling for more real-time information
about the battle space, it is important that the right amount about the right things are
provided to them. To much complex information can produce the same effect as no
information. Therefore, an effective defensive damage assessment framework must
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assess the damage following a cyber security incident, estimate the impact to mission
capability, and report it in a manner that provides the decision maker with the right
quantity of information on which to make a required decision. Above all the information
prevented to the decision maker must be presented in a way the delivers the mission
impact message in a simple and easy to understand format. Otherwise, such reporting
could become white noise in the sea of information provided to the commander.
Critical Information.
According to Joint Publication 3-13.3 (1996), Operations Security (OPSEC) is a
process that identifies critical information to determine if friendly actions can be
observed by the adversary to exploit vulnerability in friendly operations (p. vii). This
program requires that organization critical information lists created for the commander to
understand which information resources he/she must protect (p. I-6). The OPSEC
program is not a suitable for vehicle for documenting cyber information assets.
The intent of the OPSEC program is not to document potential cyber risk. The
program possesses a Global War on Terror (GWOT) risk focus. In the early part of the
GWOT, there was great concern about the large pools of personal and organizational
information freely accessible through the Internet. Information such as personal
information, street addresses, maps of facilities, and locations of critical buildings of
military and critical infrastructure organizations were freely available to anyone with
Web access.
OPSEC efforts almost entirely omit cyber information assets and there is no
valuation process within the program. As a result, the current OPSEC program
implementation is not designed to provide a commander effective mapping from

45

information assets to operational or mission impact; a problem that caused by the type of
information collected. Critical documentation of cyber information is simply not
available for damage and mission impact assessment efforts.
Damage Assessment Reporting.
The purpose of a CDA-D/MIA framework is to provide the organizational
decision makers with the appropriate situation awareness of impact to mission capability
to enable and maintain decision superiority in the battle space. Literature review thus far
has established that this is one way in which CDA-D/MIA bears a close relationship to
BDA. However, without an effective mechanism to get the assessment report to the
decision maker, there is little advantage in performing assessment, as was learned in the
problems with BDA during the military operations of recent years (Curry 2004, p.13-15;
Diehl and Sloan 2005, p. 60). The Air Force, and each respective service, has fortunately
established such a mechanism. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-138 sets cyber incident
reporting procedures within the Air Force networks and facilitates linking to GIG
command and control functions. AFI 33-138 is discussed in detail later in this paper.
Unfortunately, personal experience in the Iraq Theater of Operations in 2004
demonstrated that the existing incident reporting structure at the time was not sufficient
to get the right information to the decision makers in a timely fashion. The development
of a standardized and validated CDA-D/MIA framework that can be integrated into joint
and service defensive IO components on DoD networks may help to correct these
deficiency in future military operations.
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Damage Assessment versus Mission Impact Assessment.
Damage assessment is only part of the picture. Damage assessment in the cyber
realm is an inherently focused on technological assessment concerned primarily with
rapid system restoration issues (Lala and Panda 2000, p. 300). The Air Force Computer
Emergency Response Team (AFCERT) stood up in 1993 with the mandate of incident
handling responsibilities on Air Force networks, including incident damage assessment
(FAS 1997). Recent research (Thiem 2005) underscores the many problems with damage
assessment efforts on Air Force networks, such as lack of standardization and validation
damage assessment throughout the Air Force enterprise.
Damage assessment however, is only a step towards the more recent and more
operationally important problem with mission impact assessment. According to
Arvidsson, cyber damage is a consequence of “an attack that affects the normal operation
of a system or service. (Arvidsson n.d.)” Impact is the result of damage caused by the
attack “in terms of the user community (Arvidsson n.d.).” These definitions reflect the
common perception of damage and mission impact assessment, which leads to confusion
between the two.
Damage assessment and mission impact assessment must not be viewed as the
same thing. Damage was previously defined as a reduction in value resulting from some
external action (Oxford, 1986). Damage assessment, then, must be concerned with
determining damage in terms of value loss resulting from an incident.. This loss must be
assessed in terms relevant to the organization. Mission impact must be viewed as an
evaluation of how the damage, or loss in asset value, impairs or potentially may impair
the organization’s mission operations.
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Damage assessment and mission assessment are not the same process, but they
maintain a dependent relationship in that damage assessment must be accomplished to
accurately understand mission impact resulting from a cyber incident.
Section Summary.
This section examined the foundations of defensive cyber damage and mission
impact assessment by looking at literature on the key contributory issues to damage
assessment. Battle damage assessment seeks to determine the effects of offensive actions
against an adversary, and has much in common with defensive damage assessment. The
purpose of both is to provide the commander with the battlespace awareness needed to
make smart and timely decisions and achieve decision superiority in the battlespace.
Both BDA and CDA-D/MIA face similar challenges to meeting this objective. Both
processes are extremely important to achieving a battlespace advantage. However, unless
the assessment process measures the right things and delivers the results to the
commander in a timely and appropriate format, and in the right quantities little benefits
may be seen to either process. Even with all these things done, the information must be
presented to the decision maker in a way that it can be used and understood. The
information in mission impact assessment reporting must be quality information to be
suitable for making the right decisions in a timely manner.
Risk Management on Information Networks
The term risk management is widely used and has different meanings to different
communities of interest (Kloman 1990, pp. 201-202). Risk management is the process of
identifying and assessing the risks to the organizations information assets; and applying
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appropriate mechanisms to reduce, manage and control risks to information assets (Bragg
2002). Many enterprises ‘flirt’ with the idea of risk management, but research show that
few actually implement it correctly (Hampton 2006, p. 33). Research also demonstrates
that organizations which fail to address risk will inevitably realize a greater degree loss
than organizations which do (Whitman and Mattord 2004, p. 287). Risk management is
the most critical component of security planning; consisting of three important activities
in two distinct phases. The first two activities, risk identification and risk assessment,
occur in the first phase. Defensive damage assessment exclusively concerned with the
activities of this first phase. The third activity, risk control, solely comprises the second
phase (Whitman and Mattord 2004, p. 321), and is beyond the scope of this research.
This section will discuss the main components of risk management and examine
available literature on key approaches to risk management.
Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk.
The terms threat, vulnerability and risk are often confused and misused. Threat is
the potential for violation of security that exists when there is a circumstance, capability,
action, or event that could breach security and cause harm (SANS 2006). Vulnerability is
a weakness in system security procedures, system design, implementation, internal
controls, etc., that could potentially be exploited to violate system security policy (NCSC
1988). Risk is “an expectation of loss expressed as the probability that a particular threat
will exploit a particular vulnerability with a particular harmful result (Shirey 2000).”
Risk can be viewed as a measure of potential loss to an organization; or more
specifically, as a measure of exposure to damage or loss (see Figure 5 below). Two
additional factors be satisfied: 1) there must be some uncertainty about the outcome, and
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2) there must be some choice made about the course of action regarding the potential for
loss (Alberts and Dorofee 2005, p. 5). Without the potential for loss, there is no risk
(Petrocelli 2005, pp. 5-6). The magnitude of risk depends greatly on the assets at risk, or
more specifically, the value of the assets at risk.

Figure 5. Threat and Risk (Alberts and Dorofee, p. 5)

The eighteenth century German scientist, Georg Lichtenberg (1775) once stated
that, “Once we know our weaknesses, they cease to harm us.” Risk actualization cannot
be entirely avoided, but Lichtenberg was still partially correct. An organization that
understands the relationship of threat, vulnerability and risk to its critical assets can do
much to mitigate the damage and impact to the organization when risk becomes reality.
Risk Identification.
Risk identification is the process of self-examination in which the organization
defines, identifies, and documents its information assets into useful groups (Whitman and
Mattord 2004, p. 290). This process is not limited to simply risk and asset identification.
The assets identified also are prioritized and assigned value in this stage. Risk
identification can easily become a highly intensive task at the onset. Only by
accomplishing this process, however, can an organization identify the assets vulnerable to
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loss. This process lays the foundation for all future steps of risk management; and failure
to effectively accomplish results in a greater probability of inefficient protection
measures and an incapability to provide management necessary visibility into the impact
following a disaster (Charron 1987, pp. 80-81). The risk identification process identifies
critical assets. Critical assets are those assets that if damaged or lost would affect the
organization’s ability to operation efficiently.
Once critical assets are identified, they may be prioritized and valuated according
to the respective ‘worth’ to the organization. This is done through categorization,
classification, and determining the contextual value of each asset (Whitman and Mattord
2004, pp. 294-299). Classification can provide a baseline estimate, but the contextual
value of the information asset is the most complex, yet most important of the asset
constructs to determine (Petrocelli 2005, pp.181-182). Without accomplishing effective
risk identification activities to identify and valuate critical information assets to be
protected, no “target” exists for which to accurately identify and enumerate the
vulnerabilities and associate threats to assets requiring protection. This is vital to any
security planning effort.
Risk assessment.
It is possible for a system to appear safe, but actually have undetected
vulnerabilities that put its assets at risk (Bishop 2003). There is little reasonable argument
against risk identification and assessment as integral to establishment of the level of
protection required to adequately protect organizational assets (GAO 2000). Whitman
and Mattord (2004 pp. 290, 308) draw a distinct and important difference, however,
between risk identification and risk assessment. Risk assessment can is the process of
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analyzing threats and vulnerabilities of an information system and the potential impact of
the loss of information or capabilities of a system. Risk assessment determines probable
impact of loss of any asset identified in the risk identification stage (Whitman and
Mattord 2004, pp. 308-309).
Approaches to Risk Management.
The past two decades have seen several approaches to risk management on
information networks come and go. The first generation approaches, such as the Annual
Loss Expectancy (ALE)-based “common framework” developed by NIST, failed. Kevin
Soo Hoo (2000) attributes this failure to three fatal flaws: 1) an infeasible sized
assessment task, 2) an expectation of deterministic values that resulted in an inability to
handle uncertainty, and 3) required a large information harvest from a small field of data
to populate the ALE model (Soo Hoo 2000, pp. 4-8).
Integrated Business Risk Management.
The second generation of approaches to risk management attempted to overcome
the failures their predecessors. The Integrated Business Risk Management (IBRM)
approach holds that IT risks are analogous to business risks, and can be managed in the
same way. This approach is distinctly non-technical and focuses on the role of IT support
for business goals (Soo Hoo 2000, pp. 9-10). Additionally, the IBRM implementation can
be highly complex. While this approach is used widely in the business world, it may not
be a practical for risk management of military networks. More importantly to this goal of
this research, a central part of the IBRM approach focuses on return on IT investment,
with securing information assets as a secondary consideration.
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Scenario-analysis approach.
The scenario-analysis approach is possibly the most common risk management
methodology. This approach focus on vulnerabilities within the security controls meant
to protect the IT infrastructure. Although, in wide use within the DoD, scenario-analysis
methodology suffers the major drawback of limited scope (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 11),
focusing primarily on threat detection and exploit prevention through direct focus on
technology. This focus on technical vulnerabilities makes establishing effective cyber
damage assessment extremely difficult.
Value-driven approach.
Value-driven risk management approach is less complex than the IBRM approach
and offers valuation-driven security specifications to information assets identified and
valuated by an enterprise agent with sufficient perspective to determine relative value of
the asset. These specifications attempt to ensure security and standardize security
practices within the enterprise. According to Soo Hoo (2005), this approach avoids the
technical complexities that crippled ALE-based methodologies, and facilitates focus on
critical deployment issues. Soo Hoo argues, however, that this approach is too simple to
be effective, ignoring key capabilities such as cost-benefit analysis and the information
technology that contains the asset (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 10).
The OCTAVE method.
There are asset-focused methodologies, such as Operationally Critical Threat,
Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) method (Alberts, Dorofee et Al. 2003),
that overcome many of the shortcomings of other approaches by integrating attributes
from other methodologies. The OCTAVE method was developed by Carnegie Mellon
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University and allows organizations to balance the best practices of the previous three in
one package (Whitman and Mattord 2004, pp. 347-349). OCTAVE employs a threephase approach that is founded on information asset identification and valuation. In
Phase 1, the focus is on defining, documenting, and valuating critical information assets
within the organization. Asset profiles are created, documenting the critical information
assets on which the organization relies. These profiles record the information asset’s
value, owners, required security controls, threats and vulnerabilities, and other critical
constructs of the information asset. Technological vulnerabilities within the
infrastructure are not documented until Phase 2. In Phase 3, risk is analyzed and security
plans, policy, and other controls are created and employed to mitigate the risk (Alberts
and Dorofee 2001, pp. D-19-21). Because of its focus on the identification,
documentation, and valuation of information assets and technology, OCTAVE is a
comprehensive risk management approach that lays a solid foundation for CDA-D/MIA
framework implementation.
Air Force Operational Risk Management Program.
The Air Force employs a risk management program entitled the Operational Risk
Management Program (ORM) (AFPD 90-9 2000; AFI 90-901 2001). Among the
primary goals of ORM are enhancement of mission effectiveness at all levels, while
protecting the organization’s assets and improving war fighting mission effectiveness and
mission accomplishment (AFPD 90-9 2000). Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-901 (2001)
implements the ORM program and correctly identifies the critical risk management steps
of identification, assessment, and control of risk to operational assets. However, it is
important to note that the ORM process does not explicitly recognize cyber information
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assets in its assessment process. Air Force ORM deals exclusively with risk management
of physical assets.
Section Summary.
An effective risk management is critical to establishing an effective information
security program. There exist distinct differences in the approaches to risk management,
so an organization must carefully choose one the enables a comprehensive approach to
effective information protection. Many organizations do not perform effective risk
management activities, or limit the scope of the risk management functions such that they
are ineffective. An asset-focused approach that enables identification and valuation of
the information assets on which the organization depends, and identifies the business
processes and goals which they support, such as the OCTAVE approach (Alberts,
Dorofee et Al. 2003), is essential to building the foundation of defensive cyber damage
assessment.
Information Assets
This section will examine the relevance of information as an asset to the
organization. As Drucker (1995) correctly recognizes, information is the center of
gravity for daily operations within the modern business organization. This dependence
exists because information holds relevance and value as knowledge to the organization.
The distinction between information and the IT that enables organizations to effectively
use it is often blurred. Understanding this distinction is fundamental to creating an
approach to cyber security that facilitates defensive cyber damage assessment. This
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section examines literature that provides a fundamental understanding of information as
an asset.
An Information Taxonomy.
This aspect of CDA-D/MIA development research is primarily concerned with
developing an understanding of the difference between data and information. They are
frequently confused and used incorrectly referred to interchangeably. Some communities
of interest mistakenly hold that there is little distinguishable difference between, data,
information, and knowledge (Alavi and Leidner 1999). However, a better understanding
of each reveals the distinct contextual differences that define each and provide the
foundations for information taxonomy. Data is the foundation of this taxonomy. The
information taxonomy develops as information progresses from raw data to information
to refined knowledge suitable for decision-making (Kanter 1999, pp. 8). The catalyst for
development of the taxonomy is the assignment of contextual meaning through human
application and utility (Petrocelli 2005, p. 181).
Data is the subset of information and the focus of traditional cyber security
schemes that focus on the storage, access, and protection of the container system on
which the data is stored. However, data has no inherent value. It is completely dependent
upon its external application to produce value (Petrocelli 2005, pp. 180-181). Human
utility drives organization and aggregation of data into usable groupings of contextual
relationships that endow the data with relevance and purpose. Thus data becomes
information which, by its nature, is inherently associated with meaning (Spiegler 2000,
pp. 8-9). Information, not data, is the center of this taxonomy, as it is the basic unit that
contributes to the development of knowledge for use in all forms of decision making.
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Knowledge is information further aggregated into a more usable form that can be made
actionable to provide value to the organizational mission (Kanter 1999, pp. 7-9; Vail
1999, pp. 16-17). The ensuing information taxonomy reflects the increasing value as
information is transformed and used within the organization for decision making
(Spiegler 2000, pp. 9-11). Because information is the core asset of cyberspace, it must be
at the center of asset focused security planning and risk management if cyber damage
assessment is to be possible.
Contextual Value of Information.
The classical economics theory of uncertainty holds that information cannot be
valued like consumption good. Information is useful primarily as an input to decisions,
and is extremely difficult to assign a quantitative value (Van Alstyne 1999, pp. 328-329).
The value of information is dynamic and changes from one organization to the next; and
even within an organization as the context that assigns value changes (Petrocelli 2005,
pp. 185-189). This problem of context introduces a varying level of uncertainty in
assigning value, and is one factor that has confounded many attempts at developing
models to account for and definitively measure the value of an information asset (Soo
Hoo 2000, p. 7). Information value is not static explicitly because of this concept of
context. Its value is always relative to some target goal (Morrision and Cohen 2005, p.
34). If the information asset aligns with the mission by strongly supports an
organization’s strategic goal, the asset will prove to hold a high level of contextual value
to the organization whole; especially if the asset is a direct contributor to some
competitive advantage gained or held by the organization (Willcocks 2004, pp. 241-245).
When the information asset directly aligns with the mission of the entire organization, its

57

contextual value is simple to understand. However, an asset may exist within the
hierarchy of missions that exist within an organization. Determining the value of the
asset may not be as readily determined without examining the assets utility in relation to
its support for mission operational processes. However, it is important to realize that the
primary value driver for information is externally determined by how the owner tied the
information asset’s usability to achieving some goal the owner desires (Buffett, Scott, et.
Al. 2004, pp. 80-81; Morrison and Cohen 2005, p. 34).
Remember that Albert’s hierarchy of missions says that an organization maintains
an ordinal stacking of missions that work together to support the organization’s
established goals. Each organizational function has its own goals and processes that
support is mission. This functional mission supports the organizational mission, in turn.
Each of these functions depends on information assets and systems with an inherent
contextual value to the respective function. An information asset that is critical to the
mission of one function may have little or no value to another, but still have hold high
value to the organizational mission. This supports Petrocelli’s assertion the value of
information is not static, but is a function of context and perspective relating to mission
(Petrocelli 2005 pp. 183-184). Consider, however, that an information asset that is of
high value to as supporting function within the organization can also be high value to the
organization as a whole; depending on the degree of dependence of the organization’s
mission depends of the function’s operational processes that rely upon that asset.
Information also holds contextual value that can change throughout its lifecycle.
Information can age beyond usefulness. It can suffer compromise to its confidentiality,
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availability, or integrity that may reduce its usefulness to the organization, which equates
to degradation in value to the organization.
Owners, Custodians, and Consumers of Information Assets.
The traditional thought on information responsibility and usage hold that there are
three basic categorical communities that “touch” information: information owners,
information custodians, and information consumers, or users. It must be noted that there
is no commonly agreed upon definition of any of these and that different communities of
interest include additional, more specific categories. A commonly accepted definition for
an information owner, however, is “the person or group responsible for applying security
policies to an information object” (Computer Desktop Encyclopedia n.d.). Stephens
states “owners of an information asset are those individuals who have primary
responsibility for the viability and survivability of an asset” (Stevens 2005, p. 6). The
information custodian is the individual or group of individuals within the organization
that bears the responsibility for protection of the information asset as it is stored, moved,
or processed. Owners are responsible for establishing the security requirements and
custodians are responsible for ensuring the requirements are carried out. Stephens also
states the information owner, not the custodian, is responsible for understanding the value
that the asset maintains to the organization (2005, p. 7). The custodian, however, is
responsible for the infrastructure in which the asset resides; and is responsible for no
more than the protection and assurance activities required to keep the asset safe and
accessible. According to Stephens (2005, p. 7), in many organizations the owner is
unaware of his/her basic responsibilities and custodianship is frequently confused with
ownership.
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The information user, or consumer, depends upon the information for some
process, but does not necessarily bear ownership or custodial responsibilities. This
definition does not preclude the consumer from bearing any responsibility for protecting
the information. The consumer is most often closest to the asset and associated risk
(Spears 2006). For this reason, the consumer must bear some degree of custodial
responsibility when using information. Stephens illustrates this with a scenario of a user
accessing a database from a desktop.
“In essence, the user, as the manager of that desktop, is temporarily also a
custodian. Custodians are generally required to provide due care over the
information asset while it is in their possession. Thus, the user should
ensure that she protects this information asset as well as or better than it
was protected at the container from which she received it. More
importantly, the user should protect the information asset commensurate
with its security requirements. If she cannot, the owner of the information
asset should deny her access to it or deny her the privilege of acting as a
custodian for the information. (Stevens 2005, p. 8)“
It is important to understand that these three categorical communities of
information responsibility are not mutually exclusive. An information owner can
also be the custodian, with responsibility of determining value and security
controls for an information asset, and responsibility for the technological asset
that contains the information asset. As this literature has shown that the user can
bear some degree of custodial responsibility, the owner can also be any one of
many consumers. Stephens observes that in the real world, an information asset
may have multiple owners, and thus, many different security requirements. This
is an important concept to understand when attempting to determine damage
caused to an information asset by a successful cyber attack.
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Information Assets vs. Information Technology Assets.
Operations rely on information, and this research has established that modern
organizations rely largely upon information in cyberspace. Because of this dependency
upon specific information, operations regard the information on which it depends as an
asset. Information technology is an enabler for operations to achieve improved access to
that information. Consider that in IT non-availability, it is conceivable that operations can
continue if another mode of information delivery is contrived. However, with the
scenario reversed, the presence of IT would not enable the mission without the
information asset on which the mission depends. In his controversial article, IT doesn’t
matter (Carr 2003, p. 41-42), Carr hits precisely upon this issue. Too many organizations
erroneously believe that IT will provide a competitive advantage and focus on IT as a
vehicle to strategic success. Carr correctly argues that IT offers no such guarantee (2003,
pp. 41-43). Carr’s stance supports Davenport’s assertion made earlier in this literature
review that technology is not an equitable substitute for information (Davenport and
Prusack 1998).
An exclusive focus on IT is especially dangerous when attempting to establish an
effective security program. The first step of such a program must identify what must be
protected. If the focus is exclusively on a single target asset group, developing a
comprehensive understanding of the value and potential impact from risk realized
becomes difficult. (Soo Hoo 2000, pp. 10-11). By first understanding and identifying
information as an asset, followed by understanding the its relationship with it
technological container, a more comprehensive approach to setting security controls can
be established..

61

Valuation of Information Assets.
Information and the systems that contain and process it are among the most
valuable assets of any organization (GAO 2000, p. 2). Virtually all existing literature
regarding data, information, or knowledge value attempts to assign economic value to the
asset. This is not surprising, since the vast majority of the available work is sponsored by
for-profit private sector organizations. It is important to realize that the common thread
is that information assets are not purely commodities with prefixed value. The way
information is valued varies in a large degree on the perspective of the information owner
(Buffett, Scott, et. Al. 2004, p. 79). It must be recognized, however, that the primary
value driver for information is not internal. The value of information is determined by
how it can be used by its owner and this value is necessarily tied the utility in achieving
some goal the owner desires (Buffett, Scott, et. Al. 2004, pp. 80-81; Morrison and Cohen
2005, p. 34). Therefore, any valuation of information must reflect this acknowledgement
of utility as a value driver for the valuation to be meaningful to the owner.
Section Summary.
This section examined literature fundamental to establishing the concept of
information as an asset within the modern organization. Organizations depend on
information to accomplish the mission. Technology enables the flow of and access to the
information. Data has no inherent value, about must be organized in such a way that it
becomes information and gains meaning and, thus, value to the organization. The
information asset has owners, custodians, and consumers that hold differing perspectives
of the information, respectively. Information is frequently forgotten when exclusive
focus is placed on the technology that supports it. This limits the understanding of the
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value the information holds to these communities of interest and the organization as a
whole. Information, not technology, must be viewed as the chief asset in an information
organization if value is to be realized. Only then can damage and mission impact
assessment be fully realized.

Relevant Laws, Orders, Doctrine and Guidance Relevant to Cyberspace
A large body of law, directive, and guidance exists to govern the conduct of the
various aspects of military and government operations in cyberspace. This section will
take a comprehensive approach to provide an exhaustive review of the literature and law
applicable to conduct of cyberwarfare and the establishment of a defensive cyber damage
assessment framework.
Legal Implications of Cyberwarfare.
Air Force Policy Directive 51-4 (1993) mandates that Air Force personnel are
required to comply with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) while engaging in armed
conflict. It defines armed conflict is defined as a situation where at least one state has
engaged in use of armed force (1993). There exists much debate about the legality of
offensive cyberwarfare operations and what, in cyberspace, equates to an armed attack.
The Air Force is keenly aware of this and addresses this subject in AFDD 2-5,
Information Operations doctrine. Dr. Thomas Wingfield addresses this issue through
review of international law. He reports that the Charter of the United Nations articulates
the principle of jus ad bellum, which is “the portion of international law that governs the
lawful resort to force (Wingfield 2006, p. 2).” Wingfield determines that there are many
issues when defining the threshold of escalation from cyber conflict to the equivalent of
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armed conflict. One of the many concerns raised in other literature is the issue of
collateral damage which may have unexpected affects on unintended targets. Collateral
damage is a concern in the cyber domain because of the many interdependencies upon
information assets. Cyber attacks are not bound by the laws of physics and the effects of
an attack may have unintended consequences on the other side of the world. Failure to
accurately assess the collateral damage of a cyber attack may be unethical at best, and
illegal at worst (Rowe 2005). Ultimately, however, Wingfield concedes that there is still
no consensus on the legality of cyber warfare (Wingfield 2006, pp. 12-13).
DiCenso comes to a similar conclusion by pointing out that no clear guidance
exists to define what constitutes armed force (DiCenso 1999, p. 88). DiCenso holds The
Air Force’s definition of a weapon (AFI 51-04 1994) clearly indicates that there does not
appear to be any legal issue of significance regarding the application of cyberwar in
regards to LOAC. The areas of cryptology and encryption have raised much interesting
discussion regarding this, but primarily concerning policy and strategy rather than
legality. Both Wingfield and DiCenso agree that current interpretation of international
law holds that a nation allows a nation to engage in defensive cyberwarfare operations to
protect its cyber and real-world assets in any way, so long as these activities do not
negatively impact another nation’s assets (DiCenso 1999 pp. 98-99; Wingfield 2006, p.
12).
Doctrine on Information Operations and Cyberspace.
In 2006, both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the United
States Air Force issued revised joint doctrine on Information Operations. The DoD’s
standard for military terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (2006), was also updated to reflect
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these changes. Prior to this revision, both doctrinal documents made a clear delineation
between offensive and defensive activities in Information Operations (IO). This recent
update to JP 3-13, Information Operations (2006) states that Joint IO doctrine now
“discontinues use of the terms ‘offensive IO’ and ‘defensive IO’”, but states that “the
recognition that IO is applied to achieve both offensive and defensive objectives (JP 3-13
2006). ” This revised joint doctrine places computer network attack (CNA), computer
network defense (CND), and computer network exploitation (CNE) functions under one
umbrella by establishing Computer Network Operations (CNO). JP 3-13 cites CNO as
one of the five core capabilities of joint IO doctrine (JP 3-13 2006). The following table
displays the notional revision of joint IO structure (see Table 2 below). It is worthy to
note that the term information warfare is no longer used in joint doctrine.
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Table 2. Information Operations Integration into Joint Operations

(JP 3-13 2006)
The Air Force (AFDD2-5 2005) has created a network operations capability
which is comprised of three functions mirroring the joint CNO construct. The Air
Force’s Network Warfare operations (NW Ops) are the integration of the military
capabilities of network attack (NetA), network defense (NetD), and network warfare
support (NS). The intent of NetA is to perform offensive operations against the
adversary’s cyber information assets with the desired effect of “influence[ing] the
adversary commander’s decisions. (AFDD2-5 2005)” In this way, Air Force IO doctrine
acknowledges that cyber operations can impact the adversary’s mission capability, both
in the cyber domain and in real world operations.

66

Federal Information Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347, Title III).
The federal government has a limited role in the overall security of the national
infrastructure. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the federal
government’s primary agent for working with state and local governments, the private
sector, academia, and the general public to ensure necessary measures are enacted to
protect the national information infrastructure (Moteff 2004). It has, however, produced
requirements for securing those information systems under federal control through the
passage of P.L. 107-347, Title III, commonly known as the Federal Information Security
Act (FISMA) of 2002 (United States Congress 2002). FISMA recognizes that the chief
underlying factor in the majority of information security problems within federal
agencies this the employment of an ineffective information security program; and
attempts to create a comprehensive framework for more effective information security
(GAO 2005). FISMA authorizes the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) to develop the security standards and guidelines that will be used on federally
“owned” non-national security systems. Section 3542, subparagraph (2A) defines a
national security system as any computer or telecommunications system that is operated
by a federal agency, or agency contractor, and used in a function or activity which:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Involves intelligence activities;
Involves cryptological activities related to national security;
Involves command and control of military forces;
Involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system;
is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions; or
“is protected at all times by procedures established for information that have been
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act
of Congress to be dept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy (United States Congress 2002).”
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Subparagraph 2B explicitly excludes systems that meet the above criteria, but are “used
for routine administration and business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics,
and personnel management applications) (2002).”
Of particular interest to this research is the requirement throughout FISMA to
provide an information security program commensurate with amount of potential damage
that could result from a successful compromise. Furthermore, FISMA specifically cites
the information stored on the system, rather than the information system exclusively.
Section 3544, subparagraphs (2)(A-D) specifically tasks the head of each agency under
the authority of FISMA to ensure senior agency officials establish an information security
program based on risk to the assets that support operations. This is extremely important
as it implies the need for asset-focused risk assessment, which is the foundation of
defensive damage assessment. Section 3544, subparagraphs (2)(A-D) reads as follows:
‘‘’(2) ensure that senior agency officials provide information security for
the information and information systems that support the operations and
assets under their control, including through—
‘(A) assessing the risk and magnitude of the harm that could result
from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of such information or information
systems;
‘(B) determining the levels of information security appropriate to
protect such information and information systems in accordance
with standards promulgated under section 11331 of title 40, for
information security classifications and related requirements;
‘(C) implementing policies and procedures to cost-effectively
reduce risks to an acceptable level; and
‘(D) periodically testing and evaluating information security
controls and techniques to ensure that they are effectively
implemented; (United States Congress 2002)”
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National Security Directive 42 (NSD-42).
NSD-42 (Bush 1990) describes the foundational goals for information technology
and telecommunications security within the federal government and provides basic
implementation strategy for securing the systems designated as national security systems.
This directive mandates the national security telecommunications and information
technology must be reliable, effective, efficient, and have a sound technical base. NSD42 was signed by President George H. Bush on July 5, 1990. NSD-42 explicitly names
the Director, National Security Agency (NSA) as the National Manager for National
Security Telecommunications and Information. Among the many authorities granted to
the National Manager is the responsibility to assess the overall security posture, to
include threats and vulnerabilities to national security systems. The contextual support
provided by the other Directives and Orders examined in this section support the
assumption that the intent is to protect the information procession systems and the
information assets residing on these systems.
HSPD-7 and the President’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.
The Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 7 (HSPD-7) is an extension of
basic policy established by the previous administration’s Presidential Decision Directive
No. 63, and states that is the United States policy to enhance the protection of the nation’s
critical infrastructure. HSPD-7 is inclusive of both cyber and real-world infrastructure
assets, but specifically directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to maintain and
organization that serves as the cyber security focal point by coordinating protection
efforts between public and private sector and academia (Bush 2003).
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According to John Moteff (2004), the President’s National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace (PNSSC) (NIAC 2002)carries less weight than public law or presidential
directive, it is still considered an important step towards bringing together all interested
parties in securing those mission systems and processes dependent on cyberspace (Moteff
2004). The PNSSC outlines the strategic importance and strategic objectives for
protecting cyberspace-dependent systems and operations. This document supports, and at
times overlaps, other Executive Orders and Presidential Directives and recommends
specific tasks which include vulnerability threat and warning sharing, integrated exercises
to test cyber security response and effectiveness, coordination of national threat
assessment.
The recommendations PNSSC makes are only guidelines for suggested
implementation. Many experts feel that this plan falls short of its intended purpose. In
2004, the Professionals for Cyberspace Defense, an elite group of approximately 40
concerned scientists and cyber security experts (PCD 2002b), expressed concern that no
definitive research or validation had been conducted to assess the national vulnerability to
date. The PCD cited a “failure to establish the full nature of the problem represents a
fundamental flaw in the White House strategy (Saydjari 2002, p. 125).”
CJCSM 6510.01 Ch 3 ANNEX A TO APPENDIX B, ENCLOSURE B.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) No. 6510.01 Change 3,
Defense-In-Depth: Information Assurance (IA) And Computer Network Defense (CND),
08 March, 2006 is a limited distribution document, therefore only a very specific section
of this manual that is very important to this research will be discussed. CJCSM 6510.10
Ch3 Annex A to Appendix B to Enclosure B establishes the responsibilities of the Joint
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Staff, combatant commands, Services, Defense agencies, DoD field activities and join
activities. This manual very explicitly prescribes the operational impact assessment
resulting from a successful cyber attack on DoD networks be provided to commanders
and other responsible communities of interest (CJCSM6510.01 2006). To meet this
requirement, a validated defensive cyber damage assessment framework must be in place
to provide commanders and other required personnel with timely and accurate
operational impact report. Without a validated framework, cyber damage assessment is a
non-standardized, undependable estimate of the damage caused by cyberspace incidents
on Air Force networks (Thiem 2005, p. 43).
Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-206 Operational Reporting.
AFI 10-206 Operational Reporting establishes the Air Force Operational
Reporting System (AFOREPS) and the Operational Status Event/Incident Report
(OPREP-3). AFOREPS is a set of reports intended to provide Air Force level leadership
and intermediate commands with timely situational awareness information to make
timely operational decisions. The OPREP-3 is one of the key reports that contribute to
the AFOREPS. The OPREP-3 report is an immediate report issued to notify commanders
of any significant event or incident that effects MAJCOM, HQ USAF, or DoD mission;
to include events that impacts the commander’s mission capability in such a way that
higher level mission is affected (AFI 10-206 2004). The OPREP-3 report categorizes
events and incidents according to their potential impact. AFI 10-206 explicitly defines
the criteria for each various types of OPREP-3 reports, and more importantly the report
content and reporting procedures for each. This AFI establishes the mechanism for upchanneling incidents that impact an organizations mission capability; and therefore is
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important guidance for establishing initial mission impact reporting following cyber
damage assessment.
AFI 33-138 Enterprise Network Operations Notification and Tracking.
AFI 33-138, Enterprise Network Operations Notification and Tracking
establishes a hierarchy of reporting for all issues and incidents occurring on Air Force
networks. It implements, among other guidance, the incident and vulnerability reporting
requirements specified in CJCSM 6510.01, Defense-in-Depth: Information Assurance
(IA) and Computer Network Defense (2006). This AFI prescribes and explains the
various notification and tracking processes required to direct and coordinate action and
report status within the Air Force Network Operations (AFNETOPS) hierarchy.
AFI 33-138 (2004) is establishes a unified and standardized reporting system that
facilitates rapid dissemination of incident notification and the command and control
direction for response actions throughout Air Force networks. Specifically defined in this
AFI are the reporting and directive actions required for such protective and preventive
activities network security incidents reporting, Time Compliance Technical Orders, and
Classified Message Incidents. The reporting structure established by this AFI is
especially well suited for rapid multidirectional information dissemination through the
AFNETOPS command and control structure to the information owners affected by a
successful cyber attack. The unified and consolidated incident reporting structure
established by this AFI is very important to ensuring the rapid and secure damage
assessment reporting information to both AFNETOPS command and control, and
potentially affected information owners.
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Section Summary.
This section considered the body of essential laws, directives, doctrine, and
service instructions that provide guidance for the conduct of cyberspace and cyberwar
operations, and the establishment of a defensive cyber damage assessment framework;
and established that there are few legal complications associated with defensive
cyberwarfare activities. Particularly noteworthy is FISMA’s requirement that agencies
under its jurisdiction establish security controls for both operations and assets that is
commensurate with amount of potential damage that could result from a successful
compromise. This wording strongly implies asset-focused risk management, which is the
foundation for an effective CDA-D/MIA framework. Although FISMA does not apply to
national security systems, commanders responsible for systems supporting military
operations under CJCSM 6510.01 Ch 3 are required to provide operational impact
assessment following a cyber security incident. AFI 10-206 Operational Reporting and
AFI 22-138 establish operational impact reporting requirements and establish a unified
reporting system on Air Force networks.

Related Research and Work
This research has stated that the financial loss estimation desired by for profit
organizations provide a less effective decision making tool for non-profit driven
institutions such as the military. This statement is true when considering the necessary
decision input for tactical and operational decisions. In strategic decision making,
however, the military shares a common interest with the profit driven sector. As
shrinking budgets and an important war on terror cause DoD leadership to carefully
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guard every dollar spent; wise investment in information technology and the security
controls to protect the information assets within becomes highly important. In this
context, understanding the financial losses caused by successful cyber security incidents
has value for making important long-range decisions.
Determining Large Scale Economic Loss.
Damage assessment models that fit a military decision making framework are
scarce. In relative contrast, models that seek to determine the economic loss caused by a
successful cyber attack seem to abound. If a model is to describe financial lose within and
organization, such as the military, it must be able to address the effects of large scale
attack distributed across a wide area. One approach is to attempt assessment of large
scale economic loss of time (Dubendorfer 2004). The Dubendorfer, et. Al., scenario
assumes an external attack via the Internet. This attack specifically launches a dedicated
denial of service (DDoS) attack against national infrastructure provider in an attempt to
severely degrade wide area service and negatively impact companies. This scenario
further assumes that the attack has a relatively short duration, measured in hours to days.
The attacker’s expectancy is that a significant degradation in Internet performance will
result in financial loss and that the longer an attack lasts, the greater the potential
economic impact (Dubendorfer 2004). Furthermore, economic impact can increase past
the duration of the attack, unlike technical impact, which generally ends with post-attack
remediation.
The Dubendorfer, et. Al. model approaches this duration of potential economic
impact as t → ∞ , where t = t 0 is the time of the attack start, and t = t `1 as the time of
attack completion. The interval following the attack is represented as [t1 , t 2 ] , where t 2
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presumably represents completion of remediation and return to normal business.
Duration of impact beyond t 2 is represented as t > t 2 .
This model attempts to estimate economic loss within categories of types of
damage. Dubendorfer, et. Al, identify the following four categories:
1. Downtime Loss: Total downtime loss ( L D ) is comprised of two
subcategories, productivity loss, where the incident forces employees to
utilize less efficient means of accomplishing assigned tasks, and revenue loss.
Downtime loss may be represented as the sum of these two; and may be
modeled as follows: L D =

E ca
R
⋅ d 0 ⋅ E no ⋅ E po + a ⋅ ds 0 ⋅ R0 ⋅ S 0 , where E ca
da
ds a

represents annual cost per employee, d a represents working time per
employee per year, d 0 represents working hours overlapping outage time, E no
represents the number of employees affected, E po represents productivity
degradation during the incident, Ra is the total annual revenue, d sa represents
annual service operating hours, d so represents service hours affected by
outage, R 0 represents that part of revenue affected by the outage, and
S 0 represents the degree of service degradation (Dubendorfer 2004)
2. Disaster Recovery: Disaster recovery costs Lr include the time, material and
additional incidental expenses incurred for restoration and recovery following
an incident. Disaster recovery costs may be modeled as the sum of costs
incurred during downtime, cited by Duberdorfer, et. Al., as [t 0 , t1 ] . It is
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modeled as: Lr = E r ⋅ E ch ⋅ d r ⋅ + M c , where E r represents number of
employees assigned to recovery team, E ch represents hourly cost per team
member, d r represents non-“duty” hours work, and M c represents material
costs incurred (Dubendorfer 2004).
3. Liability: In some cases the incident may result in the organization failing to
fulfill contractual obligations with third party organizations. These
organizations may demand financial compensation, resulting in liability costs
( Lc ). Liability costs may modeled as follows: Lc = ∑ C C + ∑ C l , where

∑C

C

represents the sum of all compensation claims, and

∑C

l

represents

the sum of all liability claims (Dubendorfer 2004).
4. Customer Loss: The incident may result in loss of customers, depending on
various factors. The impact of customer loss cost ( LCL ) may accrue for a long
time, and potentially have a negative on recruitment of new customers. This
long-term loss may be modeled by considering sum of actual customers ( C A )
and potential customers lost ( C P ) over time ( Δt ), multiplied by the average
revenue per customer ( RC ) and follows: LCL = [C A (Δt ) + C P (Δt )] ⋅ RC (Δt ) .
Dubendorfer further notes that if RC has a high variance, this model is
inaccurate. When this occurs, a detailed analysis should be used, representing
only the critical customers (Dubendorfer 2004).
It should be noted that this type of model may be suited specific non-operational,
strategic decisions that military decision makers consider when determining budgetary IT
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issues, such as level of investment in technological security controls. Such a model can
perform suitably for assessment of economic loss. Associating the information’s value
with an economic handle provides some tangibility to the information, but still cannot the
intangible property of utility. Development of such a model would provide some benefit
to the decision maker of an organization not driven by economic profit motives.
A Utility-Based Value Model for Information Decision Making.
This section will briefly discuss the concepts of another model (Morrison and Cohen
2005) that information value from a utility-based perspective. This model focuses on the
value of information being relative to some goal decision (Morrison and Cohen p. 34).
This has important implications about developing value handles for the intangible
properties by which information presents value to the organizations.
Morrison and Cohen present their base target decision model (p. 35, eq. 1) as a
way to model simple decision making based, where the target hypothesis relates to the
utility value of information. This model is explicitly geared towards making economic
based decisions based on , so no further discussion will entail about the details of the
model. The model is noteworthy, however since it provides one way to determine
relative value through the information utility.
Damage Assessment on Air Force Networks.
Case study research (Thiem 2005) conducted to understand how defensive
damage assessment was being conducted on Air Force networks focused on information
collected through interviews with subjects working in MAJCOM NOSCs and the Air
Force Computer Emergency Response Team, now renamed AFNOSC NSD (AFI 33-138
2004). This effort established that some degree of damage assessment is attempted in
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various places within the Air Force networks. However, Thiem cites that “individual
organizations within the [Air Force] are developing their own methods and models to
perform network damage assessment (Thiem 2005, p. 43).” The research notes that
several of the assessment methodologies discussed did not apply guidance, such as AFI
10-206 (2004) to ensure that impact to mission capability was considered in the
assessment. Without an established standard and validated methodology, cyber damage
assessment on Air Force networks is unreliable at best.
Two interesting concepts are uncovered by Thiem’s research that underscore
topics previously discussed in this chapter and are worthy of further examination. First, it
is noteworthy that one of the few commonalities between damage assessment
methodologies was the focus on damage to the system. Two respondents to the survey
answered that damage assessment is unnecessary since it takes focus away from
infrastructure protection. Clearly, this response is symptomatic of the limited scope of
understanding created by technologically focused scenario analysis approach to risk
management discussed by Soo Hoo (2000, p. 11). This mindset, as reflected by the
respondents, holds protection of technology at a higher priority than protection the
information asset itself. This disregard for the technological enabler over the mission
critical asset causes problems on many levels and may be indicative of a perspective that
may be preventing effective and accurate damage and mission impact assessment on Air
Force networks.
Secondly, not a single respondent addresses the issue of mission capability impact
that may result from a successful cyber attack. Impact analysis, a predictive estimation of
damage to the operational mission if an asset is lost, is not considered (Stoneburner,
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Goguen, et. Al. 2002, p. 12). The survey interviews conducted by Thiem (2005) shed
light on several problematic issues regarding the current status of damage assessment on
Air Force networks, and problems that may be preventing effective damage assessment
and mission capability assessment being implemented under the existing approach to
network security and risk management.
The Horony Damage Assessment Model.
Research (Horony 1999) conducted at the Air Force Institute of Technology
aimed to develop a model for Information System damage assessment. This research was
exploratory and the model produced conceptual. Horony identifies eight primary factors
he states an Information Systems manager should consider during the risk assessment
process. The eight factors of the Horony model (see Figure 6 below) are:
•

Recovery

•

Data

•

Education/Training

•

Lost Revenue

•

Business Expenses

•

Reputation

•

Productivity

•

Human Life.

Horony breaks down each of these categories, or factors, into sub-factors.
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Figure 6. Horony Damage Assessment Model (1999, p. 35)

The Recovery Factor.
Horony defines recovery as the “process that system administrator must take to
restore an information system to the most current state prior to the incident (Horony
2000, p. 30).” Under this definition, the recovery factor of the Horony model includes all
those activities involved with incident response, investigation, and remediation.
Horony defines five sub-factors as subsets of the recovery factor. These are

investigation, restore, software / hardware, consultants / contractors, and accounts. The
investigation sub-factor consists of all activities undertaken to determine incident
causality and consequential damage incurred. Horony includes such things as intrusion
detection, determining the damage, incident handling under this sub-factor (Horony 1999,
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p. 37). The restore sub-factor includes all infrastructure affected by the incident.
Infrastructure items, such as servers, routers, bridges, gateways, desktop systems, etc.
must be returned to the pre-incident state through means such as backup restoration,
system rebuild, or purchase. The software /hardware sub factor considers damage or loss
to infrastructure system software or infrastructure system component hardware that
would require replacement. Horony states that this could include hardware or software
confiscated by an authorized investigative agency and any hardware or software deemed
necessary to improve system security (1999, p.37). The consultant / contractor sub-factor
consists of any outsourcing of manpower for assistance in investigative and/or recovery
activities. Such activities could include use of clean-room facilities for forensic
investigation, or specialized data recover assistance from damaged storage media. The

accounts sub-factor address actions required to bring affected accounts back online,
providing users access to the IS systems, once available.
The Education/ Training Factor.
The second primary factor of the Horony model is Education / Training. Horony
states that “as an investigation proceeds the need for additional education and training
within the organization may become evident. Systems administrator and information
security personnel may not have the necessary skill to perform a thorough investigation
(Horony 1999, p.31).” Therefore, this model takes into account the cost associated with
providing training to organization personnel following an incident.
The constructs of the Education/Training factor are System

Administrator/Information Security Personnel and Employee COMSEC/INFOSEC. The
System Administrator/Information Security Personnel sub-factor covers training for those

81

personnel with IS administration or security responsibilities. The Employee COMSEC /

INFOSEC covers training for system users. Horony specifically identifies training on
user security policy such as password security, system security and other issues normally
covered by the normal security training program (1999, p.38).
The Business Expenses Factor.
The third primary factor is Business Expenses, which are defined all the direct
business costs resulting from the incident. This factor attempts to measure the impact of
lost systems that affect both internal and business-to-business processes. Only a small
number of respondents to Horony’s survey agreed that business expenses are a useful part
of damage assessment. The sub-factors of this primary factor are Customer Service and

Business to Business. The Customer Service sub-factor attempts to factor in such costs
as those associated with paying “late fees, overdraft fees, and other fees associated with
accounts affected by a system outage (Horony 1999, p.31). The Business to Business
sub-factor attempts to capture the effect the incident had on the organization’s critical
inter-business relationships on which the organization depends, such as the failure of a
Just-in-Time inventory system.
The Productivity Factor.
This factor attempts to measure the impact an incident has on an organizations
production costs. When an incident occurs, the system or systems affected by the
incident will, be affected, in turn, affecting productivity. This factor is comprised of
three sub-factors, Mission Impact, Downtime, and Communication. The Mission Impact

sub-factor prescribes measurement of an organization’s ability to maintain normal levels
of productivity in its business processes. For a military organization, this may be a
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measurement of sorties launched. For a corporate organization, this may be a
measurement of any change in assembly line production. The Downtime sub-factor
prescribes measurement mission stoppage resulting from an incident. The
Communication sub-factor prescribes measurement of the effect the incident had on the

communication infrastructure.
The Productivity factor addresses extremely important constructs for information
damage assessment, but unfortunately falls short of the mark in terms of implementation
ability. Horony prescribes measurement, but doest not propose how these items may be
measured. An examination of this primary factor in relation to its sub-factors creates the
basis for the argument that Horony should have actually entitled the primary factor
Mission Impact, with the sub-components changed, accordingly.
The Data Factor.
The fifth primary factor is Data. Horony cites all respondents as identifying data
loss as an important part of a damage assessment model (1999, p.32). The Data factor is
comprised of the four following sub-factors: Restoring, Re-Entering, Unrecoverable

Data, and Proprietary Data. The first and second sub-factors, Restoring and ReEntering, appear to be related, although Horony does not explicitly state this. Restoring
is defined as those activities involved with restoration of data from backup media, while
Re-Entering encompasses those activities involved with manually inputting data that
could not be restored from backup. The manner in which Horony describes these subfactors presents a formidable challenge for implementation in an operational model.
Although each is an important construct for measurement, it is arguable that it is in
appropriate to include these sub-factors as measurements of impact to data. It seems
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more logical to include these under Recovery costs.

The third and fourth sub-factors,

Unrecoverable Data and Proprietary Data, prescribe measurement of data that has been
lost or compromised, respectively. These two sub-factors are certainly important to any
user of a DAM attempting to determine post-incident damage
The Lost Revenue Factor
This factor prescribes measurement of revenue lost due to an IS incident. An IS
incident may negatively affect an organization’s ability to generate revenue by damaging
otherwise impairing the organization’s information systems associated with critical
business processes. Horony lists two sub-factors belonging to Lost Revenue. These are
Lost Sales and Lost Customers. The Lost Sales sub-factor prescribes measuring the
impact, real or potential, on sales. The Lost Customers sub-factor creates a measurement
requirement for determining customer loss
The Reputation Factor.
Horony reports that only five of the twelve respondents were felt that reputation
was an important factor for damage assessment (1999, p. 33). It is important to note his
citation that military respondents “were not overly concerned with reputation from the
public’s view point; however, they did concern themselves with how they were viewed
by other military organizations (Horony 1999, p. 33).” Horony found that most, but not
all, commercial organizations were interested in the post-incident affects on reputation.
Reputation as a model primary factor is comprised of two sub-factors, Consumer/Public
Confidence and Quality Employees. Horony states that organizational reputation
relatively volatile and easily damaged (1999, p. 40). The Consumer/Public Confidence
sub-factor attempts to capture this affect. While it may be argued that reputation may be
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more resilient than Horony states, it is certainly true that once reputation has shifted
negatively, it is both difficult and expensive to return to the previous states. A collateral
effect of negative reputation may be that a company with a poor reputation may have
difficulty attracting quality employees, which may result in additional problems for the
organization. Horony attempts to capture this effect with the Quality Employees
construct. The relevance of this as a viable metric for damage assessment in military
operations is debatable.
The Human Life Factor
The final primary factor of the Horony model is Human Life. Loss of life is a
serious concern for any organization, but especially military and other public service
organizations in which an incident potentially could jeopardize human safety. The
military is an obvious example, but such public and private organizations associated with
such public services as police, fire, and transportation must also consider this factor.
Horony includes two factors, Loss of Life and High work load of ERT members. The
former prescribes measurement of the increased risk of loss of life following an incident.
The latter prescribes a metric to determine the long-term stress effects on Emergency
Response Team (ERT) members “causing undue stress and hardship on families (Horony
1999, p. 40).
The Horony model appears to be only one of a handful of attempts to develop a
framework for assessing damage resulting from a successful cyber attack. It serves as an
excellent foundation. Like other models, however, Horony’s model attempts to assess
economic loss. By doing so, the measurements are almost exclusively taken from the IT
infrastructure that supports the information; therefore the infrastructure becomes the
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center of the model, diminishing its ability to assess asset value. The result is a damage
assessment model that provides a framework for measuring damage to the information
infrastructure constructs (training, human life, revenue, systems, etc.), but yields little
indication as to the extent of damage done to the information itself. This model lacks the
critical measurement of devaluation of the information resulting from the incident.
Information usability is a function of the value of information to the organization.
Several of the primary factors, and/or their associated sub-factors, in the Horony
model have questionable application to military operations, and indeed any organization
seeking to understand damage and impact to mission operations following a cyber
incident. Many of the constructs have strategic use, but little immediate relevance in the
tactical and operational mission domains. Consider for example the primary factor,

Education/Training. Horony states that it may be necessary to provide training to
administrators, InfoSec personnel, and users post-incident to ensure they understand
system security issues and have required skills to prevent re-occurrence of such an
incident. While it is true that some organizations may retain employees who require
training to effectively perform their required duties, the organization’s Security
Education, Training, and Awareness (SETA) program must address this requirement.
The SETA program is an integral and perpetual component of an effective organizational
security program (Whitman and Mattord 2004, pp. 20-21). Accordingly, a SETA
program would likely fund both pre-incident and post-incident education and training.
Any peripheral costs associated with improving or otherwise modifying the COMSEC or
INFOSEC programs as a result of post-incident fallout would be absorbed by these
programs. For this reason, measuring impact to education and training from an IS
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incident will produce little, if any, useful information for the user of such a model,
rendering this primary factor invalid as a damage assessment area of measurement.
Another area of concern lies among the sub-factors under the Recovery primary factor.
Specifically, using the sub-factor entitled investigation is a misnomer that may confuse IS
manager attempting to collect damage assessment data for this sub-factor. As stated
before, Horony describes this sub-factor as encompassing all those activities associated
with detection, response, damage assessment, and forensic investigation. The concern is
that IS managers may only consider the impact metrics associated with the forensic
investigation. In fact, what Horony describes in this sub-factor covers five of the seven
components of incident response; of which investigation activities comprise two of the
components (Mandia, Prosise, et. Al 2003, pp. 12-15).
Horony’s research may be the first attempt to assess damage to military networks.
However, because it is primarily concerned with economic impact assessment resulting
from a cyber incident it can only offer very limited contributions to decision making in
military operations. However, this model offers some utility in helping decision makers
in the strategic domain understand the economic and human costs of cyber incidents on
Air Force networks.
NIST Best Practices.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed several
documents that may be considered “best practices” guidelines for industry and
government cyber security programs. NIST makes these guidelines available through a
number of ways, to include the issuance of its Special Publications (SP). Four such SP
best practice guidelines are examined in this sub-section.
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NIST SP 800-12: The NIST Handbook.
This Special Publication 800-12 (NIST 1996) is a comprehensive introduction to
computer security, providing an overall look at how to establish an organization security
program, to include a walk through of incident response procedures. SP 800-12 provides
a general guideline for cyber damage assessment best practices and impact assessment.
These are discussed in detail in subsequent publications.
NIST SP 800-61: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide.
This publication is intended to provide organizations with a best practices guide
for cyber security incident handling and is especially geared towards newly formed
incident response teams (Grance, Kent et Al. 2004). The document provides guidelines
to assist the incident response team in performing technical damage assessment after the
incident occurs. Additionally it provides guidance the impact assessment is an important,
but distinctly separate assessment from technical damage assessment. The publication
states that by “combining the criticality of the affected resources and the current and
potential technical effect of the incident”, a reasonable understanding of the impact may
be gained (Grance, Kent et Al. 2004).
NIST SP 800-30: Risk Management Guide for IT Systems.
SP 800-30 is intended to enable an organization to accomplish its mission by
understanding risk to improve the effectiveness of the organization’s security program
(Stoneburner, Goguen et Al. 2002). This document is noteworthy for several reasons, but
especially since provides to organizations a best practices guideline to implement impact
analysis. Impact analysis during risk assessment allows the organization to identify,
understand, and document the potential impact if a system is lost or damaged due to a
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cyber incident (Stoneburner, Goguen et Al. 2002, pp. 2-4). NIST SP 800-30 prescribes
the documentation of several key attributes about the asset including:
•

System mission (e.g., the processes performed by the IT system)

•

System and data criticality (e.g., the system’s value or importance to an
organization)

•

System and data sensitivity

This risk management framework provides explicit guidance for documenting asset
vulnerabilities and impact analysis in the even the asset is damaged. It is important that
organizations document this information prior to an incident to ensure that effective
damage and impact assessment is possible after an incident occurs.
NIST SP 800-55 Security Metrics Guide for IT Systems.
This publication (Swanson, Bartol, et. Al 2003) is primarily intended to assist
organizations develop metrics for their security program. There is little usable
information in this document for development of damage assessment metrics. The
assessment criteria are heavily focused on allowing the organization to assess its
technological security controls intended to protect the organization’s data
.
Section Summary.
This section examined two models that possess some degree of potential
contribution to military application decision making. However, both models approach
damage assessment from an economic standpoint. While either or both model may have
some application to military decision making, the economic nature of the approach will
limit both to only long-term, or strategic, use. Neither model is able to provide the
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tactical or operational decision maker with situational awareness of how a cyber incident
impacts the current mission in the appropriate time window, allowing the mission to
conceivably be saved and loss of human life possibly prevented. The lack of such a
model or methodology is underscored by the case study research into current damage
assessment practices on Air Force networks. This research showed that current
methodologies are non-standardized and producing non-validated damage assessment
metrics. The usefulness of these methodologies for providing commanders with
situational awareness of damage after an incident is highly suspect.
There are best practices for various aspects of computer security and incident
response that have limited application to damage assessment efforts. These are published
by the National Institute for Standards and Technology.
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III. Methodology
Introduction
This chapter outlines the methodology for data collection and analysis. The
subject matter involved with CDA-D/MIA research requires a qualitative approach. An
interview methodology was employed to gather the data for analysis and resolution of the
research questions.
Methodology and Research Strategy
Selecting the methodology best suited for a specific research effort is difficult, yet
important decision. Quantitative research is the preferred method among researchers.
This type of research is efficient and generally allows the researcher to identify causal
relationships within the data (Leedy and Ormrod 2005, pp. 94). Quantitative research
cannot easily capture complex phenomena such as human or organizational behavior,
however (Stevens 2001).
Qualitative research, on the other hand, is well suited to “answer questions about
the complex nature of phenomena, often with the purpose of describing and
understanding the phenomena from the participants’ point of view. (Leedy and Ormrod
2005, p. 94)” Strauss and Corbin (Strauss and Corbin 1990), provide five reasons for
performing qualitative research:
1. The researcher’s conviction based on research experience
2. The nature of the research problem
3. To understand a new or little understood problem
4. To gain new perspective on a previously well understood problem
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5. To provide understanding of the details in complex phenomena that cannot
be easily conveyed with quantitative methodology

Roberts notes that the qualitative approach to research is founded in the
philosophical orientation called phenomenology, a discipline that focuses on first-person
experience. Qualitative research strives to gain a holistic understanding of the studied
problem. They collect data through methods such as observations, interviews, surveys,
and even written documents. Qualitative research can focus on a range of complex issues
ranging from the personal experience of individuals to organizational processes (Roberts
2004, p. 10). Qualitative research is an “umbrella term” that covers many different
research strategies (Roberts 2004, p.11). Determining which research strategy to utilize
can be difficult to accomplish. Yin (2002) provides a three-condition evaluation to assist
in this decision:
•

Consider the type of research question posed,

•

Consider the extent of control the researcher maintains over the
phenomena

•

Consider the degree of focus on contemporary versus historical events
(p. 5)

By applying these questions to a qualitative research strategy matrix, it is possible
to determine a strategy best suited to the nature of the research (see Table 3 below). By
testing the research questions posed in the introductory chapter of this paper against
Yin’s matrix, it becomes clear that no single research strategy perfectly fits the nature of
the research questions. The questions explicitly ask how something can be done, with an
implication that the research must discover both how it is being done now and why; what
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historical events created the context in which damage assessment currently exists? This
leaves three strategic possibilities:
•

experiment,

•

historical analysis,

•

and case study.

Table 3. Relevant Situations for Research Strategies

(Yin 2002, p. 5)
Since the research cannot control the events being studied, experiment is
eliminated. Because the nature of this study fits both historical analysis and the case
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study as suitable research strategy, this research elects to employ a hybrid strategy that
employs elements of each.
This historical/case study hybrid study is warranted to ensure the investigative
questions of this research are answered appropriately. It is commonly agreed in the
network security community of interest that defensive cyber damage assessment
methodologies are not as effective as they need to be. In order to answer the first
investigative question, the research must examine how damage assessment is currently
being done and identify where these shortcomings lie. The second and third investigative
questions may be addressed in a similar manner, but each relies on the previous being
answered. All of the investigative questions, however, make assumptions about mission
impact assessment that must be addressed if the research is to be valid. For this reason,
the research must understand the state of damage to mission impact mapping on Air
Force networks and to identify what successes are present and what obstacles may be
preventing efficient mission impact activities.

Instrumentation and Data Collection
This research attempts to answer its three research questions by first gaining an
understanding of the effectiveness of damage and mission impact assessment on Air
Force networks. This was accomplished through a combination of literature review,
analysis of existing research, and interviews. It is common knowledge in the DoD that
defensive damage and mission impact assessment is not being conducted as accurately
and efficiently as it should be. However, the causes and possible solutions are widely
debated. The data collected in this research provides a foundation for proposing a more
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effective way to conduct cyber damage and mission impact assessment following a cyber
security incident in a non-profit driven organization, such as the military.
Literature Review and Existing Research.
Yin states that existing documentation is a suitable data source in case study
research (2002, p.86). Most of the documentation of damage assessment models and
methodology is focused on organizations that operate for financial profits. Relatively
little research has been accomplished in the area of damage and mission impact
assessment in organizations not driven by financial profit; and therefore, some aspects of
available literature and documentation did not directly fit. This is primarily true of the
damage and impact models used by organizations that deal explicitly with various
dimensions of financial loss caused by an incident. These are of little direct use by nonprofit driven organizations. However, for-profit organizations struggle with the same
problems as the latter in damage and mission impact assessment efforts. There was,
therefore, a substantial amount of data available in the literature review that did
applicable to this research effort that helped with identification of such problems in order
to propose an improved methodology.
Existing case study research of damage assessment efforts on Air Force networks
(Thiem 2005) provides further and more detailed insight to problems existing in damage
assessment efforts specifically on Air Force networks. The existing research investigated
cyber damage assessment methodologies used on Air Force networks by interviewing
individuals intimately involved with both Net-D direct activities and Net-D command
and control of incident response. When combined with the literature review data, a
strong case may be built for determining the state of damage and mission impact
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assessment on Air Force networks and visibility into some of the suspected causes.
Understanding the causes coupled with additional literature documentation may enable
development of new damage and mission impact assessment methodology.
Interviews.
The qualitative nature of the case study lends itself to the use of the interview as
an investigatory instrument. The interview is one of the most important sources of case
study information (Yin 2002, pp. 89-92). There are two general categories of interviews.
The structured interview consists of the research asking a set of questions. This category
is relatively rigid and leaves little room for the interviewee to discuss important related
information that may lie just beyond the boundaries of the question. In such cases,
important information may be missed. The semi-structured interview, also called an
open-ended interview, the research can ask open ended questions or follow the standard
question with a specific question tailored to the interviewee’s experience to elicit further
detail about the answer (Leedy and Ormrod 2005, p. 184; Yin 2002, p. 90).
Interview Structure.
The interview was specifically designed to address the second and third research
questions. These questions deal specifically with the core issue of this research: mission
impact assessment. The approach to the interview was to allow the professional experts
in network defense incident response provide insight into the state of mission impact
assessment. The interview was designed to allow each respondent to answer in his or her
own way and provide details and perspective into the subject through individual
experience. The intent was to elicit individual free formed responses providing multiple
perspectives on the state of mission impact assessment as it is currently being
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implemented on Air Force networks. Since successful mission impact assessment relies
on multiple other areas to be performed effectively, responses to the interview questions
would necessarily touch on the activities that enable mission impact assessment to
function correctly. In this manner, the interview respondents will reveal the issues both
contributing to and impeding mission impact assessment independently.
The interview was comprised of two distinct sections. The first section was
simply to identify the interviewee’s qualifications to provide valid responses to questions
relating to the state of mission impact assessment on Air Force networks. The second
section was comprised of three questions designed to allow the interviewee the
opportunity to discuss the issues relating to mission impact assessment on Air Force
networks.
Section 1 Questions.
This section is comprised of two questions to ensure that the interviewees have
appropriate exposure to network defense and incident response activities to possess a
reasonable observation of the state of damage and mission impact assessment on Air
Force networks. The first question asked the following:

“Are you currently or have you recently (within the past 12 months) been
professionally assigned to a position in Network Defense (Net-D) involved in
incident response activities on Air Force networks, to include Network
Operations command and control functions?”
This question is designed to ensure that the interviewee has timely experience in a job
with network defense incident response responsibilities.
The second question in this section was designed to allow the interviewee to list
the type of involvement.
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“In what capacity was this involvement? (For example, incident handling,
forensic investigation, response command and control, etc.)”
Not all involvement possibilities were listed, allowing the interviewees to self-identify
areas of incident responsibility that the researcher may have overlooked. The
interviewees identified six distinct areas of responsibility in network defense incident
response. These were:
•

Initial incident response

•

Incident handling

•

Incident investigation

•

Damage / Impact Assessment

•

Incident Recovery

•

Command and control

The demographics discussed previously show the areas of involvement of the respective
interviewees. The range of involvement increases the likelihood of wider participant
perspective of the issues affecting defensive cyber damage and impact assessment on Air
Force networks.
Section 2 Questions.
This section consisted of three progressive questions to determine the state and
effectiveness of mission effective. The first question was stated as follows:
1. “In your experience, does current incident damage assessment methodology on
Air Force networks comply with the requirement of CJCSM 6510.01 Ch 3 Annex
A to Appendix B to Enclosure B prescribing operational impact assessment of a
DoD organization affected by a computer security incident?”
This question was to gain an understanding of the interviewee’s perspective on whether
Air Force damage assessment and mission impact efforts were meeting the requirements
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(CJCSM6510.01 2006) for commanders to report how a network incident has impacted
an organization’s mission. The expected responses were a direct reflection of the
interviewee’s perception of these requirements as defined in the governing joint
document.
The second question was designed to be a progressive path to allow the
interviewee to discuss his/her perceptions about the Air Force’s network defense incident
response functions ability to meet this requirement. The question was stated as follows:
2. “ In your experience, how well are responsible Net-D functions (incident
response, forensics activities, etc.) able to estimate the impact to an organization’s
mission capability resulting from an incident on Air Force networks? “
This question was followed by the third question, which provided an opportunity for
the interviewee to elaborate anything they felt was relevant to the previous question—but
specifically those things that affected the damage and mission impact assessment actors
to successfully and accurately accomplish these activities. The third question stated as
follows:

3. “Based on your response to question #2, what factors either contribute to or
impede the ability to effectively estimate the impact to an organization’s mission
capability following an incident on Air Force networks?”

Interview Conduction.
Interviews were conducted over the telephone. The respective organizations were
contacted in advance and appointments made to formally conduct the interview. Each
interviewee was asked all questions previously discussed. The interview was conducted
in a semi-structured format to allow each respondent to discuss and elaborate on any part
of the response he/she felt was relevant to the questions. The semi-structured interview
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format allows the interviewee to discuss the context of his/her response to a particular
question to reduce the likelihood of error introduced by misunderstanding by the
interviewer of the context of the response.

Sample
The sample population was selected from Air Force active-duty members and
civilians that are employed, or have been employed in the past 12 months, in a Defensive
Network Warfare (Net-D) capacity. Interviewees in this sample must have experience
with the incident response activities of Net-D provide usable data for this research.
Specifically, the selected sample ranges from personnel with direct involvement in the
technical aspects of network defense incident response to command, control, and
coordination of Net-D activities at a level appropriate to understand “the big picture” of
how damage and mission impact assessment support the operational mission at both the
organization and enterprise levels. By necessity, this requires that participants work in
the top “tier” of network defense operations. These operations are, in fact, divided into
three operational tiers (see Figure 7 below). Network operations command and control of
incident response and the incident response experts reside at Tier 1 and work with the
responsible agencies at the subordinate tiers to ensure effective incident assessment,
response, handling, investigation, and remediation. Agencies at Tier 1 interact with all
levels and directly plug in to the Joint GIG, providing it personnel with a unique
perspective personnel at subordinate levels may not possess. For this reason, the
interview targets personnel employed in network defense incident response activities at
Tier 1.
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Figure 7. Network Defense Tiers of Operations

It must be noted that this produced a situation where the views of the interview
responders are relatively homogenous in their experience and perspectives. However,
this issue is a necessity to ensure that all respondents possess the appropriate professional
and personal experience to make qualified and reasonable independent judgments
regarding the state and effectiveness of mission impact assessment as it is currently being
implemented. Allowing personnel with little or no experience in cyber damage and
mission impact assessment on Air Force networks would certainly introduce weakness in
the data collected in the interviews.
Interviewees were self-selected by volunteering to participate in the research data
collection. No personally identifiable information was collected on the interviewees.
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Data Analysis Procedures
There are various approaches to qualitative data analysis, with some being more
suited to certain situations than others (Lacity and Janson 1994, pp. 138-140). Lacity
cites three general approaches to text analysis with each being dependent on assumptions,
to include the role of the researcher (see Table 4 below). Because damage mission
impact assessment activities are dependent on such a wide range of supporting activities,
it is important that the researcher have an understanding of the network defense incident
response and damage assessment environment to be able to accurately understand and
interpret the qualitative data collected. In this sense, the researcher must be an insider, to
some degree, to understand the wide range of issues that may be discovered during
research. For this reason, Lacity suggests that an interpretive approach to qualitative data
analysis be used (1994, p.140).
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Table 4. Lacity Text Analysis Framework

(Lacity and Janson 1994, p. 140)

Intentional analysis is form of interpretivist data analysis that attempts to
understand the speaker’s intention. It assumes the research and interview have similar
background in the research subject allowing the research to better understand the
contextual factors that influence the research subject (Lacity and Janson 1994, p. 151).
Intentional analysis allows the researcher to discuss with the participants the meaning
they ascribe to their experiences. Lacity states that this method is particularly appropriate
for analyzing data collected in interviews and consists of four steps of analysis; described
as follows:

“In the first step of the intentional analysis, the researcher describes the
‘facts’ of the phenomenon. ‘Facts’ are socially shared realities agreed
upon by all participants. For example, the analyst and payroll clerk may
both attest to the “fact” that two payroll programs need to be changed.
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In step two, the researcher determines the way participants ascribe
meaning to their separate realities by how they perceive cause and effect.
For example, the analyst may claim, “I decided to fix the payroll
calculation first because if it were not fixed this week, people’s paychecks
would be wrong next week.” Here the systems analyst perceives her
behavior in terms of cause (erroneous payroll calculation program) and
effect (erroneous payroll checks).
In step three, the researcher identifies themes- or invariants -- that
emerge from the text. The researcher then identifies themes that are used
to develop common interpretations for an entire class of phenomena. For
example, assume the researcher studies the entire set of relationships
between information systems personnel and payroll personnel. A potential
theme may be that systems personnel consistently prioritize users’
requests.
In step four, the researcher abstracts the “essences” from the text.
Essences are wholly subjective gestalts what is learned from studying the
phenomenon. Abstracting essences requires creativity, intuition and
reflection. The researcher no longer asks “What do the participants think
about the phenomenon?” but rather, “What do I think?” (1994, p. 151)“

After the interview data was collected the responses for the three investigative
questions of the interview are coded to allow graphical ‘mapping’ of the response data.

Limitations
This research effort maintains several limitations. The sample size is small.
Ideally, a study attempts to obtain interview data from a large pool of potential
interviewees to develop a more accurate picture of the problem. This is especially true
for the intentional analysis method employed in this research. A larger sample size
would better demonstrate agreement in the both the facts (Lacity 1994, p. 151) and the
contextual influences reported by the interviewees. However, it was important that
personnel providing the data posses adequate experience and skill set to make qualified
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and valid responses to the interview questions. This, by necessity, reduced the sample
size.
Another limitation is the introduced by the nature of intentional analysis. The
very quality that lends intentional analysis to interview data analysis, the common
contextual factors between the subjects and researcher, introduces some degree of bias. It
must be noted that the researcher was previously professionally engaged in network
defense incident response activities on both Air Force and joint networks. The
experiences gained were among the motivating factors for this research effort.
Qualitative research inevitably introduces some degree of reflexivity (Leedy and Ormrod
2005, p. 285), but all efforts to maintain objectivity and minimize bias introduced by this
phenomenon.
The scope of this paper is also a concern. In most research, the scope is brought
down to a near level to allow the researcher to get close to the research subject in great
detail. Indeed, this was the initial goal of this research effort. However, as research
progressed through the methodology described above, it became apparent that the lack of
research in this area created as situation where the current damage assessment and
mission impact assessment methodology as a whole must be examined to accurately and
effectively address the investigative research questions. This fact prevented any one part
of the current methodology to be examined in great detail without overlooking serious
factors that contribute to the problem being studied. As a result, the research scope is at
the lowest level to provide a look at a comprehensive methodology, in hopes of
producing satisfactory and effective recommendations for an improved methodology,
which is the ultimate goal of this research effort.
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Chapter Summary
This research attempts to answer three questions for which there is no quantitative
data available. The qualitative nature of the subject lends itself to a historical
analysis/case study hybrid research strategy. An examination of existing research
provides some of the research context, but for a better understanding of the defensive
cyber damage and mission impact assessment climate on Air Force networks, it is
important to conduct interviews with the personnel actively engaged in these activities.
Understanding why damage and mission impact assessment is not effective is extremely
important to answering the investigative questions of this research.
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IV. Results and Analysis
Introduction and Overview
It is well known and commonly agreed that defensive damage and mission impact
assessment cyber security incidents on Air Force networks is not being performed as
effective or efficient as it needs to be. This research has collected data through extensive
literature review, case study research on damage assessment on Air Force networks, and
interviews with personnel directly professionally involved with network defense incident
response activities. This section will analyze and discuss the results of the collected
research data; and is the most important part of the research effort. Here the collected
data will be presented and interpreted so that intrinsic meanings may be revealed to build
a whole picture of the problems, ultimately leading to answers to the investigative
research questions posed in the opening chapter.
Chapter Structure.
The data analysis of this chapter will present and discuss the interview data first.
Although the interview questions specifically address the second and third investigative
research questions, the semi-structured format allowed the interviewees to provide
additional data that they felt was relevant to the specific questions. Some data in the
interview responses has relevance to the first research investigative question regarding
cyber damage assessment.
Next, the chapter will discuss the findings about the state of cyber defense and
damage assessment currently employed on Air Force networks. This analysis is based on
literature review data and existing case study research (Thiem 2005). The final part of

107

this chapter will provide a synthesis of collected data and discuss the findings to each of
three investigative questions of this research.
Approach to Analysis of Research Questions.
The purpose of this research is to determine an effective and accurate
methodology for defensive cyber damage assessment on Air Force and DoD networks.
Three investigative research questions were formulated to build the framework for this
research effort. These questions are:

R1. How can the damage resulting from a successful cyber attack be effectively
measured in a non-profit driven organization?
R2. How can such damage be mapped to impact to an organization’s mission
capability?
R3. How must this assessment be reported to the decision maker to maximize the
quality of the assessment for use as decision input?

To answer these questions correctly they must be approached and answered in
order. The research must first establish how damage is currently being assessed before
proposing how damage assessment may be effectively measured in a non-profit driven
organization. As previously stated, it is common knowledge that there is ample room for
improvement in the assessment of cyber damage and mission impact arena; so analysis
will begin by laying out the facts provided by the data and identifies areas needing
improvement as they relate to the research questions.

Interview Data Analysis
Intentional analysis was applied to the transcripts of the interviews. Lacity states
that intentional analysis is a form of interpretivist analysis that is well suited to this
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particular research effort since the researcher may discuss the contextual meaning
ascribed to experiences relayed in the interview. This provides a more richly descriptive
response to the questions posed during the interview (Lacity 1994, p.151).
Intentional analysis is a four-phase process. The first three analyze the facts,
contextual perceptions issues of the respondents, and common themes presented by the
interviewees. In the fourth phase, the research abstracts the essences of the text, as a
whole (Lacity 1994, p.151).
The first section of the interview establishes respondent qualifications to establish
respondent demographics. Intentional analysis will not be used on the questions in the
section, and this data is discussed in the following the following section of this paper.
Intentional analysis is applied to the data collected in the second section of the interview.
Interview Sample Demographics.
It was previously noted that the interview sample size was small. The nature of
the research required that the pool of potential interviewees be small by necessity. The
purpose of the interview was to understand the effectiveness of mission impact
assessment as it is currently being implemented on Air Force networks. It is important to
identify any obstacles or catalysts to these efforts. For this reason it was essential to limit
the potential sample population to only those respondents possessing relevant experience
in network defense incident response activities. To ensure accurate responses were
formed both from relevant experience and appropriate perspective in this area, the
potential interviewees were purposefully limited to current or recent employment in a job
with direct network defense incident response responsibilities at the Tier 1 level of
network defense incident response activities. These agencies at the Tier level are the
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agencies tasked by the Air Force to lead and execute efforts for incident response,
damage assessment and containment, mission impact assessment, and remediation and
recovery following an incident on Air Force networks; and ensure netops integration with
DoD networks. The pool of potential interviewees was intentionally inclusive of those
performing direct technical response, as well as those responsible for the command and
control of NETOPS activities as they pertained to Net-D incident response coordination
and actions. This was important to the research as it ensured a full range of perspective
into the capabilities and limitations of current mission impact assessment efforts.
There were approximately 18-20 personnel identified as potentially
qualified interviewees. Participation was voluntary and participates were advised that no
personally identifying information would be collected which could attribute any
responses to them. Not all potential interview candidates elected to participate, however.
Due to the voluntary nature of the sample selection, data on the reasons for participation
declination was not collected. Leedy and Ormrod note that this is a common occurrence
(Leedy and Ormrod 2005, pp. 184-185).
In all, nine personnel agreed to be interviewed. All nine acknowledged that they
were currently or and recently been assigned to a position in which their primary duties
involved responsibilities directly related to network defense incident response and
response support activities shown in the following table (see Table 5 below). This table
breaks the roles of network defense incident response involvement into six categories:
•

Initial Incident Response: Those activities associated with confirmation and
declaration of an incident and the coordination of initial response activities from
Tier 1 to Tier 3.
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•

Incident Handling: Those activities associated with the documentation, tracking,
and administrative issues of network defense incident response.

•

Incident Investigation: Those activities directly associated with investigating how
the incident occurred and what systems were affected.

•

Damage/Impact Assessment: The assessment and reporting of technical damage
and/or mission impact assessment.

•

Incident Recovery: Those activities associated with returning the effected
systems to service, while simultaneously supporting ongoing incident response
activities.

•

Command and Control: Those activities associated with the coordinating and
directive actions of incident response as they relate to netops activities.
Table 5. Interviewee Involvement in Network Defense Incident Responsibilities

Of these nine, eight were responsible for initial incident response activities. Five
reported that they were currently or had been directly involved in incident handling
efforts. Six indicated experience in incident investigation efforts. Seven had been
involved with incident recovery efforts after an incident. Five were responsible in some
way for command and control of incident response activities. All responded that they
were involved in some aspect of damage and mission impact assessment efforts.
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All interviewees were currently or had recently been responsible for multiple
aspects of incident response activities. Two interviewees were currently or had recently
been involved in all aspects of the incident response process. Only one respondent was
neither involved in initial incident response nor command and control activities. This
interviewee likely specialized in technical aspects of incident investigation and recovery.
Intentional Analysis of Interview Response Data.
This section discusses the interview response data. Lacity defines the data facts
as the “shared realities agreed upon by all the participants (1994, p.151).” Since the pool
of individual interviewees may hold differing perspectives on the same problem, this
section will discuss the data in terms of commonly shared facts, conflicting data, and any
unexpected findings in each question.
Fact Analysis of Section 2, Question 1.
The first interview question of Section 2 was:
“In your experience, does current incident damage assessment methodology on Air
Force networks comply with the requirement of CJCSM 6510.01 Ch 3 Annex A to
Appendix B to Enclosure B prescribing operational impact assessment of a DoD
organization affected by a computer security incident?”

This question elicited a unanimous negative response. All nine interviewees cited that
the current incident damage assessment methodology on Air Force networks is not
meeting the intent of this requirement for mission impact damage assessment reporting.
All but one respondent elaborated on this question in some way by stated that mission
impact assessment is being attempted, but is not being carried out effectively. Three
respondents stated in this question that there are breakdowns occurring at the Tier 2 and
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Tier 3 levels that prevent effective mission impact assessment. The others deferred to
question 3 to provide additional information.
The nature of these responses were expected since it is commonly accepted the
current damage and mission impact assessment is not being performed at an effective
level. There were no unexpected responses to this question.
Fact Analysis of Section 2, Question 2
The second question of this section was:
“In your experience, how well are responsible Net-D functions (incident response,
forensics activities, etc.) able to estimate the impact to an organization’s mission
capability resulting from an incident on Air Force networks?”

This question gave the interview respondents the opportunity to provide independent
evaluation of how each viewed the effectiveness of the Air Force’s implementation of
mission impact assessment. The responses to this revealed general agreement that the
current implementation of damage and mission impact assessment is not doing an
effective job. A general agreement was expected for the same reasons stated in the
analysis of Question 1.
Since the response to this question was free-formed, all interviewees respond with

soft responses to this question, meaning that that no respondents provided a direct
answer, such as “we’re doing a poor job.” Possibly, due to the wording of the question,
all respondents provided answers that were more suited to a performance range, rather
than a discrete performance value. Examples of answers to this question ranged from,
“somewhere between a bad job and a really bad job” to “we’re doing the right things in

some areas, so overall we’re doing alright but still need to improve a lot.” This type
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qualitative response is difficult to measure, so to capture the intent of these responses, the
responses were coded as ranges of performance. The coding was based on a five-point
graduated scale from very poor to excellent. Each point on the scale was assigned a
coding value as follows: very poor = 1, poor = 2, moderate = 3, good = 4, and excellent =
5. The coding for each question was assigned to reflect the overall nature of the response
to this question. Each respondent’s answer was coded as a range of two values that best
reflected the respondent’s response intention and the range was averaged to produce a
score, as shown in the raw data table for this question (see Table 6 below). This coding
was designed only to aid in understanding the trends among the qualitative responses to
this particular question through a visual representation of the responses.

Table 6. Coded Response Ranges for Interview Section 2, Question 2

The attitudes of nearly all interviewees' responses to this question tended towards
the lower end of the coding scale. Five of the nine respondents provided a response that
indicated the Air Force's implementation was poor to very poor. Three provided
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responses indicating that the Air Force's ability to estimate mission impact after a cyber
incident is only poor to moderate. One respondent stated that "we're not there yet, but we
are getting better that we were." This respondent still did not give high marks to the
current process, but indicated perceived performance in the moderate to good range.
Expected Results.
The researcher expected a wide range of responses with the respondents closer to
the "operational end" judging mission assessment efforts to be less effective than those
handling the more technical issues involved with damage and mission impact assessment.
This expectation was based on the researcher's experience and analysis of existing
literature and research that indicated the strong focus on technology that exists in Air
Force Net-D activities.
Question 2 Findings.
The data collected for this question produced the opposite result as those expected
by the researcher. The data showed that the majority of those involved in operational
command and control positions held a relatively more favorable view of mission impact
effectiveness than did those involved with the technical aspects of damage and mission
impact assessment. This finding is very important to this research, especially when
considered in context with the data in Question 3. It is also important to note that only
one respondent rated damage assessment as moderate to good. The majority of responses
evaluated the effectiveness of mission impact assessment efforts as poor.
Fact Analysis of Section 2, Question 3.
Question 3 was stated as follows:
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“Based on your response to question #2, what factors either contribute to or
impede the ability to effectively estimate the impact to an organization’s mission
capability following an incident on Air Force networks?”

This final question provided the interviewees the opportunity to elaborate on the issues
that they viewed as affecting their assessment of question 2. The question produced
several common but independently provided responses that the interviewees felt were at
the core of the problems with cyber damage and mission impact assessment. The first
and most common was that the wrong agencies are being tasked to perform mission
impact assessment. Seven out of the nine interviewees made direct reference mission
impact assessment being the responsibility of the system or asset owner; but that the
responsibility is resting with the incident response agency to determine the damage and
impact to the organization’s mission. Three of the respondents stated that this reliance on
the wrong entity existed in all three operational tiers, but was most problematic in the
Tier 2 and Tier 3 levels. When an incident occurs, commanders at base and Tier 2 levels
expect the technical experts of the 33 IOS to tell the commander how his/her mission was
affected. All three respondents assert that this is a task that cannot be accomplished by
an agency external to the organization whose mission was affected by the incident.
These respondents state that the organization that owns the mission must bear the
responsibility for mission impact assessment since only it can possess visibility of the
relationship between the systems, the information, and the mission.
A second common problem cited by six of the nine respondents is the local
commanders rely upon base-level system administrators that are improperly equipped for
damage assessment responsibilities. Five of the respondents cited this as a training and
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education issue. Four respondents reported that the Tier 3 administrators tasked to work
with Tier 1 responders to perform local damage and mission impact assessment regularly
provide incorrect or meaningless damage and mission impact assessment information.
Two respondents noted that there have been many cases where Tier 3 administrators
provided fabricated damage and mission impact assessment information because the did
not understand the relationship between the system and the mission.

Several

respondents stated that these system administrators lack essential technical skills to
perform the mission impact, even with the assistance of the incident response agent,
which compounds the problems of determining damage and mission impact.
It is also important to note that two respondents explained the problem being that the
incident responders work with system administrators belonging to the organization
affected by the incident, not than the system users. These system administrators are
neither users of the affected system, nor have an understanding of how the information
processed by the system supports the organization’s mission. The information reported
back to the incident responders is strictly limited to technical information that has no
factual mission impact relevance. One interviewee cited that the system administrator
intentionally provided impact reporting metrics from a system unaffected by the incident
because it was easier than getting it from the affected system. This, of course, negated
any benefits of damage and mission impact efforts; and the interviewee attributes the
problem as a lack of understanding of the damage assessment process that is a direct
result of a training failure.
Another important issue mentioned by several of the respondents was a perceived
misunderstanding of the role of technical assessments performed by the network defense
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incident response agents. The interviewees that mentioned this as a problem stated that
often commanders misunderstood the role of the technical assessment as a substitute for
the mission impact assessment. These respondents stated that this failure to understand
the role of the technical assessment as a foundation for mission impact caused problems
and “push back” from these units at both a system administrator and command level. The
interviewees stated that this friction slowed and occasionally crippled mission impact
assessment efforts after an incident.
An associated issue mentioned by several of the respondents was a perceived
misunderstanding of the role of the technical assessments performed by the network
defense incident response agents. The interviewees that mentioned this as a problem
stated that often commanders misunderstood the role of the technical assessment as a
substitute for the mission impact assessment. These respondents stated that this failure to
understand the role of the technical assessment as a foundation for mission impact caused
problems and “push back” from these units at both a system administrator and command
level. The interviewees stated that this friction slowed and occasionally crippled mission
impact assessment efforts after an incident.
A third common issue was that a lack of understanding of the relationship
between the system and the information used by the system to support the mission exists.
This is similar to the previous issue, but differs in perspective. The previous facts
identified the misunderstanding as a result of technical training failures. Five of the nine
respondents to this question independently provided anecdotal examples of breakdowns
in cyber damage and mission impact efforts directly attributable to a focus on the system
technology such that the connection to the mission not understood. All five who cited
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this as serious problem included examples of the focus on the technology and a failure to
understand that the system processes information supporting some aspect of mission
operations. Two respondents specifically relayed that this misunderstanding exists in
both the command structure and the technologically focused system administrators on
which the commander depends. One respondent stated, “Its common sense, but the
commanders don’t get it and the system admins don’t get it. It’s a simple concept, but
they’re missing that the data and information processed on the system is what is
important to the mission.” Another interviewee referring to this same problem responded
that, “the Air Force is sometimes blinded by technology…which leads to a
misunderstanding of what can and can’t impact the mission.” Four of the respondents
relayed problems that this lack of understanding made it impossible to determine second
order impact elsewhere in the Air Force enterprise.
Another response commonality supported the previously discussed issue. Three
respondents stated that the problem of failing to understand the system to mission
relationship was compounded by a lack of usable documentation listing the assets owned
by the organization and the associated relationship to the mission. These respondents
independently noted that the documentation that did exist, such as system accreditation
packages, was not conducive to cyber damage activities since it primarily focused on
technical issues. One respondent noted that the system administrators, not being users,
could not use this documentation to understand how to the affected system supported the
organization’s mission. Two respondents stated that mission impact assessment efforts
could be enhanced if documentation of the systems contents and support for the
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organization’s mission was documented at some time prior to the occurrence of an
incident.
Expected Results.
The researcher expected a wide range of “problems” to emerge from the data
collected from this interview question with the hope the several central themes would
emerge. The hope is that the emergence of these themes would create a “path” to lead the
researcher to the source of the problems. These themes did in fact emerge. The majority
were in the general area expected by the researcher, but there were some surprises that
uncovered unexpected problems in the mission impact assessment processes that the
researcher had not previously considered.
Question 3 Findings.
The fact analysis has identified commonly agreed upon “facts” reported by the
nine respondents. However, there were also interviewees that felt a strong focus on
technology was important and appropriate. One interviewee stated that the technical
assessments produced by the incident response agents was meeting the needs of cyber
damage assessment, and the problems with mission impact assessment lay with
incompetence at the “NOSC and base-levels”. Additionally, although all interviewees
agreed that mission impact assessment is falling short of its mandate, not all agreed on
the cause of these shortcomings. The consistencies in responses have been discussed, but
there also areas of non-agreement that were mentioned by individuals. For example, one
respondent felt that the DoD netops function was asserting too much authority into the
implementation of network defense and mission impact efforts on Air Force networks.
This respondent felt that this was creating unnecessary work and constraints on the
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incident response efforts. Another respondent independently provided a countering view
to this by stating that the current efforts in mission impact assessment were not providing
sufficient upward feed to the commanders watching the overall health of the GIG and the
mission operations that are supported by the GIG. This respondent established that Air
Force networks are only one piece of the GIG, and mission impact assessment activities
on Air Force networks must provide sufficient support to the higher-level missions. This
respondent also noted that the big picture is often forgotten by those focused on technical
issues.
Another difference worth noting was that two of the respondents expressed a
feeling that those involved in the command and control aspects of incident response
activities did not possess an understanding of the problems that were preventing
successful mission impact assessment. One respondent with command and control
experience responded that those agents responsible for technical mission impact
assessment activities, were not providing mission impact assessment reports in a timely
fashion. As a result, mission impact reporting negatively affected since commanders
could not get results quickly.
Intentional Analysis of Contextual Perceptions in Responses.
The demographics of the sample population were discussed previously in this
chapter. It worth stating again, however, that the sample of interviewees was small and
relatively homogenous by necessity. Since interviewees were self-identified, it became
important that the pool of potential interview respondents be comprised of individuals
with appropriate professional experience in cyber damage and mission impact assessment
on Air Force networks to provide accurate and qualified individual responses to the
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interview questions. All interviewees must possess current or relatively recent
professional experience in network defense incident response activities. As a result the
interview respondents possess similar contextual perceptions about cyber damage and
mission impact assessments on Air Force networks. This may be considered an
explanation for the great consistencies in the facts reported by the interview respondents.
However, the fact that all respondents agreed that mission impact assessment efforts are
failing to meet the intent of joint guidance points towards the thematic problem area in
current efforts. This is important because it must also be remembered that the
interviewees work in differing areas of network defense incident response, providing
each with a potentially unique perspective on the problems and strengths of these
activities. Yet, these contextual differences allow interviewees to arrive at similar
conclusions about the problems. The differences in responses are few and are mainly
attributable to personal perceptions of responsibilities between the agents providing
coordination and oversight and those performing technical assessment.
Intentional Analysis of Findings in Interview Responses.
There is general agreement that the current implementation of damage and
mission impact assessment on Air Force networks is not being conducted effectively. As
can be seen in the following chart (see Figure 8 below), the majority of respondents with
command and control experience rated the effectiveness of mission impact assessment as
between moderate and poor. This was a higher assessment than provided by those with
more technical involvement. All but one respondent without command and control
experience rated current damage and mission impact assessment between very poor and
poor.
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Figure 8. Bar Chart Results of Interviewee Response to Section 2, Question 2

Question 3 allowed respondents to independently identify issues that the
respondent felt impeded or contributed to effective mission impact assessment efforts.
There were several themes that became evident when all interview responses were
examined. These can be summed up in the following bullets:
•

Mission impact assessment and reporting must be accomplished locally

•

Organizational Failure to Understand System to mission relationship

•

Current mission impact assessment is too heavily focused on technology

•

Current mission impact assessment is not producing usable metrics

•

New perspectives introduced by mission impact assessment
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These themes will be discussed in the following subsections.
Mission Impact Assessment Must Be Accomplished Locally.
Data collected in the interview process revealed that the current implantation
relies heavily upon the incident responders to assess both the damage caused by the
incident and the associated mission impact related to this damage. The current state of
mission impact assessment is evidence that this approach is not working. The Air Force
is an enormous enterprise with each organization having a specialized and independent
mission that provides direct support to one or more additional missions in the enterprise.
Cyber security incidents that occur on Air Force and DoD enterprise networks require
that an incident response agent that is external to the affected organization come in and
provide a technical assessment of the damage incurred by the incident. In nearly all
cases, the response agent is entirely unfamiliar with the affected organization’s mission.
Mission impact requires that the assessor have an understanding the affected assets’
relationship to the organization’s mission. Such a task is impossible for an external agent
to perform, as the interview respondents have noted. As a result, the mission impact
assessments are best guesses based on an extremely limited understanding of the
organization’s mission. Accurate damage assessment is dependent upon mapping
damage to the organization’s asset to it mission in order for mission impact to be
understood. The majority of respondents identified this problem as one of the chief
impediments to effective damage assessment on Air Force networks.
Organizational Failure to Understand Mission Relationship.
The second theme presents a problem for local mission impact assessment. The
ability for an organization to be the primary agent in local mission impact assessment
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assumes that the organization understands how its systems support its mission. The
failure of Air Force organizations to understand this relationship is a pervasive theme
throughout the interview responses; and a serious obstacle to effective mission impact
assessment efforts. The respondents cite that this failure to understand the critical
mission support relationship exists in all levels of the organization, but especially in the
command structure. Most commanders view a cyber security incident on the networks as
a technical issue and rely exclusively upon their system administrators to provide local
input for damage and mission impact assessment. There are many problems that result
from this approach, the chief problem being that the system administrator is not a system
user. The system administrator has a technical responsibility as the organization’s cyber
infrastructure custodian. The system administrator simply does not possess the
perspective in to the use of the system, and rarely possess an understanding of how the
system supports the organization’s mission.
Interview respondents alluded to this problem multiple times in different ways.
The common issue was centered on the problem that neither commanders nor the system
administrator understood how the information the system processed was used within the
mission. This is evidence that there is no understanding of information ownership within
the organization; and no concept and assignment of information ownership within the
organization. The commander is tasking the information custodian to perform an
assessment that only the information owner would have the perspective to perform. It is
particularly important to note that several of the interviewees made this point by
specifically citing this failure of the organizations to understand that the systems process
information supporting the mission. This underscores the kernel of understanding that
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information is the asset within the organization. By failing to understand this ownership
is not established. By failing to establish ownership of the information, mission impact
assessment is unfocused and unproductive. Commanders must have a mechanism by
which to establish information ownership, thereby allowing mapping of information
assets on the affected systems to the mission which they support. Additionally,
commanders must realize that the system administrator is the information custodian, not
the information asset owner. The system administrator may not be equipped to perform
accurate damage assessment without the necessary technical skills and understanding of
the value of the information on the affected system
Heavily Focused on Technology.
There is agreement among the interview respondents that mission impact
assessment is not being conducted effectively. Causality is extremely difficult, if not
impossible to establish without “hard” data. However, based on the responses provided
by the interview subjects and themes discovered in existing research on cyber damage
assessment on Air Force networks the researcher asserts that the Air Force maintains too
strong a focus on technology that is obstructing its ability to conduct defensive cyber
damage and mission impact assessment accurately and in a timely manner.
The Air Force has always considered technology to be an important mission
enabler. However, the interview responses indicate that too heavy of a focus on
technology may be impeding mission impact assessment efforts. This issue is a
consistent theme in a majority of the interviewees’ responses and must not be
downplayed. Six of the nine respondents directly attribute this issue as a contributor to
the problems with current mission impact assessment efforts. The respondents report that
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this problem manifests itself in many ways. The responses indicate that this focus on
technology has created confusion about cyber damage determination and mission impact
assessment methodology that is prevalent throughout the Air Force structure.
Commanders view mission impact as a technical issue. They then find that the technical
and economic metrics produced by the current cyber damage and mission impact
assessment methodology are not applicable for decision making input for their mission
operations. The results of the interviews indicates that the technologically focused
approach is not working well for Air Force mission impact assessment and a new
approach that facilitated mission impact assessment.
The problem with technological focus manifests itself in many ways, and the
symptoms may be mistaken for the illness. This researcher asserts that the problem lays
in the identification of technology as assets, rather than the treating and viewing the
information the system processes as an asset. This view is supported by many of the
respondents that indicate the focus on system technology is causing confusion and
misunderstanding about the role the system plays in supporting mission objectives. This
is tied to the concept of value; a term not specifically used by any of the respondents, but
the concept was prevalent by those respondents that discussed the relationship between
technical cyber damage assessment and mission operations impact assessment. These
respondents used terms such as “worth” and “important to the mission” when discussing
the data and information processed on the systems affected by the incident. The
implications are that this information has value to the organization. It follows, therefore,
that one of the key failings of technical focus to establish value meaningful to mission
impact assessment and mission operations decision-making.
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Lack of Asset Documentation.
Many of the respondents noted that organizations did not understand the
relationship between the systems that they used and the mission operations the systems
somehow supported. Several of the respondents noted that no usable documentation
exists to facilitate this understanding. Documentation such as system accreditation
packages exists, but are by design technologically focused and are not providing the local
system administrator the perspective needed to perform mission impact assessment. The
respondent indicated that mission impact assessment efforts would benefit greatly from
documentation accessible to both the local system administrator and the incident response
agency that would facilitate a better understanding of the system value and utility to the
mission, but understanding the value and utility of the information stored on, or
processed by the system as it supports the organization’s mission operations.
Failure to producing usable and meaningful metrics.
Based on the interview responses and the interview data, the researcher asserts
that the technical focus is resulting in an unusable mission impact assessment product.
This is not a surprising finding since it was reported in several of the responses. The
focus on technology leads to the exclusion of other important issues in mission impact
assessment, and indeed, risk management and cyber security on the whole. Since the
current cyber damage and mission impact assessment methodology exclusively relies on
technologically focused methodology and agents to accomplish mission impact
assessment, the result is a technologically focused product that cannot comprehensively
measure mission impact accurately and provides unusable and applicable reporting
metrics to the organization’s commander.
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This is true because the value presented by information technology is limited in
scope, and attempts to determine damage to technology traditionally produce economicbased metrics; and these metrics are not helpful to standard military operations. This is a
failure to produce usable metrics. Attempts to measure mission impact through
exclusively technical metrics cannot capture all the potential mission impact which may
result from a cyber security incident. This is a failure to produce accurate metrics.
Currently commanders are gaining neither usable nor accurate measurements as a direct
result of the problems identified in the interview process.

State of Defensive Cyber Damage Assessment on U.S. Air Force Networks
This section discusses the findings of an extensive examination of literature
review, existing related research, and interviews of personnel with professional first-hand
knowledge of the state of network defense activities on Air Force networks as they relate
to defensive cyber damage and mission capability impact assessment. It is commonly
agreed that the current methods of cyber damage assessment and mission impact
assessment need to be conducted with more accuracy and effectiveness. Research of
cyber damage assessment methodologies have shown that such efforts are being
employed ad-hoc and with neither standardization nor validation (Thiem 2005, p. 43).
Furthermore, the models they rely upon are producing ineffective and irrelevant
assessment report information since they measure damage exclusively in terms of
recovery costs and infrastructure availability. These metrics provide insufficient
information to the commander to present an accurate picture of impact to the
organization’s mission operations.
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Air Force guidance (AFI 33-138 2004) has designated the Air Force Network
Operations Center (AFNOC) Network Security Division (NSD) as the agency responsible
for leading incident response efforts on Air Force networks. The AFNOC/NSD is tasked
to lead and coordinate damage and impact assessment of an organization’s mission
capability following a successful compromise. This is an extremely difficult and often
impossible task under the current implementation of security management practices on
Air Force networks.
In this section, the findings of literature review, existing research, and interview
response data are examined to paint a clear picture of the factors that are confounding
efforts to perform accurate and timely defensive cyber damage assessment and mission
capability impact assessment. By understanding and documenting these factors the stage
is set for answering the investigative questions of this research.
Current Approach to Cyber Security.
The Air Force’s Network Defense (Net-D) activities are exclusively focused on
the network technology rather than on the information assets contained within the
information systems. Net-D is highly effective at defending networks. However, a
technologically focused network defense scheme cannot work alone and Net-D must be
part of a larger information protection scheme. The areas of responsibility assigned to
the Net-D function are blurred. In practice, the Air Force tends to rely exclusively on the
Net-D function as the vehicle for all aspects of defensive cyber operations; to include
cyber damage and mission impact assessment. Literature review, existing research
(Thiem 2005) and interview data demonstrate, however, the damage and mission impact
assessment efforts are falling down in terms of providing effective and useful metrics.
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Net-D is the implementation of technological security policy to establish
technologically secure networks. The technologically exclusive approach of Net-D
acknowledges the existence of data within the infrastructure, but cannot value it as an
asset. Without explicitly recognizing and acknowledging information as an asset that
directly supports mission operations, one of the chief failings of a highly technologically
focused approach to cyber security is exposed in terms of damage assessment. Because
data is without inherent meaning and appropriate value, exclusive reliance on Net-D
cannot establish value handles to data to measure the support data provides to mission
operational decision making. As a result, subsequent effective damage assessment is
defeated before it can begin.
In terms of performing effective damage and mission impact assessment, the Air
Force is finding that its information policy and doctrine do not translate well into Net-D
implementation. Thiem’s case study research (2005), when coupled with the interview
data of this research effort, shows that reliance and focus on the technical assessment
only is causing current damage assessment efforts to fall short damage assessment. The
interview data provided evidence to an implication of Thiem’s case study research on Air
Force damage assessment that current damage assessment efforts are not actually
assessing damage. Instead, agencies are simply producing technical and economically
focused metrics that are of little use in understanding the full effect of the incident
(Thiem 2005, pp. 34-35).
Net-D is a highly effective implementation of technological security policy, but it
cannot continue to be solely relied upon to provide all aspects of cyber protection and
security. Net-D must be implemented in support of a cyber protection scheme that
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recognizes and understands information asset value protection. The current exclusive
reliance on Net-D cannot support this effective damage and mission impact assessment.
The Air Force must encompass an effective risk management program that allows it to
identify, valuate, and document its information assets. The clear area of responsibility of
technologically focused network security can be passed back to the Net-D function to
protect these critical information assets that exist within the infrastructure.
Lack of Effective “Cyber” Risk Management.
Virtually all contemporary security planning methodologies include risk
management as the foundation for a successful information security program. The Air
Force understands the importance and benefits of risk management and employs risk
management processes throughout the various aspects of its operations to achieve a high
level of operations security. However, it fails to perform effective risk management of its
information assets. The risk management that is accomplished is driven by the
technology focused approach to cyber security.
The Air Force implements what Soo Hoo calls scenario-analysis risk management
techniques (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 11). This form of risk management is very limited in
scope. The Air Force tends to focus on those mitigation steps for those vulnerabilities
identified explicitly identified through scenario. The Air Force is perpetually concerned
about the damage and mission impact that may be caused a zero-day exploit. Since the
Air Force does not deliberately assess cyber risk in terms of assets and value, it is
discovering that it is largely blind to mission impact determination until after the impact
is manifest. As the interviews and existing case study research (Thiem 2005) data
demonstrate, the Air Force is finding damage and mission impact assessment exceedingly
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difficult to perform effectively since organizations do not understand the assets owned
and what these are worth to the organization’s mission. An effective risk management
program allows an organization to develop this understanding.
The Air Force is failing to implement a deliberate and effective risk management
program. In practice, technology is the center of value against which degrees of security
controls are established. When an incident occur, damage and mission impact cannot be
done with accuracy and effectiveness. The problem created by putting technology
exclusively at the center of risk management is analogous to only accounting for the
hangars on a flight line and ignoring the aircraft and assets within. When catastrophe
occurs, either through attacks or accident, and the hangar is lost simply reporting the cost
of the damage to the hangar building provides the commander little understanding to the
impact the attack had on mission capability. The commander must know what and how
many aircraft and support assets were lost to understand the impact of the incident on
mission capability and his ability to support the air campaign.
By implementing a risk assessment practice that focuses exclusively on
technological assets, and fails to deliberately consider cyber information assets within the
organization, the Air Force is simply inventorying hangars and ignoring the mission
assets within. The failure to effectively perform asset-focused risk assessment is the chief
contributor to the failure of damage assessment efforts, and is confounding subsequent
mission impact assessment efforts.
Lack of Information Asset Documentation.
One considerable problem mentioned by interview respondents as impeding cyber
damage assessment is the lack of usable documentation of cyber information assets used
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within an organization. Interview data revealed that many Air Force commanders rely on

commander’s programs, such as the Operations Security (OPSEC) program to identify
document critical information resources within the organization organizational structure.
The OPSEC program was not designed for this task and cannot accomplish such an
objective. The current implementation of the OPSEC program does document the
organization’s critical information resources, but it excludes most information in the
cyber domain, other than information GWOT-focused information such as personal
information published on a publicly accessible web page. There is no valuation of the
assets collected in any way that is meaningful for cyber damage and mission impact
assessment.
System accreditation documentation, another existing documentation of systems
on Air Force networks, tends to be heavily focused on the technical aspects to be usable
in cyber damage and impact assessment activities. Several interview respondents noted
that this accreditation documentation is of little use in determining damage and mission
impact after a successful incident. As a result, the Air Force has fallen short of
establishing a platform of documentation to assist both the incident responder and
information owner to damage and impact determination.
Current Attempts to Assess Damage and Mission Impact.
The Air Force’s approach to cyber security is also directly driving it approach to
damage assessment. This approach to cyber asset damage assessment attempts to
determine the damage caused by an information security incident through assessment of
technical impact to systems and/or infrastructure. It is fundamentally limited in its ability
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to measure impact in a value-focused manner and is finding that it does not possess the
ability to accurately measure mission impact following an information compromise.
Figure 9 is a conceptual graphical of how existing incident response process
currently works and how damage assessment is determined and communicated within
USAF networks. When an incident occurs and is detected, the IRT is dispatched to
investigate the incident as shown in step 1. The incident process conducted by the IRT
will focus on investigation, remediation, restoration, and a preliminary damage
assessment as shown in step 2. The IRT team will work with the system owners in an
attempt to determine the impact of the incident. In many cases, the system owners are not
fully aware of all of the information assets that are contained within the system. This is
due, in part, to the dynamic nature of information systems and the fact that information
assets are often deposited on (or deleted from) a system without the explicit knowledge of
the system owners. Next, a preliminary assessment of the incident is reported through
AFNOC NCD to all affected sites as shown in step 3. In this high-level example, the
report consumers are all those agencies that have a vested interest in receiving the
incident report. Current damage reporting is integrated in the narrative of incident
reporting consists mainly of tangible technical metrics (loss of availability of data and the
man-hours required to remediate the incident). A subjective operational impact
assessment may occur based upon the relative understanding the system owners have
about the use of data affected by the incident. In most cases, this understanding is very
low and incident responders are force to make a “best guess” based on their interaction
with the system owners. As a result mission impact assessment is, for all intents and
purposes, currently an unattainable goal due in large part to the lack of documentation of
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the information assets on the system and identification of organizations that depend upon
the information.

Figure 9. Current Incident Response and Damage Assessment on AF Networks

Step 4 illustrates this disjoint between the OPSEC program and cyber security
efforts. As previously stated, the OPSEC program in its current is not designed to
provide a commander any mapping of cyber information assets to operational or mission
impact. There exists no other program or initiative in the Air Force enterprise to ensure
identification, documentation and relative valuation of information assets that support
mission operations and reside within the Air Force network infrastructure.
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When an information incident occurs, the Incident Response Team is forced to
conduct a mission impact assessment with little or no documentation that shows how the
information supports the organizational mission. As a result, the primary assessment is
based upon economic factors (remediation and recovery costs) and availability.
Subsequently, an effort is made to identify and quantify the impact by contacting a
representative within the information owner’s organization. Unfortunately, this often
leads to a subjective assessment and unreliable assessment of impact.
Scenario Illustrating the Current Approach.

To illustrate the impediments to damage assessment introduced by the currently
employed approach to cyber protection, consider the following notional example based
on actual events on Air Force networks where network defenders investigating suspicious
activity have confirmed the compromise of multiple passwords to military systems. The
systems are multi-function, but bear trust relationships with systems that are known to be
critical to the organization’s mission. The incident response team (IRT) determines that at
least one password has allowed administrator access to the system; and the mission
critical systems were accessed numerous times. All findings, including time of access,
information accessed, and other important information, are reported through the standard
reporting chain, and the commander at the site of the incident is included. The
commander requests more information from the IRT regarding how the incident affects
his mission. The IRT is unable to provide this assessment as there is no documentation of
how the information provides value to the mission. As a result, the commander may
decide that since his system’s availability is intact, no action is necessary. The truth,
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however, may be that the confidentiality of a planned operation was breached which
undermines the OPSEC of the mission. As a result, the mission may be jeopardized and
materials and lives exposed to unnecessary risk since the commander cannot be provided
with a clear picture of the battlespace that enables him to understand the impact to is own
mission capability.

Synthesis of Research Data and Investigative Research Questions
This section will address the investigative research questions and discuss the
research data in terms of these questions. Each section will discuss how the data supports
or weakens the investigative research questions.
Investigative Research Question 1.
The first research question asked:

R1. How can the damage resulting from a successful cyber attack be effectively
measured?

This research has uncovered substantial data from literature review, existing case study
research, and interviews to indicate that the current damage assessment methodology is
inefficient at best, with non-validated damage assessment procedures being implemented
piecemeal in various pockets of the Air Force enterprise (Thiem 2005, p. 43). Despite
the Air Force implementing damage assessment and reporting command and control
through standardized guidance (AFI 33-138 2004), there are still many problems as
evident from the interview data.
The Air Force is attempting measuring damage in technical and financial terms,
although these damage assessment metrics note have been proven beneficial to the
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commander seeking to understand impact to his/her mission after an incident. The
interview data of this research directly supports the findings of Thiem’s research (2005)
that damage assessment is an inherently technologically focused activity being conducted
ineffectively throughout the Air Force enterprise.
Understanding Damage Assessment.
Damage assessment, mission impact assessment and mission impact reporting
form a chain of dependent activities. Conceptually, one activity cannot be accurately
performed without successful completion of the prior activity (see Figure 10 below).
Cyber damage assessment must set the stage for mission impact by determining damage
to the asset on which the mission depends. The damage is in terms of value loss. In
other words, damage assessment must assess damage. In the literature review, damage
was defined as a loss in value or usability in an asset (Oxford, 1986). Analysis thus far
has shown that a failure to accurately perform damage assessment confounds any effort
to perform mission impact reporting to the operational decision maker.

Figure 10. Damage Assessment to Impact Reporting Chain of Dependency
The previous statement is true because mission impact reporting is at the end of a
chain of interdependent processes. The mission impact assessment is failing because of
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the focus on the technical aspects of damage assessment. Air Force damage assessment
is conducted in a disjointed manner and in many cases is limited to technical reporting
without actual damage assessment being performed. Damage in terms of value loss is
difficult to measure since the Air Force risk management program is a scenario-focused
scheme that introduces limited scope to risk, and very little deliberate determination of
asset value. In all cases, the central asset of damage assessment efforts is technological
and which holds only a single dimension of value to the organization; loss of availability.
However, as the research data demonstrates, the failure to understand the system-tomission relationship is rendering even this simplistic, single dimensional form of damage
assessment ineffective. The chain of dependencies must be corrected for mission impact
assessment to be possible.
Ideal Cyber Damage Assessment.
Cyber damage assessment methodology must include a mechanism that provides
a reasonable estimate of loss in the value of an organization’s asset. This statement holds
several important implications. It implies that an asset is something that holds value to
the organization. Since damage is defined as a reduction in value or usefulness of the
affected object (Oxford, 1986), effective damage assessment methodology must assess
any reduction, or loss, in the asset’s value. This, in turn, implies that effective damage
assessment must also measure value loss in the correct asset in order to produce metrics
that are relevant to the organization’s mission. Such assets must directly support the
organization’s mission and the value of the supporting relationship must be understood
by the asset’s owner.
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This research has found that Air Force organizations are not looking at the right
assets for damage assessment, due largely to a failure to recognize what assets support
the mission. Interview data and literature both support the strong focus that the Air Force
maintains on technology over its information. The interview respondents cited a
prevalent failure to understand how systems processed information that supported the
organization’s mission. The focus on technology has blinded organizational
understanding of what assets are owned and how those assets contribute to the mission.
Moreover, the interview data shows that this focus on technology prevents the
understanding that the asset not simply the affected system, but it is the information
processed by the system that supports the organization’s mission. The literature review
and interview data support the concept that the asset’s value lies in the relationship
between this information and the mission.
Additionally, the case study of damage assessment on Air Force networks
revealed that the focus on damage assessment was exclusively on technical assessments,
and in some cases a lack of understand of why damage assessment is being conducted
(Thiem 2005, p. 35). There is no indication that an assessment of damage in terms of
value loss is being conducted. This observation is supported by the interview data of this
research effort in which every respondent discussed some aspect of the meaningless
mission impact assessment metrics consisting of exclusively technical reporting from the
Tier 3 custodians. If no damage is assessed in terms of utility value loss, mission impact
assessment becomes even more difficult and less accurate. Indeed, one of the common
themes among the interview respondents in this research effort was that the focus on
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technical issues was producing meaningless damage assessment metrics that prevented
mission impact assessment.
Ideal cyber damage assessment depends on the identification of the correct assets
and an understanding of the value these assets maintain in the organization. Ideal damage
assessment, therefore, is explicitly dependent on the identification and documentation of
the information asset before the incident occurs. This documentation must account for
the assets value in terms of mission relationship, its key attributes and containers, and an
explicit mapping to the mission which indicates potential mission impact if the asset is
lost or damaged. Value must be expressed in some way that is relevant to the
organization. Literature review data supports that the value of information lies in its
utility to the organization (Buffet, Scott, et. Al. 2004, pp. 80-81; Morrison and Cohen
2005, p. 34). In organizational decision making where mission is not motivated by
economics, such as military operations, the value of the asset must be expressed and
understood in terms of utility-based value estimation. By identifying the correct asset
and understanding its relative value before an incident occurs, damage assessment then
becomes possible. More importantly, identification, valuation, and documentation of the
asset and it mission relationship opens the door to mission impact assessment.
This allows the information owner to work with the incident responder’s technical
assessment to understand the damage to the asset in terms of estimated value loss. Since
documentation of the asset’s key attributes exists, the asset owner can now map the
technical report assessing adverse effects against the organization’s systems to the assets
on the systems. The documentation further assists the owner and incident responder in
determining how the asset supports the organization’s mission. The asset owner can
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readily understand the relationship between the system and the asset. Any estimated
reduction to the asset’s utility value may be assessed as damage in terms acceptable for
translation to mission impact assessment.
Investigative Research Question 2.
The second research question was:

R2. How can such damage be mapped to impact to an organization’s mission
capability?
The previous section established that once the correct assets are identified and their value
understood before an incident occurs, accurate damage assessment may be accomplished.
Damage to mission mapping depends on accurate pre-incident determination and
documentation of asset-to-mission relationships. If accurate identification and
documentation of the organization’s assets, asset value in terms of mission operational
utility, and key asset attributes is accomplished before an incident occurs, a great stride is
made towards mapping the asset to a potential impact on the mission if the asset is
damaged.
The chief theme revealed in the research data was an exclusive focus on
technology produces an organizational environment where the relationship between a
system affected by a cyber incident and the organization’s mission is misunderstood.
Such a failure to understand the critical mission relationship frustrates attempts to assess
both damage and mission impact in the affected organization. Several respondents cited
the lack of any documentation to assist the Tier 3 damage assessors in understanding this
relationship. The establishment of such documentation facilitates a new ability to
perform both the foundational cyber damage assessment activities and more important
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mission impact assessment activity. Therefore, pre-incident documentation of the asset,
its value, and its mission relationship lift the fog which currently exists. With a clearly
documented mapping between the asset and the mission, cyber damage to mission impact
assessment becomes possible.
Another key finding in the interview data was the fog produced by this exclusive
focus on technological assets and lack of documentation was the misunderstanding of
ownership. The literature review Stevens discussed the many problems associated with
failure to establish and understand ownership (Stevens 2005, p. 30). The research data
revealed evidence that organizations did not understand ownership roles of the system
and the associated damage assessment processes. These agencies depended on the Tier 1
agencies to determine damage and mission impact assessment. However, only the asset
owner has the perspective to understand how the mission is impacted when the asset is
damaged. Establishing and documenting explicit ownership of the organization’s assets
facilitates both damage assessment and mission impact assessment by mitigating
ambiguity about the asset attributes and ensures that the entity with the appropriate
perspective can work with the Tier 1 agency to establish an effective mission impact
assessment.
Damage assessment mapping to mission impact may be accomplished through the
foundational activity of identifying and documenting the organization’s assets and
appropriate attributes before an incident occurs. These attributes must include at
minimum, the asset owner, the asset’s value in terms of mission relationship, and such
information as the asset’s location. By doing so, the first key activities of damage and
mission impact assessment may be accomplished.
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Investigative Research Question 3.
The third investigative research question was:

R3. How must this assessment be reported to the decision maker to maximize the
quality of the assessment for use as decision input?

Mission impact reporting is the summit of all damage and mission impact assessment
activities. Appropriate and effective reporting can provide the commander with an
increased situational awareness of potential and actual impact to his/her mission
following an cyber incident that may lead to improved battlespace decision making
through decision superiority (AFDD2-5 2005). However, literature review (Bowman and
Moskowitz 2001, p. 775) has shown the usefulness of the reporting data is only as good
as the effectiveness of the preceding assessment process. Additionally the information
must be of decision-making quality in terms the decision maker can easily understand
(Jensen 2005, p.56; JP 3-13, 2006: I-3).
Mission impact reporting inherently assumes all previous supporting activities
have been accomplished effectively and accurately and must be approached from an
operational perspective. Technical issues relating to damage assessment must be
translated into a report that is free from technical details. Mission impact assessment
reporting must present information that is relevant to the commander’s needs and in
terms of the commander’s frame of reference. The mission impact assessment report
must be simple to understand quickly with minimal technical information. It must
produce an immediate understanding allowing the commander to quickly assess the
impact information as it relates to his/her mission.
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Literature review and interview data has shown that the primary guidance for such
reporting (CJCSM6510.01 2006) does not explicitly provide such a reporting format that
is free from the ambiguity that results in overly technical reporting. But as previously
stated JP 3-13 (2006, p. I-3) does provide a generic framework for the establishing the

quality of information that must be included in mission impact reporting. If the quality
criteria are used as a standard for developing report content a good start is make towards
effective reporting. To ensure that the report is populated with assessment information
that is relevant to the commanders needs, asset owner involvement in impact assessment
and reporting is essential.
Timeliness is also a critical issue to ensure the appropriate decision maker gains
situational awareness in appropriate time frame. Ideally, report distribution should be
automated through some centralized reporting system to ensure all organizations, such as
Tier 1 Netops functions, and ordinate agencies are aware of the mission impact resulting
from the incident on the enterprise networks.
From the first phase of asset identification to the final phase of mission impact
reporting, the needs of the operational decision maker must be at the forefront of all
activities. Only by maintaining this operational focus will information, rather than
technology, become the evident asset for mission, and its value realized. By doing so,
the fog that obscures the relationship between information asset, system and mission is
lifted and true cyber damage assessment and mission impact assessment becomes
possible.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter presented and analyzed data collected through the interviews,
existing case study research on damage assessment practices on Air Force networks, and
extensive literature review. The interviews focused on understanding the problems with
current mission impact assessment activities. The literature review and case studies
examination analyzed data relating to the Air Force’s approach to risk assessment and
damage assessment. The key finding is that the foundations of all network defense
activities are so exclusively rooted in the technological focus that accurate mission
impact assessment is not currently possible. Mission impact reporting is at the end of a
chain of interdependent processes. It is failing because the preceding steps are failing.
Damage assessment is conducted in a disjointed manner and in many cases is limited to
technical reporting with not real assessment of damage in terms of value loss. Value loss
cannot be measured since the Air Force risk management efforts do not deliberately
identify and valuate cyber assets.
This chapter answered the research questions after building an understanding of
why current damage and mission impact assessment is not working efficiently. Damage
from a successful cyber attack may be measured effectively only if the value of the asset
if known before the incident. Damage assessment must consist of both a technical
assessment and a damage assessment that estimates value loss. Mission impact
assessment depends that damage assessment is successful and accurate. Both damage
assessment and mission impact assessment explicitly depend on accurate asset
identification and documentation prior to the incident. Mission impact reporting is the
end goal of all damage and mission impact assessment activities. It depends on
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successful and accurate accomplishment of the previous activities and must provide the
results in a timely and clear manner to allow the decision maker to make smart and timely
decisions based on the mission impact report information.
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V. Conclusions and Proposals
Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the finding in current Air Force implementation of
damage and mission impact assessment. The chapter also provided answers to the
research questions by discussing how damage assessment can be translated to mission
impact and clearly reported to the organizational decision maker.
This chapter discusses conclusions of this research regarding improved defensive
damage assessment methodology. The first section of this chapter presents foundations
for improved damage and mission impact assessment. The second section proposes an
improved conceptual methodology for defensive cyber damage and mission impact
assessment.
Foundations for Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Assessment
Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Assessment (CDA-D/MIA) is a
system of interdependent activities that allow an organizational decision maker to
understand the mission impact resulting from a successful cyber incident. The
methodology attempts to help an organization identify its critical information assets in
such a way that effective mission impact assessment and reporting is possible. This
research effort has determined that current attempts of both damage assessment and
mission impact assessment are unsuccessful due to a number of independent failing that
prevent its effective implementation for a number of reasons. This section will discuss
essential foundational principles that establish an improved methodology.
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Information Production, Consumption and Ownership.
The literature review discussed traditional concepts of information ownership,
custodianship, and information users. Understanding these respective communities of
responsibility regarding information is extremely important for the foundation of damage
assessment. The information owner is responsible for identification, definition,
valuation, and documentation of all information assets owned. Asset profiling must be
accomplished by the information owner since only the owner maintains a perspective to
understand how the information is used to support the organization’s mission and its
relative value. Assets must be identified, documented, and profiled before an incident
occurs.
In the best of conditions, information production, ownership, and consumption are
easily and frequently confused, and in many organizations information asset ownership is
assigned without due diligence to ensuring the owner can accomplish the assigned
ownership responsibilities. Ownership must be assigned correctly or any benefits are
negated. The assigned owner must both understand the responsibilities of ownership and
possess the authority to perform ownership duties.
Ownership must not be confused with production. In many organizations, the
producer and owner may be the same person if the information asset is produced within
the organization. In a large enterprise, the information producer may exist outside the
organization that holds the information as a valued asset. This is especially true on
military networks.
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Tangible Ownership.
In a business organization, it is likely that information is produced somewhere

within the organization’s boundaries. In such a case, the information producer and
information owner may be the same. It may be reasonably expected that since they reside
within the same organization they are subject to the same organizational policies
governing information and information asset protection. This situation creates an
opportunity to create a tangible assignment of ownership.
The tangible owner possesses reasonable assurance that the information asset will
be subject to the consistent information policy and guidance as established within the
organization. Additionally, the tangible owner maintains a reasonable relationship with
the information custodian since, as with the information producer, both operate within the
policy environment of the same organization. Furthermore, since the tangible asset
owner and asset are within the same organization, the owner is in a position to place a
value upon the asset relative to its contextual worth to the organization with reasonable
assurance that the relative value of the information asset is sustained throughout the
organization. Tangible ownership can only exist in organizations where information
assets do not cross organizational boundaries.
Relative Ownership.
In a large enterprise, such as the military, tangible ownership is impossible to
achieve. Military operations rely heavily on information assets produced beyond the
boundaries of the organization, service, or even the nation of the information consumer.
On military networks, the traditional role definitions information producers, owners,
custodians and consumers are obscured as traditional concepts of ownership become
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relative to the individual needs of widely diverse organizations within the same
enterprise. Asset ownership gains a new fluidity, and becomes relative to the contextual
value within an organization. The same asset will have widely differing values and
security requirements as it moves from organization to organization throughout the
enterprise. Assignment of a single owner is impossible in this case, therefore ownership
is relative to the organization.
To illustrate this concept, consider the following scenario. An organization
receives intelligence information input from multiple external organizations, services,
and allied nations. External information producers may classify the information at the
point of origin, but because the external producer has no perspective of how each
consumer organization will use this information within the context of each mission,
definitive value for the information cannot established. Therfore, classification can only
serve as a baseline value for the asset. As the information enters the organization and the
organization finds that the information is useful to its mission, the information becomes
an asset to the organization. The organization, therefore, may store and use the
information. At this point, the organization becomes more that just a consumer of the
information asset. Now the organization is a relative owner of the asset.
In this way, relative ownership resembles tangible ownership, local to an
organization for the purposes of risk management, security controls, and even damage
assessment. As with the tangible owner, the relative owner is responsible for
identification, documentation, and valuation of the information asset. However, each
organization within the enterprise that uses the asset may realize asset value differently in
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the context of its mission usability. Each organization, therefore, bears a relative
ownership to the asset within the context of their organization.
The concept of relative ownership is extremely important to establishment of an
effective cyber damage assessment model in a large and diverse enterprise, such as the
DoD. Relative ownership implies that the buck stops here for determining asset value.
Relative ownership allows each organization to look within itself to identify, document,
and valuate the critical information assets that allow it to maintain daily mission
operations. For the purposes of this research, the term information ownership implies
relative information ownership to more easily deal with information ownership and
damage to information assets local to the organization in which the incident occurred.
Measuring Cyber Damage as Value Loss.
This research has concluded that traditional methodologies for assessing cyber
damage are not suitable for use on military networks. Traditional methodologies tend
assess damage in terms of economic loss and produce reporting constructs that are not
adequate contributors to decision making in organizations not explicitly profit-driven.
.Additionally, this research determined that Air Force damage assessment efforts do not
effectively measure damage in terms of value loss. This is one contributing reason why
current damage assessment cannot facilitate impact assessment. The other contributing
reason is a failure to understand value in terms that are relevant to an organization such as
the military. Without establishing relative value, damage cannot be assessed. This
section proposes a conceptual method for establishing value and assessing subsequent
damage resulting from an incident.
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Establishing Value for Information Assets.
Determining the value of information is a complex task due to its innately
intangible qualities and contextual derivation of value that thwarts attempts to assign a
definitive value to information assets in many models. Understanding information value
as a reflection of the relationship it presents in supporting the achievement of

organizational mission goals is critical.
The value of information is contextual; it is derived from its utility within a given
organization. Utility is an intangible quality that is extremely difficult to quantify
because it is dependent on the context in which the owning organization uses the asset in
achieving its mission goals. The value of information may deviate greatly from one
organization to the next due to context. Consider for example, live unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) feeds providing real-time battlespace information may be broadcast across
a classified network. Personnel in the finance organization may access this information
at any time to see what’s happening. As interesting as the feed may be to the personnel
in the finance unit, the UAV feed holds little or no value to the mission of the finance
organization. If a cyber incident impairs the live feed, there is no immediate impact to
the mission of the finance organization. Therfore, the feed holds little value to the
finance organization. However, the information holds great value to the commander in
the Joint Air Operations Center (JOC) making mission decisions based on the
information provided through the feed. The information is the same to both, but the
value of the information is contextual and driven by utility. The problem encountered is
how to create a value handle to measure this value; and determine loss when the asset is
compromised.
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The greater the utility of the information asset to making decisions supporting the
mission goals the greater the instrumental value the asset presents to the organization. As
more decisions can be made on the information asset supporting the organization’s goals
the more the asset’s value increases. As this value increases, the tangible aspects of
measurement tend to decrease (see Figure 11 below).

Figure 11. Information Value Hierarchy

To assess damage to information and the associated mission impact, however,
some approximation of value must be determined prior to incident occurrence. On
military networks, classification is an intial baseline, but it is not a sufficient
measurement of potential or actual value. Therefore, a new model for value assignment
must be devised to assign a handle to represent the instrumental value the information
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asset holds relative to its support of organizational mission operations. When doing so it
is critical that focus remains on the information asset as the foundation on which specific
mission operations rest. By approaching asset value determination from a mission
operations perspective, the complexity of identification and valuation may be reduced by
approximating it value in relation to its value drivers.
Asset Value.
Value is an abstracted concept and there are many things that go on under the

hood to establish the concept of value, and it is frequently confused with its unit of
measurement. It is worthwhile to briefly discuss value as it relates to damage and
mission impact assessment, because understanding how to determine value is essential to
understanding how to determine damage.
The conclusions of this research assert that an asset possesses value in two
distinct ways: potential value, and actionable value. Potential value represents the
absolute value that an asset may hold for an organization, real or theoretical. Potential
value tends to remain constant so long as its value driver remains constant. Actionable
value represents the degree in which the value is presented to the organization.
Actionable value is based on the organization’s ability to utilize the asset for its needs at a
given time. Where potential value is relatively constant in regards to its relationship with
its value driver, actionable value is relatively fluid and is readily influenced by external
factors. For example, an asset with high utility by critical mission processes may be
unavailable as the result of a server failure. The asset’s potential value remains
constant—it is still an important asset to the organization—but the actionable value is
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diminished. Since the asset’s ability to be used is diminished, the value it provides is
diminished for the duration of the reduction in utility.
This concept is important since military operations depend upon these values
differently in operations across the strategic, operational, and tactical domains of
operations. The strategic domain is primarily concerned with the asset’s potential value
to establish predictive understanding of potential mission impact. In the operational and
tactical domains, however, mission operations depend on the organization’s ability to
effectively use all the constructs of the information asset, therefore relying upon the
asset’s actionable value. The asset’s value must be established before the incident occurs
and by necessity, through an asset-focused risk management methodology which
facilitates asset identification and valuation. On initial valuation the asset’s potential and
actionable values are presumed to be the same. To assign value to the asset, however,
there must be value constructs established to which value may be assigned and damage
may be assessed. These constructs are discussed further below.
Classification as a Baseline Value Construct.
All information stored on its networks is assigned classification through a
standard system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security
information (EO13292 2003). The classification is established at the point of production
in terms of value to national security rather than value to a specific organization’s
mission. However, this classification is maintained across organizational boundaries
regardless of an organization’s mission. A system must be accredited and classified at
the highest classification level of the information processed on it. Thus, all information
stored or processed on the system must be assigned a classification level equal to that of
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the system. As a result, there can be no guarantee that the classification is a reflection of
the asset’s value to the individual organization making classification only suitable as a
baseline for establishing asset value.
Utility as a Contextual Value Driver.
Information asset value is contextual, since its value is in its support of the
organization’s accomplishment of its mission goals through operational processes that
depend on the information asset. Remember that contextual value is the most important
component in information asset valuation, and derives its value through its degree of
utility in supporting the organization’s mission. Contextual value allows the same asset
to be worth more or less from one organization to the next as its utility changes. The
more usable the asset is, the greater its contextual value. The greater the utility to a
process critical to the organization, the more critical the asset becomes. This also means
that when something occurs that affects the utility of the asset in its relative ability to
support mission goals, its contextual value is affected. Such a change could be the result
of a shift in the organization’s mission that makes the asset less useful. More often it
may be the result of an incident that affects one or more of the asset’s contextual value
constructs.
Contextual Value Constructs.
The model below proposes an asset value model in which assets can be assigned
value based on their criticality to the mission. Valuation must be done in the pre-incident
stage of the strategic operating domain of the CDA-D/MIA model. CDA-D/MIA
domains of operation will be discussed later in this paper. Valuation of the asset
constructs is a critical component in the success and effectiveness of the CDA-D/MIA
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methodology. This model allows a discrete value to be assigned to the qualitative
relationships between the asset and the mission it supports. These relationships are
identified in the model through asset constructs which model the utility bindings of the
key areas of support for the organization’s mission (see Figure 12 below). Remember
that this support for the organization’s mission is realized through layers of support of
information processes which support mission processes and ultimately the organizational
mission. The constructs of the contextual value of information are mission binding, age,
and state.

Figure 12. Information Asset Value Construct Model

The Mission Binding Construct.
Mission binding is an assessment of how closely the information asset is bound to
the organization’s mission through its supporting information process. An asset that is
closely bound to an operational process is assigned a relatively high value, especially if
the operational process itself is critical to the organization’s mission. Therefore, the
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criticality of the supported process and the strength the relationship between the process
and the asset comprises the value driver for the asset’s mission binding construct. The
nature of this relationship enjoys a relatively greater degree of permanency in comparison
to the other contextual value constructs, especially those sub-constructs under the state
construct discussed below. Mission binding is qualitative in nature.
The Age Construct.
Age is a concept common to all lifecycles. As information ages, it’s relevance to
the organization may change. This construct could conceivably be call timeliness, but
since the degree of relevance reflected in this construct is function relevance over time, it
is more appropriately called age. Some information assets may possess a more volatile
age construct than others. The value of the age construct of a weather report will
potentially alter more rapidly than the age construct of electronic patient records. An
asset which ages beyond its relevance will see a reduction in utility. Assessing the value
of this construct is arguably more useful in those assets that age at a more gradual rate.
The value of this construct is also qualitative.
State Constructs.
State is the most fluid of an information asset’s contextual value constructs. The
state construct refers to the state of the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA)
model of information quality and reflects the asset’s state of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Each organization may place a greater or lesser value on each of these
constructs depending on how the asset supports the particular mission process. Certain
processes may depend on the state of a certain construct to be maintained more than the
others. For example, some information assets, such as secrets, may not need to be
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immediately accessible, but unauthorized exposure could be devastating to the
organization’s mission capability. Others, such as medical prescription information
stored in a system depend on the maintenance of the integrity over confidentiality and
immediate availability.
An information incident can affect the state of the information asset causing it to
be of less value to the information owner. During initial valuation, it must be assumed
that the state constructs are intact unless there is reason to believe otherwise. Like the
mission binding construct, the constructs which comprise the asset’s state construct are
qualitative estimations of the value the asset provides to the organization is achieving its
mission goals.
Damage and Value Loss.
Loss is value reduction in the asset. However, value loss is not necessarily the
result of damage. Value loss can result from either external or internal influences, such
as organizational mission changes or incidents that affect the relationship maintained
between the asset and the supported mission processes, or internal factors such as life
cycle issues that diminish the asset’s relevance to the mission. Value loss can occur from
information life cycle issues, where the asset outlives its relevance to the organization,
thus experiencing value reduction. If the organization’s mission changes, the asset’s
value may decrease if it is not as critically bound to the organization’s new mission.
Damage is something more specific. Damage is the result of an incident that
reduces the asset’s utility to the organization; generally and most frequently affecting the
asset’s context value constructs. Damage is always the result of an external influence on
the asset’s value.
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This research is primarily concerned with damage. However, both damage and
general value loss are reductions in value, so it is important that a methodology for
damage assessment is also able to recognize other forms of value loss in the
organization’s information
Value Loss in the Mission Binding Construct.
Generally speaking, the mission binding will remain relatively constant so long as
there is no change in the value driver. A change in the organization’s mission may cause
a cause a change in the value of the asset if the supported process becomes more or less
critical to supporting the organization’s mission. Another factor that could influence the
mission binding is age.
Value Loss in the Age Construct.
As previously stated, an asset that has aged beyond its relevance is less useful for
decision making. Since decisions are made upon information, the information must be
timely and relevant to the situation to possess utility in decision making. If the
information asset is no longer applicable its utility is reduced, with potential collateral
impact to the mission binding construct.
Following with the previous example of age, consider that a weather report may
be updated and revised multiple times throughout the day to provide the commander the
opportunity to maximize the potential for improved mission decisions. Each successive
report supersedes the previous as the previous ages beyond relevance to the mission.
Damage in State Constructs.
Because of the nature of state constructs, value loss will be experienced as
damage. These constructs are not directly influenced through time or mission alignment.
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Changes to the value in these constructs will come from some external influence or
compromise. Therefore, such value change is damage. Each of the sub-constructs of
state, confidentiality, integrity, and availability, can experience damage independent of
each other, or collectively. Each holds in independent value that reflects the value state
of the construct at the time of its valuation; presumably also its ideal state. An incident
that results in any degree of value reduction in any one or any combination of the subconstructs of the state constructs reflects a reduction in the utility of the asset for the
duration until the asset may be restored to its pre-incident state. Again, keep in mind that
discussion of loss in these sub-sections refers to reduction in the actionable value.
Damage in Availability Construct.
There are multiple avenues for a compromise of availability. Loss of availability
can be caused by malicious activity, such as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack against the information infrastructure, or non-malicious incident, such as natural
disaster or infrastructure failure. Consider the following example of damage resulting in
mission impact following from a compromise of information asset availability.
The air campaign is in its second day. One of the wing commanders supporting
the campaign wants to know the wing’s BDA for the previous day’s missions; and
specifically why he is attacking the same target for the third consecutive day. He calls
the Director of Combat Operations (DCO) for BDA report, but is informed that an
ongoing system outage is delaying access to the BDA reports. The DCO states that the
cause of the outage is unknown at this time, but his Intelligence officers will be able to
resume completion of the first phase BDA report as soon as the system is operational.
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The Colonel on the phone is frustrated because he cannot get the information that he
needs about the next day’s missions.
In this scenario the critical information asset was unavailable to support the
organization’s mission. The availability construct was perturbed by a container failure,
resulting in a degradation of the asset’s actionable value. Damage in this case is realized
since the asset is not available for use and the mission capability, or at minimum
efficiency, is directly affected until such time the information asset is made available
again. The potential value of the asset has not diminished. It cannot be acted upon,
however, there the availability sub-construct’s value is diminished reflected as damage to
the asset’s value until it is made available again.
Damage in the Confidentiality Construct.
Consider the following notional example that illustrates how a confidentialiy
compromise can result in damage to the confidentiality value sub-construct that translates
to mission impact. As the build up for impending operations to regain control of Fallujah
begins, CENTCOM network defenders notice an increase in suspicious activity on MNFI networks. The widely dispersed network and necessities of combat operations
introduce delays in the incident response activities necessary to secure and investigate a
cluster of potential root-level compromises on systems located somewhere on Camp
Victory. Administrators and incident response personnel attempt to locate and secure the
systems suspected have sustained Category I (CAT I), but are met with resistance from
operators to shutting the systems down as they are mission critical. The suspected
compromised systems operate for another 9 hours before being secured. In all the
systems processed critical mission information for 36 hours after the initial notification
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by CENTCOM network defenders of suspected root level compromise. Within 24 hours
the number improvised explosive devices (IED) and other hostile actions on all convoy
routes increased by three hundred percent, with at least two IED detonations causing
multiple coalition casualties, including loss of life. This forced a change in movement
time tables and routes. Forensic investigation revealed that two systems used for
processing mission critical information had, indeed, been compromised at the root level.
Both systems were classified systems that had been connected to an unclassified network,
providing the intruders access. The intruders did not alter information on the system, but
quietly accessed and retrieved large quantities of sensitive and classified information,
including all convoy times and routes for the next several days. Since the impact of the
confidentiality compromise did not immediately impact mission operations as with an
availability compromise, the severity of the compromise was not understood until too
late. As a result mission operations were affected, and human lives lost.
A breach of confidentiality is more difficult to detect than an availability
compromise. The effects of confidentiality may not be immediately apparent, as in the
above scenario, but this very fact may cause the impact to be greater. Some information
assets, such as secrets, will suffer significant devaluation if known by another entity with
the capability to exploit the information. When such a confidentiality compromise the
asset experiences a actionable reduction in actionable value, since the secret is no longer
a secret. Even if the decision maker elects to proceed with the asset to make a decision
on mission operations, the value presented is still not equivalent to the its potential value.
Damage in the Integrity Construct.
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The following notational scenario illustrates who damage to the integrity
construct can result in mission impact. Recent weeks have borne witness to a growing
number of network incidents, and MNF-I leadership is concerned about network
operations and cyber security problems that have recently affected Multinational Corps –
Iraq (MNC-I) mission operations. The MNF-I/J-6 has tasked the MNC-I/C6 to ensure
that all units in the Iraqi theatre of operations provide owned and used IP ranges to 3d
Signal Brigade to aid in more rapid isolation and location of system outages and
suspicious activity. Unfortunately, not all units comply. CENTCOM network defenders
watching both CENTAF and CFLCC intrusion detection sensors report new potential
CAT I activity from systems on MNF-I networks. Although the IP of the suspected
compromised systems are assigned to CENTAF at Balad Air Base, the system cannot be
located immediately and the suspicious activity continues intermittently for three weeks.
During this time, medical staff at Balad Air Base experience an unusually high number of
anomalies such as patients being administered the wrong drugs or dangerously high
dosages, incorrect blood type, and other life-threatening issues. When the suspected
compromised systems are located and secured, compromised is confirmed. The intruders
had intentionally altered patient medical records placing several patients in life
threatening situations.
Like a confidentiality compromise, a compromise of information integrity may be
difficult to initially detect and have severe impact to the organization’s mission. Decision
makers ultimately utilize information assets as the foundation of their decisions. Altering
the information asset can force the decision maker to make a bad decision that negatively
impacts mission operations. Integrity compromise degrades the actionable value, by the
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degree of alteration and can be synonymous to an available compromise it the integrity
violation makes the asset unusable. The potential value remains constant so long as the
asset can be restored to its original state.
Establishment of a Relative Value Scale.
This research has established that value is the result of the asset’s usefulness to
the organization, whether utility in decision making or other, more abstracted mission
dependencies. In any case, as this dependency increases, the tangible aspects that allow
more simple value modeling in physical assets begin to diminish. Commonly measured
tangible value qualities tend to focus on economic contribution of the asset, resulting in
dollar-centric damage assessments that are of little use to the non-profit focused decision
maker. In fact, previous research and existing models have shown that precise value of
information cannot be determined with complete accuracy, or arguably even a high
degree of accuracy. The best approach, therefore, is to develop the closest approximation
of this value as it relates to the organization.
This research proposes that information assets possess two general areas of value:
classification, which can only serve as a baseline value, and contextual value, which is
the true indicator the support the asset has for the organization. Development of a
methodology for cyber damage and organizational mission capability impact assessment
require an information value model that can capture the qualitative estimation of the
value an information asset holds to the organization; and present the measurement of this
value with enough simplicity that it is easy to understand and work with. To meet this
need, this research proposes a five-point value scale for value assignment to the

167

constructs of information assets in a non-profit driven organization such as the military
(see Figure 13 below)

Figure 13. A Five Point Value Scale for Information Assets

This proposed value scale reflects the value of an information asset, through the
value assigned to its constructs, as it supports mission operations. Understanding that the
value reflects the asset's utility in supporting mission operations is essential to proper and
correct value assignment. Value levels are assigned to contextual value constructs, with
total contextual value being a function of a weighted average of the value constructs.
Value Level 5.
Value Level 5 reflects an asset or asset construct that provides critical support of a
mission process. Loss or degradation of this asset or construct will directly result in a
failure of the information process it supports. It is important to note at this point that the
CDA-D/MIA methodology focuses on the identification, documentation, and valuation of

critical information assets to determine impact to mission capability when such critical
assets are compromised. It is important to understand at this point that the methodology
is designed to be self-scoping to exclude all but those assets critical to mission
operations. The CDA-D/MIA methodology for identification, documentation, and
valuation of assets is discussed later.
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Value Level 4.
Value Level 4 reflects the value of an asset or asset construct that provides an
important contribution, but not critical support. Loss or degradation of the asset or
construct assigned this value will greatly impede the information process it supports, but
not singly cause process failure.
Value Levels 3 through 1.
The remaining value levels reflect a graduate reduction in the utility value of the
asset for mission operations through the supporting information processes. Value Level 3
reflects the value of an asset or asset construct that provides some utility contribution, but
would not result in significant impediment to mission supporting information processes if
the asset or construct was compromised. Value Level 1 indicates the asset presents very
little mission critical utility within the organization. This is not to say the asset is
valueless in other ways. However, if the asset was compromised in some way, there
would be little or no impact to the organization as a result of the asset’s compromise.
Due to the self-scoping CDA-D/MIA methodology, it is not expected that a great
number of the critical assets identified and ultimately valuated will be initially assessed a
value less than Value Level 3. However, this is just an expectation of the researcher.
The nature of the asset and its contextual value may produce wide deviation between the
Value Levels assigned to individual constructs. It should also be noted that this
expectation addresses pre-incident asset valuation only. A compromise may cause a high
level of temporary asset devaluation caused by degradation in the asset’s utility within
the organization through some compromise of confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
Such devaluation is damage, and will be discussed further below.
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Estimation of Damage through Value Loss.
The goal of the CDA-D/MIA methodology is to assess mission capability impact
through cyber damage assessment following a successful cyber attack. Value is assigned
to all constructs of the asset value model to determine pre-incident value and value loss
can occur from both internal and external factors. The scoped nature of damage, as
previously discussed, implies that damage determination need primarily deal with those
constructs which may be directly impacted by external factors introduced through an
incident; specifically those sub-constructs, confidentiality, integrity, and availability
which comprise the asset’s state value construct.
This research defines damage is some function loss of value within the contextual
value constructs caused by an incident. This loss of value is a direct reflection of the
asset’s utility caused by some external influence that affects the asset’s confidentiality,
integrity, availability, or any combination of these three. Generally, damage in
information asset is not permanent and is only becomes so if the asset is compromised in
such a way that it cannot regain its previous level of utility to the organization. Examples
of permanent damage are a compromise of confidentiality that prevents the information
from being used anymore; or a natural disaster where the information asset, its container,
and all backups are destroyed and the asset cannot be restored.
Damage in the Domains of Operations.
The tactical, operational, and strategic domains of operations are defined and
identified by their respective time constraints. Assessing damage across the various
domains of operations requires assessing different constructs of the asset’s state value to
determine loss in terms relevant to the constraint of the specific domain. This section
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will concisely discuss each and describe how critical asset damage occurs in the value
constructs.
Damage in the Tactical Domain.
Information assets that reside exclusively in the tactical domain of operations
generally have a relatively short life cycle. Often, the information assets used in the
tactical domain are not stored in a static container, but exist as an information stream.
Examples of tactical domain information assets include such important real time
information on which decision makers depend, such as UAV feeds and other targeting
feeds that provide the commander battlespace awareness in the here and now. These
real-time assets have become critical to AOC operations and loss or damage would
certainly affect the commander’s mission. However, it should be noted that not all assets
that exist in the tactical domain of operations reside exclusively in this domain. There
exists many information assets with extended lifecycles that still present commanders
with utility in tactical operations.
The difficulty in measuring damage to tactical assets is a product of the short
lifecycle of the information asset. This domain of operations require that damage and
mission impact assessment occur rapidly to provide the decision maker with assessment
information for timely use in the time constraints of tactical operations. When an
incident occurs, there may be insufficient time for an incident response team to work with
the incident owner to assess fully the damage in terms of a value loss model. This holds
especially true if the asset is an information stream, rather than a file accessed on a
server.
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These issues underscore the previously discussed importance in the difference
between potential and actionable value. When an incident occurs in the tactical domain,
the primary concern is the availability construct. In terms of actionable value and
damage, this availability can directly be translated to the organization’s ability to use the
asset—can he get the information he needs right here and right now? If the answer is no,
the actionable value is reduced and damage has occurred because of the incident.
Incidents affecting the confidentiality and integrity constructs are not forgotten, but will
generally not be assessable in the time constraints imposed by tactical operations. Since
the CDA-D/MIA methodology advocates the pre-incident valuation of critical assets, it
becomes possible to immediately know the potential mission impact resulting from the
incurred damage. By estimating the potential mission impact through strategic
determination of asset potential value, some degree of predictive damage and mission
impact can be accomplished in the tactical domain; even without explicit technical
support provided by an incident response agent.
This, however, is only a first step and meant to describe those CDA-D/MIA
methodology actions that may occur in the time constraints of the tactical domain. Most
incidents outlive the tactical time constraints and move into the operational domain.
Determination of defensive cyber damage in the operational domain is discussed in
greater depth in the following section.
Damage in the Operational Domain.
Damage and mission impact assessment in the operational domain is the area
most suited for employment of the CDA-D/MIA framework, and the domain in which the
greatest benefits are realized. In this domain, information asset life cycles span a time
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great enough for the incident response to coordinate with the information owner to
determine value loss. Since the asset’s potential value is determined in pre-incident
activities, the information owner can know immediately the potential damage and
potential associated mission impact caused by the incident. It is important to understand
that the information owner is responsible for assigning the degree of construct and asset
devaluation based on the technical assessment analysis provided by the incident
responder and the levels of criticality assigned in the initial asset valuation.
The constructs suitable for damage assessment in the operational domain are
illustrated below (see Figure 14 below). These constructs allow the information owner
to model the assessed damage affect on the usability of the information asset by reducing
the actionable value in the constructs that were affected by the incident. This reduction in
value reflects loss of asset utility in support of organizational goals, affecting the
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actionable value but not the potential value of the asset.

Figure 14. Asset Value Constructs Susceptible to Damage-induced Devaluation

Value Loss in the Strategic Domain.
Since damage is defined as value loss resulting from a successful cyber incident,
value loss resulting from damage is generally restricted to the tactical and operational
domains. Construct value loss can occur in the strategic domain however and must be
reflected within the asset’s value constructs to ensure effective and proper asset risk
management and accurate values which facilitate accurate damage assessment when a
cyber incident occurs. Construct value shift can occur as the result of changes within the
organization, or simply through the passage of time. Some examples of this are changes
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in the organization’s mission which affect the asset’s utility in supporting the new
mission objectives. Likewise changes in infrastructure technology may result in the
creation of a new information asset that makes the current asset obsolete. Both of these
examples directly affect the asset’s mission binding construct. Time is also a factor if the
information asset outlives it relevancy to the organization. Since the information is less
relevant, the asset’s utility to the organization is diminished and the value of the asset’s
age factor must be made to reflect this shift.
The value of the identified critical information assets must be re-assessed at
regular intervals to ensure that the previously assigned value is still meaningful and
useful in damage assessment. This maintenance is as critical to successful damage and
mission impact assessment as the initial asset identification and valuation.
Measuring Mission Impact as Mission Degradation.
The CDA-D/MIA methodology is founded on identification and valuation of
information assets for the ultimate purpose of mission capability impact assessment
following a cyber incident. The CDA-D/MIA methodology employs a top-down
methodology for identification of these critical assets which identifies the dependency
relationships between the critical information asset and the critical mission operational
process or processes it supports. This inherent asset-to-mission mapping which results
from this methodology is a central part of the CDA-D/MIA methodology. It is the
catalyst that allows critical asset damage to be mapped to mission capability impact.
Establishment of an Impact Scale.
Impact assessment, like damage assessment is a qualitative estimation. For any
mission impact metric to be useful, it must accomplish two critical tasks. First, it must
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translate damage to the cyber information assets on which the organization depends into
an accurate reflection of the impact to the organization’s mission. Secondly, it must
present this impact to the organization’s decision maker in terms that allows the design
making agent to make smart and correct decisions quickly and accurately.
This thesis has discussed loss as a qualitative estimation of reduction in actionable
value of the critical information asset. Remember that assessing this loss it to estimate
the degree to which the critical information asset’s utility has been reduced; and that
reduction in the critical asset’s utility implies a potential reduction in mission capability.
This reduction in mission utility is realized as mission impact in those processes that
depend on the effected asset. As this value decreases, the theoretical impact increases.
All things being equal, therefore, value and impact maintain an inversely proportional
relationship. The decision maker operating in the tactical or operational domain cares
little about these technical aspects of value reduction that about mission impact, however.
The decision making must be presented with impact assessment metrics that immediately
provide situational awareness regarding the impact to his/her organization’s mission
capability. To meet this need, this research proposes a scale similar to the Value Rating
scale proposed earlier in this paper (see Figure 15 below).

Figure 15. A Five Point Scale for Mission Impact Assessment and Reporting
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This proposed scale serves the purpose of providing a simple to understand
estimation of the qualitative mission impact assessment. The scale is designed to provide
a human decision-maker with a single-look situational awareness of the mission impact
assessment at the time of reporting. The impact scale is meant to be a part of a graphical
executive summary of the impact level. The Incident and Impact Report in which it is
presented will contain further detail about the technical details and potential or actual
mission impact specifics.
Ideal Implementation of the Impact Scale.
The impact scale will ideally be presented in a graphical user interface of an
automated reporting system. Refined damage models will ideally translate damage
assessment to mission impact will provide the commander with the incident and impact
report rapidly, producing faster battlespace awareness of friendly mission capability. To
be most effective the scale must be presented in a graphical format, with mission impact
Y-axis shown over time on X-axis. This would allow the organization decision maker to
visualize both potential and actual mission impact as more technical information about
the incident becomes available over time. The following figure presents a conceptual
graphical application of the value scale from initial potential mission impact assessment
through graduated refinement though interim assessments. (see Figure 16 below).
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Figure 16. Conceptual Graphical Application of Value Impact Scale
Conceptual Methodology for Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Assessment
This section presents a conceptual methodological framework for establishing and
implementing cyber damage and mission impact assessment. Cyber damage and mission
impact assessment is not a single task. Instead, it is a system of activities that rely upon
each subsequent activity to correctly implement its responsibilities correctly to facilitate
the ultimate goal of providing the operational decision maker with improved situational
awareness through accurate and efficient mission impact reporting. As this research has
shown in the state of Air Force and DoD damage and mission impact assessment
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activities, a failure in any of the subsystem activities results in a failure in mission impact
assessment capability.
Overview of the CDA-D/MIA Methodology.
The CDA-D/MIA framework is comprised of three main stages: pre-incident
activities, damage and mission impact assessment, and reporting. The foundation of
defensive cyber damage and mission impact assessment is pre-incident asset
identification, valuation, and documentation. For accurate defensive damage assessment
to occur, the organization must have developed a portfolio of profiles of its critical
information assets before the incident occurs. When the incident occurs, the asset owner
and the incident responder must work together in their respective roles to determine what
information assets were affected by the incident and what damage was incurred. The
incident responder is responsible for producing a technical assessment of the incident to
allow the information owner to understand which assets were affected by the incident.
The information owner may then use the asset profiles of the affected assets to determine
the damage. Assuming the asset was correctly documented, the owner may then quickly
determine the impact to mission capability. This impact assessment may then
consolidated and reported through existing reporting channels to provide fast notification
and reaction to the incident.
The CDA-D/MIA methodology is founded on the identification, valuation, and
damage assessment of critical information assets. Modern organizations and especially
military operations depend on vast amounts of digital data and information stores to
operate. Attempting to identify and document all information assets within an
organization would quickly prove an overwhelmingly vast and insurmountable objective.
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The loss of certain information assets would cause great harm to the organization’s
mission capability; the loss of others may hardly be noticed. Critical information assets
are those information assets which directly support the organization’s mission. Therefore
the CDA-D/MIA methodology’s seeks to identify, document and valuate those critical
assets owned by the organization to allow accurate and effective defensive cyber damage
and mission impact assessment when an incident occurs..
CDA-D/MIA Application Across Domains of Operations.
The military recognizes three primary domains in which operations occur:
tactical, operational, and strategic. The CDA-D/MIA methodology can provide the
decision maker situational awareness in each of these domains. However, as the time
constraints existing within each operational domain grow smaller, constraints are
introduced in the CDA-D/MIA methodology’s application. The CDA-D/MIA
methodology requires certain activities to occur in certain operational domains more
often, and restricts activities form occurring in others. The following figure provides a
conceptual illustration of how the CDA-D/MIA activities on an incident timeline
approximately map through the domains of operations (see Figure 17 below). This figure
is only a notional example, but provides a good example of how activities would align
with the CDA-D/MIA activities.
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Figure 17. Key Mission Impact Activities Across Domains of Operations

For example, risk assessment that facilitates critical asset identification and
valuation must occur prior to the incident to allow effective damage and mission impact
assessment. These pre-incident activities occur in the strategic domain. The tight time
constraints of the tactical domain often preclude all but the basic response activities since
the tactical commander cannot wait until incident investigation to understand how/her
mission has been impacted.
Pre-incident Activities in the Strategic Domain.
All assumptions of the CDA-D/MIA methodology are based on accurate
identification, documentation and valuation of the organization’s information assets

181

before an incident occurs. Therefore, the preparatory activities an organization takes
before an incident occurs are essential to the successful cyber damage and mission impact
assessment (see Figure 18 below). The pre-incident activities of CDA-D/MIA
methodology that allow the required front loading of the damage assessment framework
are accomplished in four essential phases. Each of these comprises a step in the top-tobottom identification of the critical assets that enable the organization to accomplish its
mission. A validated and asset-focused risk management framework such as OCTAVE
can effectively assist the information owner to identify and document information assets
that are valuable to the organization and focus risk analysis activities on the critical assets
identified (Alberts, Dorofee et Al. 2003, pp. 3-5). The asset identification methodology
advocated by this research is a top-down, operations-oriented, and asset-focused
approach. A high-level view of critical pre-incident steps are as follows:
•

Define the organizational mission

•

Identify, define, prioritize, and document the operational processes that support
the mission

•

Identify, define, enumerate, prioritize, and documents the information processes
that support operational processes

•

Identify, define, document, and valuate the information assets that the information
processes depend upon.

Figure 18. Asset Identification and Documentation Process
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Critical Information Asset Identification.
Before valuation of critical information assets within an organization can be
accomplished, they must be identified. To do so, employing an effective information
asset-focused risk assessment methodology is essential. The approach to risk
determination is very important, and this research proposes a departure from risk
assessment methodologies that focus on technological assets.
Risk exists where threat to an asset and a vulnerability in the asset intersect.
However, identification of the wrong asset negates the benefits of risk analysis. This
research proposes that risk to cyber information assets exists explicitly as risk to the
information assets that exist within the technological infrastructure and vulnerabilities are
shortcoming in the security controls designed to protect these information assets from
malicious or non-malicious incidents (see Figure 19 below).

Figure 19. Risk To the Asset Within the Container

There are several proven asset-focused risk assessment methodologies from
which to choose, including Carnegie Mellon University’s OCTAVE methodology. It is
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imperative however that the methodology selected facilitate a top-down, operations
oriented approach to identifying the critical information assets on which the organization
depends.
Critical information assets exist within every organization with information
dependencies. These assets are the at the core of modern military operations. The
dependencies upon information exist in dependency layers of organizational processes, as
show in the following figure (see Figure 20 below). Accomplishing the organizational
mission depends on individual and integrated mission operational processes. Many of
these operational processes depend upon information flows, or information processes.
These information processes rely upon one ore more information assets. A failure of a
critical information asset could generate an upward ripple effect that impairs one ore
more critical information flows, which cripples a mission process with the ultimate effect
of impairing the organization’s mission. By following this internal chain of dependencies
the information owner can identify the organization’s critical information assets by
drilling-down from the top, starting with identification of the organization’s mission, and
ending at the bottom with the information assets on which the organization depends.
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Figure 20. Information Assets as the Core of the Mission Operations

Establishing Relative Ownership
As the head of the military organization, the commander is the information owner.
The information owner bears the responsibility for identification of critical information
assets, which is an important but difficult task at the onset. For this reason, the
commander will necessarily delegate ownership to an a responsible organization member
to act on his/her behalf to execute asset ownership duties and responsibilities. However,
the commander must be diligent when delegating this responsibility. Accurately
establishing information ownership is essential to successful CDA-D/MIA efforts. The
delegate information owner must possess both a clear understanding of the organizational
mission and the appropriate operational perspective to identify the critical processes
within the organization that directly support the mission. When acting on behalf of the
commander, the delegate effectively becomes the information owner.
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Identification of Critical Mission Processes.
Accurate and comprehensive mission impact assessment through cyber damage
assessment depends explicitly on identification of those critical cyber information assets
without which the mission would be impaired or fail. Therefore, the CDA-D/MIA
methodology strongly advocates the identification of these critical assets by starting with
the mission they support. This is the reason why the information owner must possess the
appropriate level of operational perspective when beginning to identify the critical assets
in the organization.
First, the information owner must clearly define the organization’s mission, to
include the upstream missions it supports, and the downstream mission that support its
mission. This is important, as it aids in identifying other organizations whose mission
may be affected by a mission-impacting cyber incident. When the mission and any
important high-level mission dependencies are identified, the information owner must
next identify, rack and stack, and document the mission’s operational processes which
enable the organization’s mission to exist. The information owner must identify,
enumerate, and prioritize each process, defining how the each operational process
supports the organization’s mission.
It is important to understand that prioritization of operational processes is to
facilitate identification of the organization’s critical processes. Prioritization and
assigning criticality values to each identified operational process facilitates the selfscoping process to exclude those processes that are less important to the organization’s
mission operations. This basic establishment of criticality is the first step in identification
and valuation of the critical information assets that will be ultimately identified. The
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CDA-D/MIA five-point value scale should be used to rack and stack each process. A

Value Level 5 is assigned to those processes assessed as critical to mission support.
Each critical process must be documented to ensure record of its mission support,
mission criticality rating, and other important information is maintained. It is important
to ensure accurate documentation for further identification of supporting processes, and
ultimately facilitation of damage to mission operations impact mapping after an incident.
This documentation will be maintained in the associated information asset profile
discussed later.
Identification of Critical Information Processes.
The next phase is the identification and documentation of critical information
processes. In this phase, each operational process identified as critical to the
organization’s mission must be examined to identify the information processes that
support that operational process. As with mission processes, these information processes
must be enumerated and prioritized by criticality using the same five point value scale to
annotate the information process’ criticality to the critical operational process it supports.
Also like the previous phase, the critical information processes that support critical
operational processes must be documented in the same way as the previous phase.
Identification of Critical Information Assets.
The process thus far has been a self-scoping process to identify the organization’s
most valuable cyber information assets in terms of mission enablement. Beginning with
the mission, organization’s most critical operational process are identified; allowing the
most critical information processes supporting these critical processes to be identified.
The stage is now set to identify the information assets that directly support these critical
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information processes. Identification of the critical information assets within the
organization is the most important activity of the CDA-D/MIA methodology.
Once critical information processes have been identified, the information owner
must determine what digital information supports these processes. As in the previous
stages, the information must be identified, documented and assigned a value. Critical
information assets are the epicenter of the CDA-D/MIA methodology, so it is important
to understand how value is assigned. As previously discussed, the value of the
information asset is derived by its utility for the organization to meet its mission goals.
Since the identification methodology has led the information owner to the information
assets supporting the organization’s most important information processes, which in turn
support its most critical mission operational processes, the assets identified are all very
important to the organization’s mission capability. However, not every asset is equally
critical since damage to one asset may result in a lesser degree of degradation to the
information process that it supports.
Identification of Critical Asset Containers.
It is important that the infrastructure asset on which the information resides be
clearly identified and documented. Identification of the information asset container is
essential for generating mission to supporting system mapping. In relatively stove-piped
systems, this support may be self evident, but in many mission processes that depend
upon information assets shared over a network, the physical location of the information
asset may not be as readily known. Knowing which system contains the asset is
especially important during incident response. Incident responders, by necessity, will
perform response activities to assess damage to the technological infrastructure resulting
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from a cyber incident. Container documentation in the information asset profile will
facilitate a more rapid understanding of potential mission impact by bridging the gap
between the system and the information asset, which will lead to more efficient
assessment of mission capability impact.
Critical Process Documentation.
All aspects of an organization’s information assets must be well documented to be
an effective tool for damage assessment. This includes documentation of the critical
mission operational and information processes that the organization relies upon.
Documentation of these processes is critical to the success of damage and impact
assessment since such documentation provides mapping from the asset to the mission.
Documenting Critical Mission Processes.
Accurate and effective mission process documentation must be accomplished
first. The information owner should use the proposed worksheet (see Figure 25,
Appendix B) to ensure all important information is captured. By this time the
information owner will hold an understanding of the processes critical to the
organization’s mission. Specifically, the mission process should be provided a unique
mission process identifier (MPID) prevent any confusion between mission processes. It
is also important that the agent responsible for the mission process is documents, to
include contact information. This agent may prove valuable in the identification and
valuation process, as well as damage and mission impact assessment following an
incident. Any known impact to the mission must be documented, as this is an important
factor in understanding the process’ criticality to the mission. This worksheet must be
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maintained to assist in the drill-down process to identify the organization’s critical
information assets.
Documenting the Critical Information Processes.
Documentation of the critical information processes is similar to the documentation
of mission processes. The goal is to identify the information processes providing critical
support to the organization’s mission processes and to discover and document the
information assets on which the organization’s mission ultimately depends. The
information owner should utilize the proposed worksheet (see Figure 26, Appendix B) to
identify the important information about the critical information processes. It is
important that the information process be enumerated and given an information process
identifier (IPID) to uniquely identify and distinguish the information process. As with
the mission process, establishing processes ownership is very important. The attached
worksheet should be used to assist in documenting information processes within the
organization.
Critical Information Asset Profile Documentation.
Documentation of the critical information assets is the foundation of damage and
mission impact assessment. It is important that the information owner capture the
appropriate information about both the information asset and the system on which the
asset resides. As with process documentation, a set of worksheets is proposed to aid the
information owner in this task. Asset and container documentation form the core of the
Critical Information Asset Profile (CIAP). The CIAP contains all documentation used in
identifying and valuating the asset; to include documentation of the processes that it
supports.
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Documenting the Critical Information Assets.
All key aspects of the critical information asset must be documented. At
minimum, the following information is essential to documenting information in a manner
which facilitates the capability to perform damage and mission impact assessment
following an incident:
•

Information owner and custodian, with contact information

•

Information producer and consumers, if known

•

Supported mission critical process(es)

•

Criticality rating (value)

•

A description of how the information asset is used

•

The asset’s container

•

Additional important information
The proposed worksheets (see Figures 27 and 28, Appendix B) should be used to

assist the information owner in this task of collecting the basic, but essential information
about the asset. It is during the identification and documentation phase that the
information owner must determine and document the value of the asset to the
organization. The worksheet also assists the information owner in determining the value
for the asset through criticality rating values assigned to its value constructs.
Documenting the Critical Asset Containers.
Thorough documentation of the critical asset containers is also extremely
important. The container is the system on which the asset is physically located.
Incidents that impact the container will likely impact the information asset. Documenting
the relationship between the container and the information asset is important to the
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information owner attempting to determine mission impact from the technical assessment
information provided by the incident response agent. It is important that the information
owner document such important information as the ID and location of the container, the
contact information about the custodian responsible for the maintenance of the container,
important technical details about the container, and any other information that may help
map technical information to the information asset. The proposed worksheets (see
Figures 29 and 30, Appendix B) will help the information owner document the important
information about the container.
Information Asset Valuation.
Valuation of the asset is a qualitative estimation of the utility of the asset within
the organization. The assumption is at the stage that the assets identified are critical to
the organization. Not all recognized value constructs may have the same criticality to the
mission, so the criticality of each must be considered independently. Unless there is
information to indicate otherwise, it is assumed that no external factors are present to
influence the value of any constructs at the time of valuation. The value assigned to each
construct must reflect the criticality of that construct in its relative support for the
mission. The proposed worksheet will assist the information owner in appropriately
assigning value to each value construct.
Mission Binding Valuation.
The mission binding construct reflects the criticality of the asset to the
organization’s mission. Assets critical to critical information processes, which support
critical mission processes will inherently be critical. This construct is relatively constant
in the operational and tactical domains of operations.
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Age Valuation.
The age value of an asset is a reflection how quickly it loses relevance in the
organization. Most assets do not age beyond operational relevance excessively fast,
however there are some such as weather reports that do. Age is not considered in
operational and tactical damage assessment, because it is a temporal function generally
unaffected by a cyber incident. But if the asset’s age decay could cause impact to the
mission, the information owner should value this construct at a rating that reflects this
criticality. Those assets that do age rapidly should be annotated as requiring a periodic
refreshment, with the defined refresh period also annotated. For example, a weather
report may be provided hourly, with each successive report superseding the previous.
The information owner must annotate this on the construct value worksheet that the asset
is refreshed every hour.
Confidentiality Valuation.
If a compromise of this asset’s confidentiality would have an impact on the
mission, the information owner must value this construct accordingly. Also, it is
important for the information owner to annotate on the worksheet how the mission would
be impacted to the best of his/her understanding.
Integrity Valuation.
If a change in the data may cause impact to the mission the asset supports, the
information owner must value the construct accordingly. The information owner must
not consider the potential for back up and recovery when valuating the asset, but must
assign the value as to the impact to the mission before any remediation or recovery
actions can be undertaken.
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Availability Valuation.
The information owner must assign a value to the importance of the availability of
this asset to the mission. The owner must annotate the mission impact to the best of
his/her understanding should the asset be lost. In many cases, short term loss of an
information asset may not have great mission impact; with these affects being realized
over time. At the time of valuation the information owner must valuate the asset with not
assumptions of restoration. This will aid in determining the potential impact when an
incident occurs.
Asset Profile Maintenance.
There are several concerns about the maintenance of information asset profiles.
Once completed, these CIAPs will contain a large amount of information about the
critical assets for the organization. All of an organization’s CIAPs will be compiled into
the organization’s Critical Cyber Asset Portfolio (C-CAP). The C-CAP is simply the
collection of all critical processes and cyber assets on which the organization depends.
This introduces a new avenue of risk to the organization, as unauthorized access to the
organization’s C-CAP would provide a malicious actor a roadmap for targeting and
attacking the critical assets that could cripple the organization’s mission. For this reason,
the organization’s C-CAP must be maintained in some location safe from unauthorized
access, but where the information owner has ready and immediate to the C-CAP access in
the event of a successful cyber incident, to include catastrophic network failure.
Security issues aside, the issue of the sensitivity of the information about
contained in the C-CAP the organization gives rise to a second issue that is equally
important to the effectiveness of mission capability the CDA-D/MIA. This issue is
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whether the C-CAP is maintained locally, or by a centralized agency, such as the AFNOC
NCD with its responsibility for maintaining continual network operations and security.
Local C-CAP Maintenance.
When a cyber incident occurs, the information owner needs access to the
information within the C-CAP immediately. In many cases, this may allow the decision
maker to know the immediate potential mission capability impact, assuming that the
critical information asset profiles are current and accurate estimations of the asset’s state
and value. Local storage would ensure expedited access to this valuable tool, allowing
the commander to have almost immediate situational awareness of the threat to the
mission. The downside is that by keeping the information local, notification of the
damage an asset on which other agencies depend may be delayed. Having an agency
with enterprise NETOPS authority and responsibility maintain all C-CAPs for the
organizations in the enterprise may allow more rapid downstream incident damage and
mission impact assessment.
Centralized C-CAP Maintenance.
While centralized management and maintenance of C-CAPs for all organizations
in the enterprise may expedite damage and mission capability impact assessment, it reintroduces the problem of risk. As previously mentioned, the C-CAP could potentially
provide a malicious actor a goldmine of information about where to attack the network to
optimize mission impacting effects. If all the C-CAPs of all organizations within the
enterprise are located in centralized storage and the security controls are defeated, the
malicious actor would have not just a target map for one organization, but for the entire
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enterprise. Aside from security risks, there may be political complications associated
with releasing sensitive information of the organization to another.
For these reasons, the research proposes localized maintenance of an
organization’s critical information asset portfolios.
Automation of Profile Maintenance.
Whether stored locally or centrally, the organization’s C-CAP must be automated.
The proposed worksheets allow the information owner to collect the information needed
to load a relational database for more rapid access to the organization’s C-CAP for faster
determination of mission impact. A notional ERD based on the data collected from the
worksheets (see Figure 21 below) demonstrates how such a database would automatically
link critical dependencies within the organization. This ERD is intentionally very high
level and elementary, but it is easy to see how automation can allow a better
understanding of information asset dependencies within the organization. Ideally, such
database deployed across the enterprise, would lay the foundation for nearly
instantaneous mission impact assessment, both predictive and actual.

Figure 21. Notional Entity Relationship Diagram for C-CAP Automation
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Incident Damage and Mission Impact Assessment Activities.
In the CDA-D/MIA framework, there is no noticeable change to the function and
activities of incident response, as currently implemented in the Air Force. IR function
will remain focused on the traditional activities of response, remediation, and forensic
investigation. However, rather than being tasked with determining the impact of an
information incident to an organization’s mission, the IR function will work closely with
the information owner, providing the technical details to allow the information owner to
perform damage assessment at the site of the incident. The constructs of an asset-focused
pre-incident valuation will allow the IRT and information owner to determine asset
devaluation resulting from not only asset availability but also confidentiality and/or
integrity compromise—an aspect not attainable under the current, infrastructure-focused
assessment implementation.
This section will discuss the roles and responsibilities of those agencies involved
with incident response, damage and mission impact assessment, and initial reporting and
the conceptual implementation of these tasks.
Responsibilities for Damage and Mission Impact Assessment.
There are two aspects to performing defensive damage assessment: technical
assessment and asset damage assessment. Technical damage assessment is the evaluation
of damage to the organization’s cyber infrastructure. It reveals such important evidence
as how the attack occurred and what, how long, and by whom information assets were
accessed, attack vectors in malicious cases, or the number of passwords compromised.
Technical assessment must be accomplished to enable accurate asset damage assessment,
but cannot tell the information owner the degree of value loss in the affected asset. The
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technical assessment allows the information owner to determine this through asset
damage assessment, which allows damage to be mapped to mission impact. This section
will discuss the responsibilities for each of these important activities.
Technical Damage Assessment.
The technical damage assessment is critical to establishing what information
assets were affected during a cyber incident. The technical assessment is a direct carry
over of the damage assessment practices currently implemented on Air Force networks.
It was previously stated that these assessments do not produce results usable for
operational or tactical decision making. This statement is true, because technical
assessment evaluates the very important aspect of impact to the infrastructure; but it
cannot evaluate the impact to the information asset. Therefore, technical assessment is
only the critical first piece of damage and mission impact assessment.
AFNOC NSD’s Incident Response Team (IRT) is responsible for technical
assessment of incidents on Air Force networks. The Air Force’s IRT is a group of highly
trained experts in cyber incident response activities. The IRT works through the AFNOC
NSD with AFNOC NCD to coordinate and control all incident response activities on Air
Force networks. The IRT is tasked to be the technical lead on these activities and is
responsible for the post-incident response, handling and technical damage assessment of
cyber incidents. As the technical lead, the IRT is also responsible for coordinating
centralized incident reporting throughout incident life cycle.
Because the CDA-D/MIA methodology operates across all operational domains,
there are some cases in which the time constraints of the tactical domain may preclude
traditional IRT technical assessment. In such situations, the mission cannot allow the
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affected system to impair the mission long enough for traditional IRT response and
technical assessment. In this case, another agent must act as an incident response(IR)
agent to perform stop-gap technical assessment to provide the information owner
information about the systems affected by the event or incident, and conduct immediate
response and remediation efforts to ensure mission continuity. For example, in some
tactical situations, time constraints may require that the extent of technical assessment be
the server room technician providing the information owner limited details on which
servers have failed. For this reason, the agent responsible for providing technical damage
assessment is called the IR agent.
Under the CDA-D/MIA methodology, the IR agent would continue to perform its
assessment and provide the result to the information owner at the site of the incident. As
mentioned, the IR agent is already performing excellent technical assessment following
cyber incidents. The IR agent also currently works directly with the local information
owner in an attempt to better determine impact. Therefore, the implementation of a
CDA-D/MIA methodology for damage assessment would add no new tasks to the IR
agent’s current responsibilities. Rather the CDA-D/MIA delineates the roles of both the
IR agent and the information owner in determining damage following a cyber security
incident.
Asset Damage Assessment.
The information owner bears the responsibility for both asset valuation and asset
damage assessment. The information owner is the only entity with the perspective to
determine the value of an information asset to the organization. The information owner
will work with the IR agent to understand the technical assessment and how best to apply
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the technical assessment to determine the extent of damage to the information assets.
The information owner will assign a damage assessment based on the reduction in the
assets utility resulting from the incident. This damage assessment will be used to
perform the mission impact assessment that will be reported.
Mission Impact Assessment.
The mission impact assessment is the most important aspect of the CDA-D/MIA
methodology. This assessment must be accomplished by an agency with appropriate
perspective of how the damage will affect mission capability. Only the information
owner can make such a determination. The information owner is responsible for using
documented mission criticality and asset attribute information in the C-CAP to determine
what missions may be affected by the damage incurred in the information asset.
Mission impact assessment will initially be predictive, based on the potential
mission impact expected during the initial information valuation in the pre-incident risk
assessment activity. However, as the IR agent continues to work with the information
owner, providing more refined interim technical assessment, the actual mission impact
may be realized as less than initial expected. The information owner is responsible for
reporting this refined mission impact assessment in each interim incident report.
Although the information owner is responsible for mission impact assessment, it must
work closely with the IR agent to ensure updated and accurate interim reporting.
Responsibilities for Assessment Reporting.
Incident and impact reporting (IIR) is as important as the assessment itself.
Current reporting contains only technical assessment information. The IIR mechanism
extends existing reporting content to contain the necessary impact assessment provided
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by the information owner. The report must convey the nature and impact of the cyber
incident as quickly as possible to the decision maker in a way that may be easily
assimilated into the decision making process. Both the IRT and the information are
responsible for working together to compile and release an accurate report in a timely
manner. There are three basic reports to be presented to the decision maker: initial
report, interim report, and final report. The initial report is the initial notification of the
incident. This report must declare the nature and classification of the incident and known
technical information to facilitate rapid response action. However, under the CDAD/MIA methodology, the initial report will also contain potential mission impact to
advise the decision makers and NETOPS community of potential mission impact, thus
provide an additional degree of battlespace awareness that currently does not exist. It is
the responsibility of IR agent and the information owner to compile this information
quickly. The potential mission impact is based on the assumption that the information
assets’ value and mission relationships were correctly assessed and documented in the CCAP. The initial report will be followed by any number of interim IIRs which provide
updated information on the status of the incident investigation, remediation and recovery
efforts, and refined mission impact. Again, the information owner must work closely
with the IR agent to develop the most accurate mission impact assessment. The final IIR
provides the decision maker with notification of incident closure.
Conceptual Damage and Mission Impact Assessment Implementation.
This section describes in further detail how damage and mission impact are
conceptually conducted in the CDA-D/MIA methodology. It is important to remember
that the CDA-D/MIA methodology is intended to assess damage and mission impact in
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the organization where the incident occurred and provide rapid reporting of the
assessment results to both the local decision maker, NETOPS command and control
structure, and the appropriate interested report consumers.
Incident Declaration and Predictive Mission Impact Assessment.
Damage assessment is an inherently post-incident activity. Under the current
damage assessment methodology the commander is can gain neither a timely nor accurate
understanding of the potential mission impact resulting from an actual or suspected cyber
incident. The CDA-D/MIA methodology, as applied in the tactical domain of operations
(see Figure 22 below), offers the decision maker predictive mission impact assessment in
that time period between detection of a suspicious network event by the network defender
(Te) and the declaration of cyber incident by the incident response agency. The
information owner cannot act upon a suspicious event until notified. Once the
information owner is notified of suspicious activity on a system or systems identified to
contain information assets (T0), the decision maker is provided awareness of the potential
impact to the mission. While investigation into the event is concurrently conducted, the
information owner makes a predictive mission impact assessment based on the predictive
valuation of the information assets potentially impacted by the suspicious event. The
network defenders will only be able to provide technical information to identify what
systems may be involved in the suspicious activity. Assuming the asset container was
correctly assigned to the information asset and documented in CIAP and stored in the CCAP, mapping the system to the critical asset is elementary. The information owner can
determine if the system is a critical container, determine which critical assets are
threatened, and determine a potential mission impact. At this point, mission impact is

202

predictive and will be equal to the maximum impact assigned during pre-incident
valuation (T1). The decision maker will now be able to make decisions based on this
potential mission impact (T2), allowing greater situational awareness in decision making
in this interim period until more granular damage and mission impact assessment may be
conducted. This tentative mission impact assessment is kept locally until such time the
event investigation reveals incident threshold is meet and an incident declared by the IR
agent activity. At this time, the predictive mission impact assessment is included in the
initial Incident and Impact Report (IIR) provided to the Netops community through the
existing consolidated reporting structure (T3).
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Figure 22. Mission Impact Assessment in the Tactical and Operational Domains

Incident Response and Damage Assessment.
Incident response officially begins with the declaration of an incident. Incident
response, therefore, is inherently post-incident. Incident response, particularly the
technical assessment, must occur for actual damage and mission impact to be assessed.
This does not imply that IR agent personnel have no role in event investigation. In fact,
the IR agent must be involved to ensure the event meets the threshold of escalation to
incident declaration. However, IR agent activities cannot begin until post-incident;
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specifically including technical damage assessment. This is especially true in incidents
caused by non-malicious events.
With incident declaration, the IR agent will coordinate with the information
owner to help establish initial damage and mission impact resulting from the incident (see
Figure 23 below). The technical impact assessment will be provided to the information
owner by the IR agent. The information owner uses the technical assessment to
understand which information asset containers may be affected by the incident in the
initial technical assessment, and the degree of exposure that may have occurred based on
interim technical assessments. Based on these technical assessments the information
owner can begin to estimate damage by comparing the amount of critical information
asset exposure to the threat. The information owner and the IR agent work together to
determine if the threat has been actualized and resulted in any damage to the asset.
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Figure 23. Notional CDA-D/MIA/MIA Incident and Impact Reporting
As previously discussed, damage to the asset is reflected in terms of reduction in
utility; therefore if any reduction in the asset’s usability to the organization results from
the incident, the assets value is potentially reduced and reflected as damage to the asset.
The amount of damage is based on the original valuation performed in the strategic preincident phase and recorded in the CIAP, stored in the organization’s C-CAP. Any
damage reflects a reduction of the actionable value of the information asset. The
potential value as documented in the asset’s CIAP, however, remains constant for the
duration of the incident.
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Value is reflected and shifted using the established five-point value scale. The
information owner must consider the individual constructs of the value model when
determining damage. If the technical assessment indicates a compromise of
confidentiality, the information owner must consider what extent this construct was
damaged and adjust the construct value accordingly to accurately reflect the resulting
immediate utility of the asset. Damage can only be accurately assessed by the
information owner by working with the IR agent to determine the type and extent of
exposure the asset experienced. In this sense, damage may be as contextual as
information valuation.
As more technical information about the incident becomes available to the
information owner through interaction with the IR agent, this damage assessment can be
reflect less damage than initially thought. Before any critical information asset damage
assessment becomes truly useful, however, it must be mapped to mission impact.
Mission Impact Assessment.
Damage assessment cannot provide the organization’s decision maker actionable
information on which to make mission decisions following a cyber incident. Therefore,
the information owner must be able to understand how the incident impacts the
organization’s ability to accomplish mission objectives following an incident.
Determining asset damage must be accomplished to allow the information owner to
determine the impact to the mission.
Mission impact assessment is a function of the damage assessment process.
Therefore mission impact assessment may be revised over time and as more information
about the incident becomes available (see Figure 24 below). The goal of mission impact
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assessment is to provide the organizational decision maker with situational awareness
about actual mission impact resulting form a cyber incident. However, actual mission
impact may not be fully determined until the full extent of technical damage is known.

Figure 24. Graduated Refinement of Mission Impact Reporting Over Time

Mission impact assessment cannot begin until after the information owner is
notified of either suspicious activity on the network, or that an incident has occurred (T0).
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After notification, the information owner can immediately perform an initial mission
impact assessment (T1). Because only basic information is known about the event or
incident, the information owner must assume the actual impact to be equal to the
potential impact established during strategic pre-incident asset documentation. However,
as time progresses and more technical information is made available through
coordination with the IR AGENT, the mission impact may be revised and show that
actual impact is less than originally estimated. This revised actual mission impact
assessment is provided included in interim IIR updates (TIIR1…IIR_n) which continue
indefinitely until the incident is closed and the final IIR report of closure (TRC) is
submitted. Mission impact is assigned by the information owner using the five-point
impact scale previously established in this paper.
Incident and Impact Reporting.
The IIR is the vehicle in which situational awareness relating to cyber information
is provided to the organizational decision maker. The IIR presents both technical
information pertaining to the incident and the resulting mission impact. IIR reporting
also serves the purpose of advising other organizations of potential second order effects
resulting from the mission impact. The IIR is the product of the technical assessment
details provided by the incident response agent and the most current mission impact
assessment provided by the information owner. In nearly all cases, the IIR will be
compiled and entered into a consolidated reporting database by the response agent tasked
by the NETOPS command and control agency. On Air Force networks, this means that
the AFNOC NSD IRT would work directly with the information owner on all IIRs to
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ensure the IIR submitted timely and appropriately. The three forms of IIRs are discussed
further here.
Initial IIR.
The initial IIR must be submitted in a very timely manner after incident
declaration. Air Force NETOPS guidance requires initial incident report submission
within one hour after incident declaration. The initial IIR serves to notify the all
interested parties in the NETOPS community of an incident on the organization’s
networks. As previously mentioned, it serves to provide situational awareness to the
local organizational decision maker about potential mission impact. However, this
situational awareness through impact reporting also alerts the NETOPS command and
control and higher command authority of a mission impact incident on the organization’s
networks. This provides agencies in all directions situational awareness of potential
second order effects from potential mission impact at the site of the incident.
Additionally, agencies that may have dependencies on the information assets damaged by
the cyber incident may elect to perform local defensive cyber damage assessment to
determine any immediate impact resulting from the incident that occurred outside of their
organization.
As previously stated, the initial IIR contains only limited technical assessment and
potential mission impact, based on the potential mission impacted documented in the preincident risk assessment activities. The initial IIR provides situational awareness and
allows the local organization and agencies throughout the enterprise to posture for
potential second order effects that may have been produced by the cyber incident.
Interim IIRs.
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In most cases remediation and recovery will begin as early as possible, thus
allowing less down time and increased mission continuity. Investigation by the IR
function during the incident response stage will facilitate determination of the
compromise cause and size.
The interim IIRs are essentially updates that provide more detailed information relating to
the cyber incident. The interim IIR is released by the NETOPS ordained IR agent, which
on Air Force networks is the AFNOSC NSD. In the first interim IIR the designated IR
agent has accomplished some degree of technical investigation and incident response that
facilitates more refined damage and mission impact assessment by the information
owner. Each subsequent IIR may be an additional refinement, and provide the
organization decision maker and all parties of interest a more accurate picture of the
actual damage and mission impact that resulted from the cyber incident. Interim IIRs
will be issued at set intervals as need or NETOPS authority dictates until the incident is
closed.
Final IIRs.
The final IIR is released at the closure of the incident investigation. It signifies
that all technical actions, such as investigation, remediation, and recovery, have been
completed. It is highly unlikely that new information will become available at this time
that is relevant to the information owner’s responsibility to determine additional mission
impact. The final IIR will contain a full summary of events and technical assessment
developed by the IR agent and a final description of the actual mission impact.
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Post-incident activities.
The post-incident activities of the CDA-D/MIA framework are important
contributors to the continuity of effective CDA-D/MIA operations and cyber security
efforts as a whole. The research emphasizes two critical activities that must be achieved
following the remediation, recovery, and closure of a cyber incident.
Strategic Accountability Reporting.
Accountability and lesson learned from the incident can have influence on future
IT and security planning and investment. Failure to assess the long term impact can
hamper efforts to determine such important economic impact factors as, customer
confidence, which potentially affects long-term income. From a military perspective,
strategic reporting will focus on accountability not only to prevent future occurrences of
an information incident, but also assess potential budget impact. The strategic domain of
operations is the one place where understanding the cost loss of a cyber incident may be
useful to a decision maker.
When a mishap occurs on the flight line, an after actions report is submitted to
report the results of how and why the mishap occurred and includes the cost of the
mishap in economic terms. The information from these reports are collected and tracked
for trends analysis, but are used most importantly for accountability and prevention. For
this reason, this research recognizes the need for enterprise post-incident accountability
reporting following an incident. Such reporting can reveal trends that may lead to
improved security practices and reduction in risk to information assets. Additionally, it
can help the Air Force understand the enormous cost of repeated incidents in a time when
budgetary constraints force more frugal investment. Most importantly, post-incident
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accountability reporting will hold those accountable who disregard security controls or
otherwise introduce unnecessary and actualized risk against the critical information assets
on which mission operations depend. Strategic post-incident accountability reporting
would offer the Air Force enterprise several advantages in understanding and preventing
cyber incidents that it currently does not enjoy.
Periodic Asset Valuation.
Events may occur that result in an asset identified as critical to experience
reduction in its utility by the organization to such an extent that it may no longer be as
important to the organization. Events such as shifts in the organization’s mission,
lifecycle issues that have caused a the asset to outlive its usefulness, an incident that has
irreparably damaged an asset’s confidentially value, or bringing a new system online that
contains information assets and data stores that replace the existing can all result in
permanent devaluation of the information asset. For any of these reasons, it is critical
that the organization establish a periodic and scheduled re-visitation of the risk
assessment activity. This is not only a good security and risk management practice, but it
ensures that all critical assets continue to be identified within the organization and the
value documentation in the asset’s CIAP is maintained accurately.

Limitations.
All research maintains some limitations despite the best efforts of the researcher.
This research effort is no exception. One such limitation was bias. The investigator was
motivated to this research by experiences gained while professionally employed in
network defense incident response operations. Despite great and sincere efforts to remain
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objective, there is a high probability that some degree of investigator bias was introduced
by the researcher’s experience. Additionally, sample bias imposed limitations on this
research effort. The targeted population was limited to 18-20 possible interviewees to
ensure the integrity of response data. Most research efforts would prefer a larger sample.
This issue was compounded by non-response bias. Since the sample was self-selected
through voluntary participation, only 9 personnel elected to participate. This represented
only half of the targeted population, and potentially resulted in failure to collect important
relevant responds data.
Another limitation of this research was the scope. The problem of damage and
mission impact assessment is complex, and consists of many activities with strong
interdependencies. Failure to accurately and effectively accomplish one of these
activities creates a ripple effect that taints the quality of the systems of activities that
comprise cyber damage and mission impact assessment. No study exists that looks at the
entire process. Therefore this scope of this research project is large by necessity. This
fact limits the ability to examine the components in great detail, as deserving of such an
important area of research.
Recommendations.
This research has made of number of recommendations for improvement to the
current damage and mission impact assessment methodology by proposing a new
methodology to do this. The prevailing theme throughout the research was the need to
relax the exclusive focus on technology to allow a more comprehensive understanding of
cyber protection and mission impact assessment. The Air Force, and indeed, the DoD
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must understand the purposes of network defense is not to protect the network for the
network’s sake. Rather, its purpose is to protect the information assets on the network. It
is the information on the network that allows the bombs to drop on target and allows to
commander to make the right decisions in the battlespace.
As the Air Force moves towards standing up a new Cyber Command, it is
imperative that information takes center stage in cyber operations. Many sections of
private sector industry have been moving in this direction of several years. The Air Force
would be wise to understand industry “best practices” will work in the unique
environment of military operations. Failure to do so may cause continuation of
limitations that currently plague Air Force network operations, and especially defensive
cyber damage and mission impact assessment efforts.
Areas for Future Research.
The scope of this research was very high level by necessity. The goal of the
research was understand the current state of damage and mission impact assessment in
order to propose a methodology offering improvements over the current implementation.
It was necessary to abstract many functions, which leaves considerable room for
additional research.
Operational Validation.
The proposed methodology is conceptual. To ensure that an operationalized
methodology is attainable, the concepts of this proposed CDA-D/MIA methodology most
be validated. Ideally, performing the proposed risk assessment activities to identify the
assets in a mock operational arena, such as a test Combined Air Operations Center at
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Nellis Air Force Base (CAOC-N) would be an ideal scenario to test the proposed
methodology and concepts. Both shortcomings and successes of the conceptual
methodology would quickly be revealed in all aspects of the methodology, but especially
in the damage assessment and mission impact reporting areas.
The recommended approach would be to “artificially” identify a small quantity of
assets. By artificial identification, it is meant that the CAOC system, associated
information assets on the system, and mission relationships are known quantities and not
discovered through risk assessment. Test scenarios may be run against the systems to
accurately evaluate the methodology’s effectiveness at assessing damage and mission
impact; and the quality and accuracy of mission impact reporting.
Automation of Assessment and Reporting.
The conceptual methodology is extremely human labor-intensive. Certainly, an
effective methodology can not completely separate itself from human involvement,
especially in the areas of risk assessment and asset identification, but there are some
aspects that are suitable for automation. Further research into the development of
damage and mission impact automation and reporting is recommended. The pre-incident
loading activities of asset identification, value determination, and attribute documentation
are highly subjective and will very greatly from organization to organization. These
activities must necessarily maintain a high human involvement. However, once these
values are loaded, the possibilities for automated damage detection and assessment, and
subsequent mission impact assessment and reporting, are great. Recommended research
in this area is database development that would facilitate asset attribute loading to enable
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dynamic asset dependency mappings from system to asset, but also easier mapping of
trans-asset dependencies.
Asset Value Models.
This research has proposed a new approach to establishing value handles to the
intangible value qualities of information assets. This approach seeks to assess asset value
as a function of the relationship the asset holds to the mission, and is based on the
constructs established in the proposed conceptual construct model. The value rating scale
is intentionally simplistic for the purposes of illustrating how the relative value the asset
maintains can be estimated and reflected with minimal complexity of use. However,
further research in developing more mature value models is recommended.
Future models should hold true to the concept of value as a reflection of utility,
and value assignment as an estimation of the approximate “strength” of this relationship.
Development of such a value model may have a profound impact on the assessment of
information value in areas beyond military networks.
Asset-Focused Risk Assessment and Asset Identification.
This research found that accurate identification, valuation, and documentation is
the foundation for any subsequent damage and mission impact assessment activities.
This critical activity is not being accomplished effectively for Air Force cyber
information. Further research in improved methodology for information asset
identification would be beneficial to only damage and mission impact methodology, but
to all aspects of Air Force cyber security. There are many avenues from which to begin
such research, but it is important that the research focus on development on a risk
identification and assessment methodology that focuses on information as an asset.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter proposed conceptual methodology for defensive cyber damage and
mission impact assessment. The chapter opened with a discussion of foundational
concepts critical to the establishment of such a proposed model. This proposal was the
result of the extensive literature review of publications, thorough examination of related
research of damage assessment on Air Force networks, and interviews with personnel
professional involved with the current damage and mission impact assessment efforts.
The purpose of this research is to establish a comprehensive understanding of the state of
mission impact assessment on Air Force network in order to propose an improved
methodology.
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Appendix A
Case Study Interview Questions

SECTION 1: INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION
1. Interviewee #:
2. Are you currently or have you been professionally involved with Network Warfare
Operations (NWO) or Network Defense (NetD) activities on Air Force networks?
NWO is defined by AFDD 2-5.

SECTION 2: INCIDENT DAMAGE /MISSION IMPACT ASSESSMENT
1. In your experience, does current incident damage assessment methodology on Air
Force networks comply with the requirement of CJCSM 6510.01 Ch 3 Annex A to
Appendix B to Enclosure B prescribing operational impact assessment of a DoD
organization affected by a computer security incident?

2. In your experience, how well are responsible Net-D activities (incident response,
forensics activities, etc.) able to estimate the impact to an organization’s mission
capability resulting from and incident on Air Force networks?

3. Based on your response to question #3, what factors, if any, contribute to the level of
effectiveness estimating the impact to an organization’s mission capability resulting
from and incident on Air Force networks?
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Appendix B
Information Asset Profile Worksheets

Figure 25. CIAP Worksheet: Mission Process Worksheet
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Figure 26. CIAP Worksheet: Information Process Worksheet
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Figure 27. CIAP Worksheet: Asset Profile Worksheet – Page 1
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Figure 28. CIAP Worksheet: Asset Profile Worksheet – Page 2
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Figure 29. CIAP Worksheet: Container Profile Worksheet - Page 1
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Figure 30. CIAP Worksheet: Container Profile Worksheet - Page 2
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